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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the de facto Kurdish capital of Diyarbakır, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in late 
March to celebrate the traditional Kurdish spring. This year’s celebration, however, was 
different than previous ones, as Kurdish guerilla leader Abdullah Öcalan’s call was read to the 
mass: it was a historic call to end the armed struggle, which lasted for three decades and cost 
the lives of some 40,000 people. Signaling the peak of negotiations between the Turkish 
government and the Kurdish movement for a peace deal, the call takes place against the 
background of a decade of transition. This decade, as well as the ongoing process of peace 
building, has highlighted the roles interest associations may play in political life. The 
dissertation investigates the rise of Kurdish interest associations from Diyarbakır as politically 
salient actors vis-à-vis the contestation of the state in this transitional decade. 
The transitional process started when the armed conflict between the Turkish army and the 
Kurdish guerilla organization PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kürdistan – Kurdistan Workers Party) 
came to a halt in 1999, albeit to re-start in 2004 at a lower density. Again in 1999, Turkey was 
officially recognized as a candidate country by the European Union, who has begun pressing 
Turkish governments to carry out reforms for the resolution of the Kurdish issue as well as 
democratization of the political system. This process has opened up a space for interest 
associations in Diyarbakır. They were increasingly addressed by international delegates as 
political representatives of Kurds. Two major political actors contesting over the Kurdish 
population and the Turkish state – the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Justice and 
Development Party) government and the PKK-led Kurdish movement – also gradually began 
taking these associations into consideration and attempted to articulate them to their political 
projects. The associations, hence, engaged in various activities appearing as third actors who 
try to moderate the conflict, press for reforms, and provide alternative channels for 
articulating grievances and demands, in addition to pursuing their business as usual. In other 
words, as civil society organizations, they were to play a role in conflict resolution and 
democratic consolidation. 
However, there have been constraints to play such a role because of dynamics not only 
outside of but also within the associational site, as associational leaders at times experienced 
conflicts among themselves and took part in opposing political coalitions. This dissertation, 
on the other hand, investigates the rise of Kurdish associational activism from a different yet 
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not unrelated angle: the role of associational leadership in a strongly polarized and uncertain 
environment can be better understood in terms of struggles for hegemony between alternative 
models of political integration and social order. The AKP government and the Kurdish 
movement attempt to achieve hegemony by, inter alia, articulating and mobilizing Kurdish 
groups with variable appeals to economic interests and collective identity. Providing a link 
between individuals and political actors, Kurdish interest associations have turned into both a 
major actor and a site of this contestation, where the cross-pressures of economic interests and 
collective identity politics play out themselves in diverse ways. The dissertation explores 
these diverse ways with a detailed analysis of three associational sites for business, 
professional, and labor communities in Diyarbakır, against the background of changing 
political, economic and institutional environments in the country. The empirical analysis helps 
explain the variation in associational behavior as well as its consequences. Overall, it explores 
what roles associational leaderships may play in political life vis-à-vis the contestation of the 
state, considering their activities to forge coalitions among themselves and with political 
actors against the background of the above-mentioned cross-pressures as potential sources of 
cleavage. 
Before proceeding to the conceptual framework, let me give more details about the process 
which led to the rise of associational activism in Diyarbakır, as well as the context and content 
of this activism. Diyarbakır is a province in southeastern Turkey with a population over one 
million. It has been the historical center of the predominantly Kurdish-populated region, as 
well as of the Kurdish movement which developed in the 1970s. Kurds, comprising about 
some 15 to 20 per cent of the country’s population as the largest minority group, have been 
deprived of cultural-linguistic rights and subjected to periodic state oppression as a result of 
an authoritarian process of nation-building throughout the 20th Century. As political channels 
were either closed or unresponsive to pro-Kurdish actors, the armed struggle given by the 
PKK in the post-1980 period developed as ‘politics by another means.’ The conflict reached 
its peak in the 1990s and came to a halt in 1999 (albeit to restart in 2004 at a lower density) 
when the PKK’s leader Öcalan was captured by foreign intelligence services and handed to 
Turkey to be imprisoned to date. Coupled with other dynamics, this event triggered a 
complicated process of efforts for conflict resolution and democratization. 
The European Union has been a significant actor in this process with its annual progress 
reports, which evaluate the institutional setting and governmental performance of Turkey as to 
whether it met the political and economic criteria for membership. As human rights violations 
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and anti-democratic institutions were among the major political concerns raised in these 
reports, the Kurdish issue obtained a special significance in the EU accession process. Its 
significance further increased in the aftermath of the 2003 US-led war on Iraq, as the PKK 
ended its ceasefire, being encouraged by the increasing autonomy of the Kurdish regional 
government in northern Iraq. Faced with challenges both within the country and in European 
and Middle Eastern fronts, the Turkish governments have been revising the Kurdish policy 
and implementing some reforms. 
The AKP came to power in 2002 and has been ruling the government since then. As a newly-
established party with roots in political Islam, the AKP undertook significant initiatives to 
achieve legitimacy and to consolidate its power, which was threatened by military and civilian 
bureaucratic elites who made appeals to secularist concerns (see Ch. 3). Parallel to this 
contestation of the state, the government initially speeded up the EU reform process, while 
also making steps with regard to the Kurdish issue. It introduced some cultural-linguistic 
rights for Kurds, as well as more general political reforms. Prime Minister Erdoğan made 
several visits to Diyarbakır promising a solution the Kurdish issue via democratization. The 
state officials conducted periodical secret talks with the PKK, while the legal representatives 
of the Kurdish movement, specifically the pro-Kurdish political parties, were being faced with 
political repression via party closures and imprisonment. Against this background, the 
government, as well as the mainstream media, has started paying more attention to interest 
associations in Diyarbakır since 2005: associations were depicted as an alternative actor, more 
legitimate and less radical than the Kurdish movement. However, they were to act in a highly 
uncertain and turbulent political environment, as the configuration of power has been 
changing at the national, local and regional levels. More specifically, they were faced with a 
somewhat dynamic set of opportunities and constraints presented by the AKP government and 
the Kurdish movement, as well as by the respective peak associations – these range from 
access to new resources to intimidation. 
The associations, at least some of them, had been already engaged in human rights activism 
and addressed by foreign delegates in this respect. Yet, as they started enjoying a hitherto 
unseen public visibility and governmental support via official meetings, they increased their 
political activities, in addition to pursuing their business as usual. Activities have been as 
diverse as the following: making press releases; organizing demonstrations; negotiating with 
political actors at the local and the national level; taking part in philanthropic activities by 
political actors, and so on. In doing so, associational leaders called for an end to the conflict, 
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made pro-Kurdish rights-claims, pressed for political reforms, and tried moderating the two 
political forces in their contestation. However, they also had conflicts among themselves, as 
manifested in their participation in opposing coalitions with each political rival at times of 
important political events such as the constitutional referendum and elections, as well as one-
to-one relations of interest intermediation.  
As outlined in the theoretical framework below and elaborated in the empirical analysis, 
collective identity politics can present an integrative force enabling encompassing coalitions 
within the ethnic group. Interest politics, on the other hand, can have divisive effects within 
the group, serving narrow coalitions, and integrative effects across the groups, conducive to 
national coalitions. These two tendencies roughly correspond to the hegemonic projects of the 
Kurdish movement and the AKP government, respectively. While no single model of 
integration or a line of social division could reign, the associations negotiated diverse 
compromises with the political actors. Some of them could turn the situation to an advantage 
and some ended up relatively disadvantaged. 
The dissertation analyzes the activities by three types of interest associations: first, the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry as the compulsory business association; second, the Bar 
and Medical Associations as the compulsory professional associations; and third, the labor 
unions in the municipality sector as the de facto compulsory labor organizations. I focus on 
both political activism and associational behavior related to interest representation. I examine 
how cross-pressures of economic interests and collective identity politics, emanating from 
both political interlocutors and memberships, play out themselves in diverse ways and 
influence the process of coalition formation and articulation of social groups. This 
examination will help explore what roles associational leadership may play in political life 
vis-à-vis the contestation of the state. 
1.1 Studying associational politics 
Interest associations may play a role in maintaining social order and political integration, 
beyond the representation of narrowly-defined special interests. This idea was first developed 
by Emile Durkheim in relation with the processes of capitalist development and later 
elaborated by the corporatism literature in political science in its analysis of organized 
interests. Although associations have been receiving less attention in advanced industrial 
countries in the neoliberal period, these actors can still play important roles in the politics of, 
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at least, late industrializing countries. In this section, I highlight theoretical approaches to the 
place of associations in political life, first outlining the Durkheimian tradition and second 
elaborating on the role of associational leadership in the ‘political articulation’ of social 
groups vis-à-vis the contestation of the state. Third, I outline the theoretical approach for the 
empirical study of associational behavior. This discussion hence provides a conceptual 
framework to understand the Kurdish associational activism in contemporary Turkey. 
The role of interest associations in state-society relations  
In his preface for the second edition of the Division of Labor in Society, Emile Durkheim 
(1933: 1-31) elaborates on the role of occupational groups in contemporary societies. We can 
summarize his ideas as a dual role of economic regulation and socio-political integration. 
According to Durkheim, increasing specialization in economic life brings about a social need 
for cohesion and regularity. This situation may lead to anomie, unless a system of rules is 
instituted and the pursuit of self-interest is restrained. Since the state’s capability weakens as 
differentiation accelerates; it is the occupational group or corporation who can serve this 
function: it is close enough to the site of economic activities and well-informed about the 
needs and functioning of a specific industry as its organized actors. The occupational group 
can exert a moral discipline over individuals, by containing egoism, regulating relations 
among them and with the public, and supporting shared interests. It provides a spirit of 
solidarity as well as a ‘source of life’ for its members, since it also offers activities for leisure 
time and charity. Its function, hence, may go beyond the regulation of economic life and link 
to the need for social order and political integration: 
A nation can be maintained only if, between the State and the individual, there is 
intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to 
attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the 
general torrent of social life. We have just shown how occupational groups are suited 
to fill this role (Durkheim 1933: 28). 
Durkheim is interested in ‘the problem of . . . what holds societies together’ (Parsons quoted 
in Tilly 1978: 16), a problem which is also very relevant to the situations of intrastate conflict. 
In Durkheim’s time, it appears significant as a result of the processes of capitalist 
development. In this vein, as the market extends from the local to the national and 
international scales, Durkheim argues that occupational associations also should enlarge to 
include all the members of the occupation over a territory. He sees these associations as an 
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important basis of political organization, as opposed to territorial divisions, for he thinks that 
‘the provincial spirit has disappeared never to return; the patriotism of the parish has become 
an archaism that cannot be restored at will’ (Durkheim 1933: 24-28). This seems like wishful 
thinking though, considering the ongoing significance of territorial divisions, and as I argue 
below, what type of social divisions provides the basis of political organization is an outcome 
of political and social activity; hence, contingent. Here, it is important to note Durkheim’s 
emphasis on the role of associations in the political representation of social interests. 
Political roles played by these organized actors connect to Durkheim’s theory of democracy. 
They mediate individuals and the state, by providing a channel for communication and 
regulation. Hence, they may work against two opposing tendencies: on the one hand, they 
protect individuals from being ‘tyrannized’ by the state. This is why occupational associations 
should enjoy autonomy from the state to play the buffer role in a fashion similar to the liberal 
theories of civil society (Cohen/Arato 1997). On the other hand, they protect the state from 
getting ‘absorbed’ by individuals. Hence, they provide some administrative stability against 
changes in popular opinion, as the state does more than expressing the ideas held in society. 
However, Durkheim accepts that occupational associations are not a kind of remedy for 
everything, and his theory is more about how social institutions would function under 
appropriate conditions (see Durkheim 1933: 1-31; Durkheim 1992: 98-109; Giddens 1996: 1-
31). 
Throughout the 20th Century, functionally-based associations have shown a great variety in 
practice and theory. The post-war settlement in Europe depicted a model most similar to what 
was envisaged by Durkheim (see Streeck/Schmitter 1985). It aimed to reconcile the capitalist 
economy with mass politics through the incorporation of worker collectivism and the 
institution of collective bargaining. This led to a compromise among the government, 
business and organized labor ‘in which social and political integration were purchased by the 
provision of material benefits rather than enforced by coercive state authority’ 
(Streeck/Kenworthy 2005: 447). The corporatism literature that rose in the 1970s was to study 
such roles played by organized interests in the politics of industrial societies. Works examined 
different forms of organized interest representation across and within countries, focusing on 
topics such as organizational structure, concertation, private-interest government, as well as 
impact on economic performance.1 As the neo-liberal policies have brought about significant 
                                                          
1 See the literature reviews by Streeck (2006); Streeck/Kenworthy (2005).  
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changes in economic life, however, the corporatist literature started declining in the West by 
the 1990s. 
The environment of interest politics has changed since then.2 Yet, some of the notions of the 
corporatism literature still appear useful for the study of this environment, in addition to the 
Durkheimian emphasis on the political roles of intermediary organizations. As detailed in 
Chapter 4, most of the interest associations under scrutiny (the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, the Bar and Medical Associations) have a corporatist organizational structure. Here I 
follow Philippe Schmitter’s seminal work for the definition of corporatism:  
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing 
certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support 
(Schmitter 1974: 93-94). 
The possession of such organizational structure has played an important role in the rise and 
nature of activism by these associations, as I show throughout the dissertation. Especially 
properties such as compulsory membership, monopoly of representation, internal electoral 
processes and the public status provide the associations with a larger constituency, greater 
capacity and social legitimacy, as well as a better access to some political channels. These 
advantages gain significance against the background of an environment of voluntary 
associations, where there are more explicit and established coalitions between associations 
and political parties. In compulsory associations, on the other hand, competition takes place 
internally among different factions, and associations appear either relatively neutral or 
conjecturally aligned.3 It is this corporatist structure what brings together the pressures of 
economic interests and collective identity politics. Associational leaders, then, have to 
                                                          
2 For an evaluation of changing organized interests in the advanced industrial context, see Schmitter (2008). 
Historically, Turkey’s system of interest representation has depicted important differences than the Western 
models underlying the corporatism literature. This is also why it keeps – or even increases – its political 
significance in the neoliberal period, unlike in the West. For a historical overview of the Turkish system, see Ch. 
4. 
3 There are also other reasons for why particularly these compulsory associations are significant and selected for 
investigation, see the next section for sampling.  
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intermediate these sometimes-conflicting pressures and reach a compromise, whereas 
voluntary associations could accommodate the situation thanks to fragmentation. 
Yet, voluntary associations also have an important place in this study. In the empirical 
analysis, I refer to a number of voluntary business associations as complementary partners of 
Diyarbakır’s Chamber. Moreover, I focus on labor unions organized in the municipality 
sector, although their situation is more ambiguous with regard to the definition of voluntary 
association possessing a de facto corporatist structure, as I clarify it in the next section. In 
addition to the empirical sample, there are institutional-reform proposals for turning the 
corporatist environment of interest representation into a pluralist environment of voluntary 
associations. This is important for understanding the contested nature of interest politics in 
contemporary Turkey, especially with regard to the AKP government’s failure to control the 
environment as it wished (see Ch. 4). As to what I mean by pluralism, it  
can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, 
nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) 
categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or 
otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and 
which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective 
categories (Schmitter 1974: 96). 
As the interest associations in Diyarbakır have arisen as third actors, the rival political actors 
– the ruling party AKP and the Kurdish movement – started taking these associations into 
consideration and attempted to mobilize them in their struggle for hegemony. While 
advocating associations as one basis of political representation, Durkheim did not elaborate on 
political parties or social movements, let alone their interaction with associations. Yet, we see 
a useful approach in the corporatism literature to the interrelations among these different sites. 
Schmitter elaborates the notion of modern democracy as a combination of ‘partial regimes’ 
rather than as a single regime. Partial regimes are institutionalized sites for the political 
representation of social groups. Major examples include political parties, social movements, 
and interest associations. The boundaries between these regimes can be vague and 
changeable. They may grow together: many political parties and interest associations have 
their origins in social movements. They may also compete against each other to attain power 
and to influence policy. Thereby, they may represent diverse ‘interests’ and ‘passions’ 
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corresponding to cleavages in society (Schmitter 1992; Schmitter 2008). One of them may 
become more powerful thanks to constraints on the representational function of another one, 
as it has been partly the case with the rise of Kurdish associations vis-à-vis pro-Kurdish 
parties. This analytical distinction will help us disaggregate the political environment in which 
the Kurdish associations are embedded. It will help consider how each site relates to each 
other, while we are looking at the efforts for coalition formation within the associational site, 
as well as in its interaction with the other sites. Yet, the roles played by these partial regimes 
and their interrelations become all the more contested in transitional contexts (Schmitter 
1992). 
Associational leadership vis-à-vis the contestation of the state  
The question of what holds society together has been central also to the experiences of nation-
state building. Similar to Durkheim’s ideas, an established network of civil society was 
proposed as one of the reasons for a successful integration of ethnically diverse societies 
(Wimmer 2004). What roles, then, may interest associations play in a context where the 
nation-state is already being contested? The literature on intrastate conflicts pays a great 
attention to economic factors with regard to the likelihood and nature of conflicts; however, 
studies of interest associations in such situations are rare.4 One major study comparing the 
roles played by different types of civil society organizations in conflict situations suggests that 
interest associations can be more effective for building trust and cooperation as they are based 
on social and civic ties that cut across ethnic groups (Varshney 2003). This role can be less 
effective, however, when there is a geographical concentration of ethnic groups, as in the 
Kurdish case. Hence, the Kurdish interest associations are based on both ‘social-civic’ and 
ethnic ties. Yet, the relations of local associations with their respective peak associations, 
which do cut across ethnic groups, are important in this regard and the tensions that can be 
seen between the two levels beg attention (see Ch. 4 and Part II). 
On the other hand, I would like to focus rather on the roles played by interest associations in 
struggles for hegemony. I use the notion of hegemony in a loose version of the Gramscian 
                                                          
4 In relation with economic factors, the literature emphasizes the impact of natural resources and individual 
economic motivations (Collier/Hoeffler 2004), inequalities across social groups in society (Stewart 2009; 
Cederman/Gleditsch/Weidmann 2010), and regional uneven development (Horowitz 1985; Østby/Nordås/Rød 
2009). Many works in the literature are driven by a dichotomy of ‘grievance or greed’ for causes of individual 
and/or collective participation in civil wars. This framing sounds similar to my discussion of cross-pressures of 
interest and identity politics; however, unlike my discussion, works usually focus on inter-group divisions, rather 
than intra-group divisions, and may miss the fact that motives such as grievances, as well as divisions, are 
socially constructed and ‘might be redefined by hegemonic projects’ (Tuğal 2009: 269, fn. 7). 
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tradition: political domination based on not merely force but consent, under the leadership of 
a ruling group, who articulates certain ideas and interests in society as ‘common sense,’ i.e. ‘a 
particular way of seeing the world and human nature and relationships’ (Williams 1976: 145; 
Gramsci 1971). Consent does not mean a passive compliance though, but can be ‘informed, 
partial and strategic,’ while the ruling group also may sacrifice its interests to a degree 
(Wimmer 2008: 998; Scott 1985; Thompson 1967). 
We can argue that associations play a role in struggles for building hegemony by taking part 
in not only the political representation but also the ‘political articulation’ (De 
Leon/Desai/Tuğal 2009) of social groups. In this vein, the Durkheimian approach also 
underlines the role of associations in giving individuals ‘stable identities and conceptions of 
interests’ (Schmitter 2008: 208).5 This is what differentiates the corporatist notion of ‘interest 
intermediation’ from the pluralist notion of ‘interest representation’: associational leaders are 
charged with ‘aggregation and transformation of diverse special interests into more broadly 
defined common, adjusted interests.’ They are, in other words, ‘active producers instead of 
mere purveyors of collective interests’ (Streeck/Kenworthy 2005: 450, emphasis original). 
The relation of such efforts of ‘political articulation’ to the struggles for hegemony is that they 
may serve ‘naturaliz(ing) class, ethnic, and racial formations as a basis of social division by 
integrating disparate interests and identities into coherent sociopolitical blocs’ (De 
Leon/Desai/Tuğal 2009: 194-195). In their discussion on the conception of political 
articulation, De Leon et al. emphasize the role of political parties in the formation of social 
cleavages, as opposed to the classical approach which assumes cleavages a priori to party 
politics (Rokkan/Lipset 1990). Their emphasis also appears opposed to the ‘groupism’ 
tendency to treat ethnic groups ‘as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be 
attributed’ regarding them ‘internally homogeneous and externally bounded’ (Brubaker 2002: 
164), whereas ethnic boundaries are the result of ‘classificatory and political struggles’ in 
society (Wimmer 2008). 
In this respect, I aim to explore the conditions under which particular lines of cleavage gain 
relative salience and provide the basis of political coalitions. The roles played by interest 
associations in this process can be understood in relation with other partial regimes – that is, 
political parties and social movements – as they also engage in similar activities of political 
                                                          
5 In this regard, the Durkheimian approach is similar to the non-liberal approaches to civil society, such as 
Gramscian and Foucaultian ones (see Hardt 1995), if we bracket Durkheim’s more optimistic take on it and 
underline its productive aspects. 
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articulation (see De Leon/Desai/Tuğal 2009; Buğra/Savaşkan 2012; Tuğal 2009). However, 
each of them rests on different types of constituency (functional, territorial, or an intersection 
of both), ‘which impose a different logic of competition and cooperation’ (Schmitter 1992: 
431). It is their interaction shaped by such logics that contributes to the relative political 
salience of particular cleavages (cf. Greif/Laitin 2004; Wimmer 2008). 
In the Kurdish case, first of all, the partial regimes of political parties and social movements 
have been characterized with a special situation: the contestation between the Turkish 
government ruled by the AKP and the Kurdish movement led by the PKK (and pro-Kurdish 
parties) has constituted a situation of ‘dual power’ in the Kurdish region. This situation 
implies two rival claims to sovereignty, accompanied with the co-existence of competing 
institutions and sources of legitimacy (Tilly 1978). I elaborate on this situation in Chapter 2, 
as it is more an outcome of the growing power of the Kurdish movement in the region. Here, 
let’s note that the Kurdish associational site, as well as the province of Diyarbakır, appears in 
this situation as a ‘contested zone’ in which control is contested and limited sovereignty is 
exercised (Kalyvas 2006). 
Against this background, salient cleavages, as well as political coalitions, were attempted to 
be (re)constituted along two major axes: economic interests and collective identity.6 On the 
one hand, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan repeatedly framed his party’s contestation with the 
Kurdish movement in elections in a dichotomy of ‘service versus identity politics.’ Erdoğan 
accused the municipalities run by the pro-Kurdish party of doing identity politics while 
ignoring social needs for which Erdoğan’s party AKP promised to provide services. He also 
accused the PKK of being against the economic development of the region as the government 
claimed to realize. The accusation at the Kurdish movement at times included even religious 
perversion and ‘necrophilia.’7 The AKP, in other words, hailed to ‘interests’ to counteract 
‘passions;’ i.e. a conception of legitimate benevolent motives versus illegitimate, even 
perverse motives (Hirschman 1997). This has something to do with the modernization 
approach,8 which has underlined the Turkish state’s understanding of the Kurdish issue. The 
                                                          
6 I do not take interest and identity as exogenous variables; they are endogenous. The Durkheimian approach and 
the corporatism literature underline the endogeneity of interests. As to ethnicity as a collective identity, I agree 
with the idea that ‘cleavage structures are . . . endogenous to societies but exogenous to any individual member 
of that society’ (Greif/Laitin 2004: 645). Therefore, in the present study, I investigate collective-identity politics, 
rather than an essentialist conception of identity, as a category of analysis (cf. Brubaker/Cooper 2000).  
7 The first is related to the secular (and at times anti-religious) approach of the Kurdish movement and the latter 
to the movement’s efforts to make the government accept responsibility for an incident in which Turkish jets 
fired at a group of Kurdish smugglers near the border, killing 34 civilians (see Ch. 3). 
8 For the modernization theory in this line, see the seminal work by Lipset (1963). 
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Kurdish uprising was often seen as an outcome of the regional underdevelopment, while it 
was thought that economic development would produce positive social changes, hence, a 
solution (see Yeğen 2003). The rise of Kurdish interest associations as political actors is also 
partly connected to this approach; they enjoy legitimacy thanks to their economic roles and 
provide an integrative network across ethnic groups and between the individuals and the state, 
as in the Durkheimian approach. Yet, in its rivalry with the Kurdish movement, the AKP had 
to use discursive and non-discursive strategies with regard to both interests and passions (see 
Ch. 3 and Part II). 
The Kurdish movement, on the other hand, emphasized ‘passions’ over ‘interests’ by 
engaging in collective identity politics. By highlighting the shared ethnic identity and 
articulating common demands and passions (grievances, ideals, commitments, etc.), it tried to 
integrate Kurds under its leadership. It accused the AKP of trying to ‘divide’ Kurds and 
attempted to build encompassing coalitions for both electoral and associational politics, with 
efforts to ‘downplay differences’ between Kurdish groups in ideas and interests (cf. 
McAdam/Tarrow/Tilly 2008). In addition, the movement draws on a moral economy which 
has emerged in the Kurdish region thanks to the growing power of the movement and the 
conflict situation. This moral economy is based on ‘patriotism’ and political ‘sacrifice’ as 
sources of legitimacy. It promotes certain conceptions of mutual rights and obligations. 
Accordingly, passions may influence and outweigh calculations of interests, and the 
legitimacy of each type of motive appears to be the reverse of the AKP’s rival model. As 
explored in the empirical chapters, the moral economy provides bonds for intragroup 
solidarity, as well as norms of conduct between the movement leaders and the locals. In other 
words, it outlines an alternative model of political integration.9 However, it has become more 
contested as a result of economic and political changes in the last decade, while the Kurdish 
movement also had to use discursive and non-discursive strategies with regard to both 
passions and interests, in its rivalry with the AKP (see Ch. 2 and Part II). 
The cross-pressures of economic interests and collective identity politics can be best observed 
in the environment of interest associations. The pressures play out themselves in diverse ways 
                                                          
9 The term moral economy originally belongs to E. P. Thompson. In his study of bread riots in the 18th C. 
England, Thompson refers to an economic environment where material calculations are outweighed by moral 
obligations and considerations of legitimacy (Thompson 1971). The term has had different interpretations since 
his seminal work and can be linked to similar approaches to the study of the economy as embedded in social 
relations (see Booth 1994). I use the concept in a loose sense here and see it as a political normative order and as 
a by-product of the contestation of the state. This is similar to Salzman’s (2010) use of the concept in relation to 
the processes of state formation. Also see Ch. 2 on this. 
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within and among associations. They may appear in harmony or lead to conflicts depending 
on circumstances and definitions. However, to act as political actors, associational groups 
require ‘a minimal degree of internal cohesion, a sense of solidarity in spite of existing 
internal divisions, and legitimate leadership strong enough to impose discipline and individual 
sacrifice on their members’ (Schmitter/Streeck 1999: 11). Given the political polarization and 
the precarious situation of Kurdish citizens, associational leaders also need to frame their 
claims in accordance with the ‘public interest’ and other sources of legitimacy. Then, the 
questions how these problems are solved and how political mobilization becomes possible 
seem important. Answers to these questions will help understanding whether the mentioned 
pressures attain relative salience as a basis of social division and coalition and whether the 
associations are successful as political actors (Schmitter/Streeck 1999). 
In the literature, interest heterogeneity is seen to be a major problem for collective action 
(Olson 1982: 17-35). It makes it difficult for actors to find a common ground and to agree on 
the need for and nature of action. However, it is argued that collective identity and political-
moral commitments may mitigate such problems (Offe/Wiesenthal 1980; Rueschemeyer 
2009: 168-82; Buğra 2002a). Considering the inter-associational action and coalition 
formation in the Kurdish case, we see a similar trajectory: collective identity politics has an 
integrative force enabling intra-group encompassing coalitions in pursuit of common 
concerns. Interest politics, on the other hand, can have divisive effects within the group, 
underlying narrow coalitions, and integrative effects across the groups conducive to national 
coalitions and political integration in a Durkheimian fashion (cf. Buğra 2002a; Yashar 2005). 
These two trajectories roughly correspond to the hegemonic projects of the Kurdish 
movement and the AKP government, respectively. However, the interest associations are not 
mere instruments for the political actors to manipulate social groups; they have an agency, 
with a special logic of action. 
Analyzing associational behavior 
Studying something inherently ambiguous such as collective action (Rueschemeyer 2009: 
179) is a difficult task, especially in a context of highly polarized and uncertain political 
environment. Schmitter/Streeck (1999) offer a useful theoretical framework for the study of 
associational behavior.10 The authors identify two environments which affect the dynamics of 
                                                          
10 There are, of course, several approaches to the study of collective action, most notably the social movement 
literature (for a classical work, see  Tilly 1978; for a contemporary overview, see Della Porta/Diani 2006; 
Johnston 2011). In the present analysis, I prefer to focus on the literature on organized interests and the political 
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intermediary organizations and are governed by different logics: the membership environment 
(the social group from which they draw their members) and the influence environment (the 
collective actors in relation to which they represent their members). These environments are 
governed by different logics. 
Interaction between an interest association and its constituency is shaped by factors such as 
the following: the members’ perceptions of interests, demands, willingness to comply with 
decisions made on their behalf; the means available to the association for controlling its 
members; and the collective benefits and inducements the association offers. These constitute 
the ‘logic of membership.’ As to the interaction between an interest association and its 
interlocutors, it is governed by factors such as the association’s demands; the support it has to 
offer; the compromises it is willing and able to negotiate; the constraints and opportunities 
presented by the relevant political institutions; and the concessions offered to the association. 
These constitute the association’s ‘logic of influence.’ In its classical form, these variables are 
used to explain the organizational properties of interest associations such as structure and 
outputs (Schmitter/Streeck 1999; Streeck/Kenworthy 2005). 
In my empirical analysis of associational behavior, I loosely draw on this approach to adapt it 
to the questions of the study. I focus on three levels: associational properties and leadership; 
dynamics in the membership environment; and contemporary political activism. Although 
there are some overlaps among them, the first two levels are thought to provide insights into 
the dynamics of the third one, which comprises the major concern of the study: manifestations 
of the cross-pressures of economic interests and collective identity politics, as well as 
dynamics of coalition formation. This, in other words, relates to the influence environment, 
but I refer to that also in the first part with regard to associational properties and leadership. 
This analytical division helps deal with the complex involvements of the other partial regimes 
(represented by the AKP and the Kurdish movement) in the environments of both influence 
and membership. 
Associational leaders appear to be significant actors in the present study. Their leadership 
talents and individual choices gain a special importance because of the transitional context 
characterized by high uncertainty (Collier 2006b: 6; Schmitter 1992). Leaders play significant 
roles in articulating claims, managing internal cohesion, leading (inter)associational 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
articulation approach outlined above. It still touches on common themes though, such as framing, opportunities, 
and mobilization.  
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mobilization, and negotiating with political actors. They may experience difficulty to 
reconcile demands from the membership and influence environments. They may also pursue 
their personal interests such as career advancement, improving personal networks and 
increasing public visibility. In this respect, leaders are faced with special opportunities and 
constraints as a result of the contestation of the state along the two poles of the AKP 
government and the Kurdish movement (cf. Buğra/Savaşkan 2012). The empirical analysis 
examines the variation among associations concerning the configurations of these special 
circumstances and regular factors such as structural conditions and institutional settings, in 
relation with the research questions. 
The potential contribution of the dissertation is twofold: first, the analysis will strengthen the 
English literature on organized interests by focusing on associational leadership in a context 
where the nation-state is contested. The literature paid attention to supranational challenges to 
the nation-state as a result of globalization and regionalization (see Streeck/Crouch 2006; 
Streeck/Schmitter 1991). However, subnational challenges to the nation-state and their effects 
on organized interests, and vice versa, appear to be underanalyzed.11 The topic, on the other 
hand, seems important in relation with not only the ethnic conflict in Turkey and elsewhere, 
but also the Islamist mobilization in the Middle East. Interest associations have provided 
important channels for Islamist movements in countries such as Turkey and Egypt since the 
1990s, while affiliate parties were to rule national governments in the 2000s.12 A study of 
interactions among different sites for the political representation-articulation of social groups 
can contribute to the understanding of gradual political change and shifting salience of 
cleavages, as well as the role of associational leadership in these processes. 
Second, the dissertation introduces a new dimension to the literatures on organized interests 
and the Kurdish issue in Turkey, by examining their intersection. There are several works 
which examine civil society organizations in relation with the Kurdish issue 
(Dorronsoro/Watts 2013; Gambetti 2009; Çelik 2006). Yet, interest associations (be them 
local or peak) are rarely studied in this regard.13 In a similar vein, the dissertation might be 
useful for policy advocacy: the recent steps by the Turkish government and the PKK to 
                                                          
11 Works on transitions from authoritarianism and democratic consolidation are relevant for such a focus, though. 
For example, see Schmitter (1992); Schmitter (1995); Collier (2006a); Schneider (2004). The study by 
Buğra/Savaşkan (2012) on the organized interests in Turkey with regard to political polarization is also relevant.  
12 On Turkey, see Ch. 4. On Egypt, see Wickham (1997); Bayat (1998); Fahmy (1999). For a broader view of the 
role of civil society in the Islamist quest for political change and power, see Berman (2003).  
13 For exceptional works, which albeit have a limited scope, see Yüksel (2011); Bora (2002) and for a 
journalistic work, see Diken (2001). For an overview of interest associations in Turkey, see Ch. 4. 
16 
 
negotiate a peace deal have highlighted the need for mechanisms of intermediation, for which 
the government has approached civil society actors, while the PKK emphasizes the 
development of a democratic civil society as a requirement of a solution. A study of how 
interest organizations acted in the transitional period, as well as how they were differently 
influenced, can offer insights and cautions for the peace process under way. 
1.2 Methodology  
Conducting empirical research on politics and actors at the meso level in a situation of 
transition from conflict can be a challenging task for methodological and ethical reasons 
(Wood 2006). In this section, I first clarify the selection of sample associations within the 
case. I then elaborate on the methods for data collection. This latter part also mentions some 
ethical questions. 
Sampling 
Diyarbakır has been the center of the associational activism, thanks to its political importance. 
The city has a vibrant civil society with numerous organizations working in areas ranging 
from human rights to poverty alleviation. However, interest associations – and especially 
those with corporatist structure - have been the major actors of the activism. The Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, the Bar Association and, to some degree, the Medical Association 
led the activities, also often accompanied by voluntary business associations. They formed 
encompassing and narrow coalitions of civil society organizations mostly only from 
Diyarbakir, but sometimes also from either all the Kurdish region or from the rest of the 
country depending on the nature of activities. 
The reason why corporatist associations have taken the leader position appears to be linked to 
their organizational properties such as compulsory membership, representational monopoly, 
internal elections and public status. As mentioned before, these properties provide a larger 
membership, greater capacity and more legitimacy, compared with the environment of 
voluntary associations which is fragmented and polarized. Also, compulsory associations 
appear important for politics at the local and national levels, as the oldest associations linking 
individuals to the political authorities. In this vein, the AKP attempted to influence corporatist 
associations around the country; hence, their significance has increased in the last decade in 
political struggles (Ch. 4). Also, the Kurdish associations were addressed by foreign delegates 
as the local representatives of Kurds in visits to Diyarbakır. 
17 
 
There is also the nature of the Kurdish issue that gives advantages to certain associations and 
makes them more vocal. First, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry is significant because 
the Kurdish issue has an economic dimension. This dimension is both an objective one, as the 
region suffers from regional underdevelopment and devastating effects of the armed conflict, 
and a subjective one, as the Turkish state historically framed the problem in economic terms 
supporting the idea that economic development would bring an end to the insurgency. Second, 
the Bar Association is significant because the Kurdish issue has an important legal dimension. 
This has, on the one hand, to do with human rights violations that targeted Kurdish citizens 
and turned legal profession into a form of activism at times. On the other hand, many of the 
rights-claims require legal reforms, such as the right to education in Kurdish language, as well 
as the re-writing of constitution against the assimilationist approach. Third, the Medical 
Association appears less important than the previous two but more important than the rest of 
compulsory associations because there is also a healthcare dimension. This includes both the 
demand for healthcare services in Kurdish language, but also the low supply of physicians in 
the region, due to the reluctance for working there, and the policy sanctions to deal with the 
problem. There are also other factors contributing to the political activism of these 
associations, such as organizational traditions (see Ch. 4 and Part II). 
Therefore, my selection of these three compulsory associations results from their higher 
political visibility in the process. I mention also voluntary business associations in relation 
with the Chamber’s activities. Hence, a set of business associations and another set of 
professional associations. I decided to add labor unions so that I can observe the interplays of 
economic interests and collective identity politics among different social groups. Labor 
unions too engaged in various activities in the process; however, they were not much visible 
in the mainstream media. This has to do with the lower legitimacy and strict constraints facing 
the unions. There is also the fragmentation of the environment, which decreases the power of 
organized labor. Legally, unions are pluralist associations based on voluntary membership and 
competitive structures. However, the unions organized in the municipal sector usually show 
de facto corporatist properties with regard to membership and representation (see Ch. 4). This 
means there is only one union organized in a given municipality for civil servants and one for 
workers. I focus on the municipal sector of Diyarbakır city, where there is only one union for 
civil servants and two unions competing for the workers of different municipal governments. 
The de facto corporatist properties of these labor unions make them more comparable with the 
compulsory business and professional associations. 
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Data collection 
I conducted research to collect data for the analysis of associational behavior according to the 
theoretical framework in the previous section. The data concerns associational activities 
related to both political activism and interest representation and focuses on the dynamics in 
the environments of membership and influence, as well as organizational properties and 
leaders. With such a wide scope, it refers to factors both at the macro level, such as the rivalry 
between the political parties or liberalization processes, and at the micro level, such as the 
individual activities of associational leaders. Yet, these factors come together at the meso 
level of associational politics, forming the dynamics of collective action. 
Accordingly, I used archival and ethnographic methods. First, I conducted research about 
policy developments and institutional settings relevant for each associational group, as well as 
the Kurdish issue. This research also extends to the other partial regimes as represented by the 
Kurdish movement and the AKP. It has a historical perspective considering the importance of 
the contestations’ cumulative history and institutional legacies (especially associational 
traditions). I benefited from both primary and secondary resources. Primary resources include 
data as diverse as legislation; official statistics; associations’ assembly proceedings and 
magazines; party programs and documents; writings by the guerilla leader; and judicial 
indictments. This material help analyze the associational behavior within its historical and 
contemporary environment of membership and influence. Second, I surveyed the media 
coverage of activities by the associations. I examined a number of national and local dailies 
focusing on key events and periods in the last decade. The availability of online archives 
enabled searches based on keywords (e.g. the names of associations and leaders). This 
material help identify the patterns in associational activities, as well as the process-tracing of 
important events. 
Third, I carried out a fieldwork in Diyarbakır and the national capital Ankara to complement 
the data about associational activities and interrelations with their membership and 
interlocutors. I did multiple fieldtrips between March and September 2011, spending a total of 
three months in Diyarbakır and one month in Ankara. I conducted 78 interviews with persons 
such as the following: past and present representatives from the interest associations (mostly 
local but also peak level); associational members; politicians of the major political parties (the 
AKP and the pro-Kurdish party BDP); municipal administrators; and experts of several 
governmental and non-governmental organizations in Diyarbakır concerning poverty 
alleviation and economic development. The interviews were scheduled and semi-structured; 
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they included both experts and informants. They lasted between 20 minutes and 3 hours, the 
majority of them taking an average of 60 minutes. The reason for the variation has to do with 
either the nature of the inquiry (e.g. shorter with experts) or the availability of the interviewee 
(e.g. shorter with politicians). Majority of the interviews directly relate to the associations 
under scrutiny. However, since my research has been exploratory, I visited more associations 
than I scrutinize here: for instance, I made interviews also with unionists organized in the 
sectors of healthcare and education, visiting organizations in both Diyarbakır and Ankara. 
Because of the reasons explained in the section on sampling, I selected and analyzed only the 
associations which are most important and comparable. Finally, I had the chance to have 
informal and spontaneous conversations with several locals, while I was living in Diyarbakır. 
I kept a diary for these daily encounters and observations, which contributed to my general 
understanding of the topic. 
During the year of my fieldwork, judicial investigations were still taking place into Kurdish 
civil society organizations, amongst others, for alleged links to the PKK (see Ch. 2).14 As the 
wiretap evidence of phone calls and conversations held in office spaces were used in these 
investigations, I did not record any of my interviews but take notes manually to make my 
interviewees feel safer and to avoid a risk of harm. I keep my interviewees anonymous in the 
dissertation, unless they have been the leaders of associations or political organizations. The 
reason for this exception is that the great public visibility of leaders makes it difficult to keep 
them anonymous, as I often refer to their press speeches and other publicized activities. 
1.3 Organization of the dissertation 
Following the introduction, the dissertation is divided into two parts, each consisting of three 
chapters, and closed with the concluding discussion. Part I investigates the co-evolution three 
partial regimes for the political representation of social groups: social movements, political 
parties, and organized interests. Part II investigates the selected three types of associations in 
Diyarbakır. Considering the specificities of the Kurdish case, Part I is organized in three 
chapters focusing on the major actors: the Kurdish movement, the AKP government, and the 
organized interests. It aims to give background information for the analysis of the associations 
in Diyarbakır vis-à-vis the contestation of the state. Hence, the focus is on the national level. I 
                                                          
14 The compulsory associations under scrutiny were not influenced from these investigations; however, the 
municipal governments and the labor unions organized in the municipal sector did. 
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trace the historical development of each organized actor, contemporary dynamics within each 
site, as well as interrelations among the actors, in relation with the questions of the study. 
Chapter 2 traces back the development of the Kurdish movement since the late 1960s. First, it 
outlines the founding and the program of the PKK as the illegal component of the movement; 
the armed conflict in the post-1980 period between the PKK and the Turkish army; and its 
devastating social and political consequences. Second, it outlines the emergence of the pro-
Kurdish political parties as the legal component of the movement, as well as their rise to the 
municipal government in the Kurdish region and entry to the national parliament as 
representatives of Kurds. It gives examples of the efforts the parties made for the political 
articulation of Kurdish groups, while the constraints on their representational function were to 
enlarge the space for the associations. The third section elaborates on the situation of dual 
power in the Kurdish region as a result of the rising power of the Kurdish movement. In this 
respect, I elaborate on the alternative claims to sovereignty, as well as the moral economy at 
the local level providing an integrative framework, with important manifestations in the 
associational environment. 
Chapter 3 elaborates on the rise of the AKP to the power and its approach to the Kurdish 
issue. First, I outline the party’s roots in political Islam which goes back to the late 1960s, 
roughly pointing at continuity and change in party politics in general and relationship to the 
Kurdish electorate in particular. Second, I elaborate on the AKP governments in the last 
decade pointing at the political reforms partly triggered by the EU accession process, 
economic developments, and the party’s confrontation with the bureaucratic elites. These two 
sections provide background information for readers unfamiliar with contemporary politics in 
Turkey, which has been highly turbulent and had a significant impact on Kurdish politics. The 
third section focuses on the government’s approach to the Kurdish issue, using some primary 
resources. I outline major practices targeting Kurds, from political reforms to repression; 
articulation attempts along the rhetorical lines of material interests and collective identity; and 
socio-economic policies. The AKP’s increasing concern for asserting its power over 
Diyarbakır, as well as Kurdish interest associations, can be observed through these policies. 
Chapter 4 traces back the development of interest associations in Turkey. First, I outline the 
historical origins of the associations at the peak level, as well as the contemporary legal 
setting. Second, I show the diverse paths of politicization the associations took since the late 
1960s. These two sections provide background information on the institutional framework 
and legacies, which are important for understanding contemporary associational behavior at 
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local and national levels. Compulsory associations are underanalyzed in Turkey, while they 
are currently faced with significant reform proposals; therefore, the sections provide original 
data and observations. Third, I focus on associational politics in the AKP period. I identify 
patterns of political interaction between the government and the associations, pointing at the 
major lines of cleavage. Political trends at the peak level are important for the local level not 
only because of their possible impacts on affiliate associations but also it helps depicting the 
peculiarity of associational politics in a contested zone. Finally, I provide a broad view of the 
rise of Kurdish associational activism and proceed to Part II for its empirical analysis.  
Part II provides an in-depth analysis of the three associational sites for business, professional 
and labor communities in Diyarbakır. The chapters aim to explore the dynamics of collective 
action and coalition formation at the associational level vis-à-vis the cross-pressures of 
economic interests and collective identity politics stemming from both memberships and 
political interlocutors, that is, mainly the AKP and the Kurdish movement.  
Chapter 5 examines the politicization of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the post-
2005 process. I outline major factors for the associational politics: first, I give background 
information about the leadership and organizational properties such as the associational 
tradition and the access to new resources. Second, I elaborate on the major dynamics in the 
membership environment such as the recent economic progress and the presence of a moral 
economy as well as political insecurity. Third, I examine associational activism in relation 
with the major political actors. I show the diverse bases of encompassing and narrow 
coalitions, with a focus on how business leaders played a leading role in this process actively 
contributing to the categorical division of Kurds. I show also how the business leaders 
pursued a balanced approach, even strategically manipulating the dual power situation and 
eventually increasing their bargaining power and public visibility, as well as getting their 
economic conditions improved. 
Chapter 6 examines the increasing politicization of the Bar and Medical Associations in the 
recent period. I outline similar factors that are important for the associational behavior: first, I 
give background information about the leadership and organizational properties such as the 
associational traditions and the access to new resources or lack thereof. Second, I elaborate on 
major dynamics in the membership environments, such as professional activism, liberalization 
processes, and politically-induced opportunities and constraints. Third, I examine 
associational activism in relation with the major political actors. I discuss the diverse bases of 
encompassing and narrow coalitions the associations participated in. I show how the Bar 
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usually pursued a balanced approach and became a leading actor in activism, and how the 
Medical Association, on the other hand, engaged in an alternative coalition with the unions in 
support of the Kurdish movement, but has not been successful in achieving public visibility. 
Chapter 7 examines the activities by the labor unions organized in the municipality sector of 
the city. First, I give background information about the changing environment of the 
municipal sector and unionism as a result of the election of pro-Kurdish parties to local office, 
as well as the AKP government’s counter-activities, in addition to identification of some 
organizational properties. Second, I elaborate on the major dynamics in the membership 
environment, pointing at the consequences of liberalization process and the armed conflict, as 
well as recent political pressures. Third, I examine the interaction between the unions and the 
political actors, looking at both political activities and interest representation activities such as 
collective bargaining. These activities depict a compromise between the unions and the 
municipal governments, underlining the salience of collective-identity politics. I discuss how 
this compromise is an outcome of the dynamics mentioned in previous sections, as well as its 
implications for the bargaining power of the unions. I also show that the unions’ efforts for an 
alternative coalition were overshadowed by the business-led coalition.  
Chapter 8 provides a concluding discussion for the dissertation, synthesizing the findings of 
the empirical analysis in Part II against the background of the theoretical discussion and the 
wider historical and political context. First, I re-examine the contestation of the state with a 
focus on the strategies by the AKP government and the Kurdish movement for the political 
articulation of social groups. I explain the processes that opened up the space for Kurdish 
interest associations in Diyarbakır to play a politically salient role in this contestation. Second, 
I elaborate on how the associations form coalitions with diverse forms and scope, as well as 
their role in the re-definition of social divisions. I also highlight the different compromises 
reached for associational groups and briefly comment on the ongoing process in relation with 
the Kurdish associational activism. 
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PART I: COEVOLUTION OF THREE PARTIAL REGIMES: 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND 
ORGANIZED INTERESTS  
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Chapter 2: The Kurdish movement 
The Kurdish issue has a long history, having its origins in the transition from the empire to the 
nation state. In its efforts for building a nation, the Turkish state denied the physical existence 
of a Kurdish ethnicity, subjecting Kurds to assimilative and oppressive practices. Kurds 
resisted these practices in various ways, most important of which has been embodied in the 
Kurdish movement. This chapter focuses on the development of the Kurdish movement since 
the late 1960s. It aims to provide a historical background and examine the contemporary 
Kurdish politics, as they relate to the associational politics. 
First, I focus on the rise of the PKK as the illegal component of the movement and the armed 
conflict it had with the Turkish army in the post-1980 period. I highlight some turning points 
such as the 1980 coup and the capture of the PKK’s leader in 1999, as well as devastating 
consequences of the events. Second, I examine the emergence of the pro-Kurdish political 
parties as the legal component of the movement, paying attention to political demands and 
participation in electoral politics. Despite being faced with severe constraints, they could 
come to the power at the municipal level in the Kurdish region as well as enter the national 
parliament as representatives of Kurds. In this respect, I elaborate on their efforts to articulate 
Kurdish groups, in their contestation with the AKP government. The third section investigates 
the situation of dual power in the Kurdish region, pointing at the movement’s efforts to assert 
authority through the creation of alternative institutions and sources of legitimacy. This is 
complemented by an overview of the moral economy that provides bonds among co-ethnics 
for solidarity, as well as norms between the Kurdish ruling elites and the ruled. The chapter 
ends with a brief summary of conclusions. 
2.1 Emergence of the PKK and the intermittent armed conflict 
The Kurdish movement in contemporary Turkey is comprised of a number of illegal and legal 
components, each with a history of its own. This section focuses on the major illegal 
component, that is, the PKK. I point first at the rise of the left in Turkey in the 1960s and its 
incorporation of some Kurds. I go on with an overview of the emergence of the PKK and its 
program, and then I draw attention to the coup d’état of 1980 and the armed conflict which 
started in 1984, as both has had devastating social consequences as well as vital political 
impact. The capture of the guerilla leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 marked another turning 
point, bringing about a rupture to the conflict and a revision in the PKK’s program at a time 
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when the legal wing of the movement started to have a growing role. Yet, the outbreak of 
clashes in 2004, after a long period of ceasefire, was to increase uncertainty again. 
Incorporation of Kurds by the left movement 
Parallel to the worldwide developments in the 1960s, student movements and the left were 
also on the rise in Turkey. For the first time in the republican history, a legal socialist party 
was established: the Labor Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi – TİP), which won seats in 
the national parliament in the 1965 elections and paid attention to issues such as the 
underdevelopment of the Kurdish-populated regions. The decade also witnessed the 
translation of the classical Marxist literature on ‘the national question’ into Turkish as well as 
a discussion on ‘the eastern question’ in left-leaning journals. These were helpful in the 
incorporation of some Kurds to the leftist movement. University students and professionals 
played an important role among these Kurdish activists, thanks to the migration from rural to 
urban and eastern to western areas as well as to increasing enrollment in higher education. 
Several mass meetings were organized toward the end of the decade by left-leaning groups in 
Kurdish provinces such as Diyarbakır, and a network of cultural associations (Revolutionary 
Eastern Cultural Associations – Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları, DDKO) was established. 
However, leading activists were arrested and trials took place in 1970, resulting in 
imprisonments and closure of the associations. Demands in this period, on the other hand, 
were generally moderate, aiming for the economic development of the Kurdish region15 and 
introduction of cultural rights such as the use of Kurdish language in education and 
publishing, against the background of legal prohibitions (van Bruinessen 2006: 57-59; 
McDowall 1997: 395-417).  
A military intervention in 1971 brought about a rupture in political life and a severe 
oppression on the left. This included a ban on the TİP, on the grounds of one of its 
declarations which recognized Kurds as a separate people and as having been subjected to a 
long history of repressive and assimilative policies (Şener 2008). Yet, radical left groups were 
to proliferate rapidly, following the restoration in 1973. The new decade was marked by 
unstable coalition governments, societal polarization along left-right lines, and homicidal 
clashes toward the end of the decade among ideological and sectarian groups. The decade, 
                                                          
15 The Kurdish region refers to the eastern and southeastern Turkey which is predominantly Kurdish populated. 
According to unofficial calculations, the Kurdish population today comprises 62 per cent of the region and 
concentrated in higher ratios in certain provinces. The estimated ratio of Kurds to total population in Diyarbakir 
is 72.78 per cent for 1990 and 64.1 per cent for 2011 (Yeğen 2011; Mutlu 1996). Note that these are compiled 
from different sources and there have been immigration waves in the region, as described below.  
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which was to be ended by another military intervention, witnessed also the expansion and 
radicalization of Kurdish political groupings. A dozen of illegal Kurdish organizations, mostly 
left-leaning, was founded. Debates included ideas on the colonization of Kurdistan by four 
countries (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria), establishment of an independent and united 
Kurdistan, class domination within the Kurdish region, and collaboration between local ruling 
classes and central governments as well as a critique of Kemalism, the founding ideology of 
the republican Turkey (van Bruinessen 2005: 337-355; Bozarslan 2003). As the atmosphere 
became more radical, violence appeared to be a means both for some of the Kurdish 
organizations and radical groupings in the country, irrespective of whether they were leftist or 
rightist (Kürkçü 2008). 
The PKK: initial program and targets  
Among these organizations which opted for armed struggle was the PKK. Its establishment 
was declared in 1978 in a village of Diyarbakır, under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. 
Öcalan had studied at Ankara University and was a sympathizer of the revolutionary youth 
movement. He was imprisoned for seven months in 1971 because of participating in an illegal 
protest in the university against the killing of Turkish revolutionaries by the state forces 
(Özcan 2006: 88-92). In its first program, the PKK defined Kurdistan as a colony and national 
liberation as its goal. The revolution would be a national and democratic one while socialism 
was a long-term goal. It recognized the youth, working classes and poor peasants as its social 
base. All patriotic social segments would join this bloc to achieve the revolution. Deciding on 
armed struggle as the major means of struggle, targets were declared as Turkish colonialism, 
imperialist powers behind it, and its native feudal collaborators within Kurdistan (Özcan 
2006: 98-103; Bozarslan 2003). Parallel to the course of the conflict and changing political 
context, the program and conceptual framework were to be altered in following decades.  
Attacks in the first two years targeted mostly local landlords and tribal chiefs (aşiret aghas). 
They targeted also rival leftist groups, be them Kurdish or Turkish. For attacks on the local 
gentry, the PKK employed selective violence, by making a distinction of ‘collaborators’ and 
‘patriots’ – a distinction which still has a use in contemporary Kurdish politics – and trying to 
draw tribes to its side while exploiting the conflicts among them. The significance of tribes 
stemmed from the agrarian structure. Land distribution was rather uneven in the Kurdish 
region, characterized by sharecropping-like arrangements, in contrast to the rest of the country 
where small to medium sized enterprises have dominated agriculture (Pamuk 2009: 388-389). 
Thereby, the PKK was able to gradually increase support and recruit from the rural and urban 
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poor, by directing its violence mostly at the rich on behalf of the former (Romano 2006: 74; 
van Bruinessen 2005: 361-364). The targeted rich, however, comprised of mostly the rural 
than the urban while the PKK was to receive support from some of the latter, voluntarily or by 
force.  
The 1980 coup and the changing political setting 
In September 12th of 1980, the Turkish military made another but this time harsher 
intervention in civilian politics. All the political parties existed before the coup were banned 
and their leaders were imprisoned. Bans targeted also labor unions and non-governmental 
organizations while detainments included more than half a million individuals. Many were to 
end up in imprisonment and forty-nine in capital punishment (Öktem 2011: 58-66). A military 
junta ruled the country for the next years until the transition to civilian regime took place in 
the end of 1983. The junta regime carried out fundamental reforms concerning the political 
and economic structure of the country, the most important of which was the new constitution 
of 1982. The constitution, which is still in force with some amendments, has considerably 
restricted the freedom of speech and association, and outlawed political struggle based upon 
class, race, sect, or language, while sticking to the ideology of Kemalism. Subsequent 
legislative arrangements introduced a 10 per cent electoral threshold of national vote16 and 
aimed to repress Kurdish identity, by prohibiting the use of Kurdish language and changing 
the names of places from Kurdish to Turkish (McDowall 1997: 424-425). 
Kurds were not exempt from the great confinement, either. Around 81,000 Kurds were 
detained in the first two years of the coup while 1,790 suspected PKK members were 
captured, including several members of the central committee (McDowall 1997: 414, 420). At 
this time the Diyarbakır military prison became the most notorious site for systematic torture 
against Kurdish prisoners. While torture was a practice employed nation-wide in police 
detention and prisons irrespective of ethnicity, the torture in Diyarbakır appears to have been 
more brutal and targeted also the Kurdish identity (e.g. punishing the use of the Kurdish 
language, forcing individuals to declare themselves as Turkish and to sing national anthems, 
etc.). Prisoners, on the other hand, engaged in various forms of resistance, such as riots, 
hunger strikes, suicides, and self-immolation. The torture at Diyarbakır prison and other 
prisons in the region which occupies an important place in the collective memory of Kurds 
                                                          
16 The electoral system is based on proportional representation.  
28 
 
has been widely interpreted as an important factor for the popularization and radicalization of 
the Kurdish movement (Öktem 2011; Zeydanlıoğlu 2009).  
Another important consequence of the coup was the internationalization of the Kurdish 
movement. Many Kurds sought asylum in Europe, gradually forming a large diaspora which 
provided increasing visibility and financial resources for the movement. More importantly, 
the PKK partly moved out of the country and re-located from one country to another, such as 
Syria and Lebanon (Marcus 2009). The PKK finally settled in its camps in mountains of 
northern Iraq, not far from the Turkish border. This journey made the PKK – and the Kurdish 
issue – embedded in the dynamic context of the Middle East and the regional realpolitik, 
which has included also other international actors such as the USA. Actors trying to take 
advantage of tensions within and across countries, shifting coalitions and changing political 
circumstances have increased uncertainty, which is still a huge problem in the region as far as 
the Kurdish issue is concerned (Barkey 1996).17  
The armed conflict and its devastation  
In August of 1984, the PKK launched a series of attacks on Turkish military forces in the 
Kurdish region, marking the start of an armed conflict between the two forces which was to 
go on until 1999. The conflict in the end cost the lives of some 40,000 people, including 
troops, guerillas, and civilians. The PKK’s targets comprised of mostly soldiers and village 
guards. In addition to ‘collaborators,’ a number of individuals that were former or current 
members of the organization was targeted as ‘traitors’ because of dissent or competition 
(Marcus 2009; Bozarslan 2001). Thereby, the use of strategically selective violence would 
help influence behavior, in order to induce collaboration and deter defection (Kalyvas 2006). 
It should be noted, however, that not all the news of violence that were attributed to the PKK 
were necessarily done by the PKK (van Bruinessen 1995). While disinformation contributed 
to uncertainty, the PKK, David McDowall argues, has created a climate of ambivalent 
feelings among ordinary Kurds: some feared it, others loathed it, and increasingly many 
admired it (1997: 421). 
                                                          
17 As an example for the regional effect, one can think of the impact of the Gulf War in 1991 and the war on Iraq 
in 2003 for northern Iraqi Kurds in obtaining an autonomous status (Kurdistan regional government) and in their 
leaders’ changing relationship with the PKK and Turkey. While the changing status of northern Iraq provided an 
opportunity to the PKK to establish bases there deeper than before, it was also to increase the nationalist urge for 
Kurds in Turkey (White 2000: 165; Yeğen 2006: 23). 
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The Turkish government took a variety of measures to counter the Kurdish contenders, in 
addition to the military campaign. One is the village guardianship: the armament of villagers 
in the region to form a paramilitary force against the PKK (Balta 2007). While these created a 
group of people with vested interests in the conflict, the guardianship system enabled certain 
aghas to exploit this power against the vulnerable. In addition, the Emergency Rule was 
declared in 1987 for eight Kurdish provinces, including Diyarbakır, and a governor-general 
was appointed over them. The governor-general had extensive powers, such as the evacuation 
of villages and deportation of population ‘if this was deemed necessary.’ It appears that this 
was thought enormously ‘necessary’ during the course of the war, with a classification of 
places as ‘neutral,’ ‘pro-state’ and ‘pro-terrorist-organization’ (Yükseker 2008a: 149). 
Hundreds of villages and several thousands of pasturages were evacuated, leading to the 
internal displacement of over a million Kurds.18 Some also migrated by themselves, having 
been caught in the crossfire of the conflict. The process of internal displacement was at times 
accompanied by ‘burning of houses and possessions, killing of livestock and destruction of 
crops and orchards’ (Jongerden 2004/2005: 68) and led to devastating socio-economic 
consequences for the victims, who migrated to the urban areas of Kurdish provinces including 
Diyarbakır or to big provinces in the rest of the country (Yükseker 2008b; Kalkınma-Merkezi 
2010; Yılmaz 2008; Doğan/Yılmaz 2011).  
Human rights violations targeted civilians, including politicians, human-rights activists, 
unionists, journalists, sympathizers and alleged sponsors such as several businessmen. The 
violations took various forms: arbitrary arrests, torture in detention, threats, forced 
disappearances and murders by unknown perpetrators. Oppressive activities in this so-called 
‘dirty war’ were carried out by security forces as well as non-state bodies supported by the 
state (Bozarslan 2001). In addition, the Anti-Terror Law of 1991, which is still in force with 
amendments, provided a legal framework for oppressing non-violent dissent such as 
demonstrations and publications, with allegations of separatist propaganda and membership in 
terrorist organizations (McDowall 1997). The fact that calling the region as Kurdistan was 
until recently seen as an offense might give an idea about the severity of limitations on the 
freedom of expression. 
                                                          
18 Different numbers are stated by official bodies, national and international non-governmental organizations: 
official statistics indicate 350,000 persons whereas NGOs estimate 3 million (see Kurban et al. 2008: 74-75; EC 
2004: 51). 
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These experiences contributed to the popularization of the PKK. According to Doğu Ergil, the 
number of guerillas reached to 20,000 at the height of armed struggle while active supporters 
numbered 500,000 and sympathizers about one million and a half. The PKK, however, got 
militarily weaker toward the end of the 1990s, and the number of guerillas in following 
decade was to be around 9,000, allocated between Turkey and northern Iraq (Ergil 2007: 348). 
From 1990 onwards, increasing support for the PKK and rising demands and grievances 
became more visible in diverse forms of protests that took place in urban areas and involved 
civilian Kurds: rallies, celebrations of Kurdish New Year (Newroz), shop-closure protests, 
school boycotts, and uprisings, some of which accompanied the public funerals of guerillas or 
followed the murder of important civilian figures (Güneş 2012: 110-111). Brutal intervention 
by Turkish security forces was common though. Such forms of protests still continue today; 
however, the context has changed quite a lot since 1999. 
The capture of Öcalan and the ongoing state of limbo  
In 1999, Abdullah Öcalan was captured by foreign intelligence services in Kenya, where he 
arrived after several international stops seeking asylum, and he was handed over to the 
Turkish state. Öcalan’s capture caused outrage among Kurds, leading to protests within and 
outside Turkey. Öcalan was first sentenced to capital punishment; however, following the 
reforms carried out for Turkey’s candidacy for the EU membership, he ended up with a life 
sentence in 2002 and has been held in a prison island in the Marmara Sea since then. Turkey 
was accepted as a candidate for EU membership in 1999. The acceptance started a process of 
reforms and the solution to the Kurdish issue appeared as an important condition for the 
membership. Thereby, this provided an opportunity for the movement to press for its claims 
also as a road to EU membership, which it has supported so far. Mesut Yılmaz, a former 
prime minister, also interpreted the emerging situation in a similar way, stating that ‘the road 
to the EU passes through Diyarbakır’ (Milliyet, 17/12/1999). 
The 1990s had witnessed three short-lived attempts of unilateral ceasefire by the PKK; 
however, Öcalan’s calls after his capture for a ‘peaceful solution’ via negotiations brought 
about a longer ceasefire, until the year of 2004, when armed clashes gradually re-emerged, 
and continued until 2013, yet in a lower density than the past. This interval period was 
accompanied by some degree of normalization in the region in both political and socio-
economic terms and witnessed reform initiatives by the AKP government, raising hopes. The 
re-start of clashes and inconsistent political moves, however, added to the climate of 
uncertainty, leading to worries whether there will be a return to the 1990s. 
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Öcalan engaged in negotiations with the Turkish state and continued his leadership in prison, 
by articulating ideas in his defense and in irregular weekly meetings with his lawyers, who 
circulated the notes to pro-Kurdish dailies and publishers.19 These texts altogether brought 
about a revision in the PKK’s program. Some of these alterations were already hinted in the 
past, at times of negotiation with the state and against the background of changing 
(inter)national context. In the course of the conflict, for instance, the goal of a united 
Kurdistan and the rhetoric of Marxist-Leninism were less pronounced, possibly as a result of, 
respectively, conflict-prone competitive relations with Kurdish groups in other parts of greater 
Kurdistan and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc (Özcan 2006: 104-109). 
The post-1999 rhetoric might have stressed democracy more than ever: Öcalan elaborated on 
a ‘democratic solution to the Kurdish issue,’ developing concepts such as ‘democratic 
republic’ and ‘democratic confederalism.’ While the former relate to a re-definition of 
constitutional principles of Turkey, guaranteeing linguistic and cultural rights of Kurds, the 
latter concerns a loose union of Kurdish communities of the Middle East, on the basis of 
participatory mechanisms from below (Öcalan 2001: 169-175; Öcalan 2005). Another concept 
to follow was ‘democratic nation’ by which Öcalan proposed a re-configuration of territorial 
authority, to give Kurds the right to local self-government. Thereby, the goal of independence 
was quitted, at least officially, and Öcalan emphasized a ‘stateless solution’ within the 
existing nation-states. He criticized the approach the PKK had in the 1970s when it 
understood self-determination in a Leninist sense, in the form of a state creation, and instead 
he now acknowledged that it was possible through other means too (Öcalan 2004: 306-335).20 
It is hard to know Öcalan’s calculations behind the programmatic revision; however, one can 
guess that it offered him a stronger position as he had less maneuver space in the next context. 
In a parallel fashion, pro-Kurdish party politics have focused on, inter alia, the demand for 
‘democratic autonomy,’ in a similar content with Öcalan’s proposals. The definition and 
details of this concept have varied by time and within group; yet, the idea is roughly about 
political decentralization through either creation of regional units across the country with 
                                                          
19 Prison notes have been controlled by Turkish officials and edited by the Kurdish movement before 
publication. As for negotiations, they were kept somewhat secret, except Öcalan’s remarks to the public and 
recently leaked news about meetings in Oslo between representatives from the Turkish government and the 
PKK. 
20 Öcalan’s relevant statements refer to and reflect some influence of classical anarchists and modern figures who 
emphasize self-management, horizontal organization of society, and creation of alternative institutions within an 
established system. Names include Kropotkin, Proudhon, Mooray Bookchin, Noam Chomsky, and Antonio 
Negri. For a list of his prison library, see the essay in Express journal (Anonymous 2009).  
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autonomous powers, or devolution of such powers only to the Kurdish region. In the 
meantime, another political project appears to have emerged underground: the KCK 
(Koma Civakên Kurdistan – Union of Communities in Kurdistan). The KCK was described as 
a ‘parallel state’ by Prime Minister Erdoğan (Radikal, 07/11/2011) and has provided the 
ground for the mass arrests that took place since 2009. According to its founding contract, or 
its ‘constitution’ in the words of some, it consists of legislative, executive, judiciary, and 
security organs as well as participatory mechanisms in Kurdish communities. The reception 
and implications of this initiative are mentioned below; however, let’s add that the contract 
supports principles elaborated by Öcalan in the post-1999 process such as the stateless 
solution, participatory democracy, confederalism, and a system of economy which is not 
based on profit maximization.21 It touches also on linguistic and cultural concerns – concerns 
which were strongly voiced in the 2000s (KCK 2005; also see a relevant indictment, TC 
2010: 1/56-70). 
As the unilateral ceasefire was to end in the summer of 2004, Öcalan declared the transition 
from position of a ‘passive defense’ to that of an ‘active defense’ unless a bilateral ceasefire 
was declared. Hence, armed clashes started once again and increased up to 2013, 
accompanied with shorter breaks for calls and negotiations. Demonstrations and unrest 
followed in urban areas. One vital event took place in Diyarbakır in March 2006: following 
the public funeral of some guerillas killed in armed clashes, riots took place in the city for 
several days and spread to other provinces in the region. Clashes between demonstrators and 
Turkish security forces resulted in the killing of ten civilians, half of whom were under the 
age of 18 (İHD 2006). One important aspect of the event is the fact that young demonstrators 
also damaged several bank and shop windows and this was interpreted by some locals in 
terms of class tension.22  
Demonstrations in which children played a leading role became widespread in the following 
years. At total, thousands of children ended up with detentions and imprisonments because of 
                                                          
21 Although the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and symbols in the flag were abandoned, Öcalan maintained a 
somewhat critical view of capitalism and called the pro-Kurdish political parties to cooperate with left-wing 
parties for electoral politics. It is probably not mistaken to claim that the rank and file of the PKK tends to 
support socialism.  
22 This event spontaneously came up in a few interviews I made in Diyarbakir. While those who brought up the 
example interpreted it also as a reaction of the urban poor against the rich (hence, an intra-group tension), others 
argued that the attacks were not against wealth, but targeted either symbols of the state or those who did not 
participate in shop-closure protests. Demonstrations usually head to the city center which is relatively developed. 
The city appears highly unequal in terms of income distribution, with spatial segregation along slums, gated 
communities, and middle-income neighborhoods.  
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participation in demonstrations and throwing stones at security forces. The criminal treatment 
of children received widespread reaction from the public though, forcing the government to 
make some legislative arrangements in 2010. Moreover, several public attempts of lynching 
took place against Kurdish civilians in places which received immigration, by the middle of 
the decade (Gambetti 2007). These events that increased tensions and worries, however, have 
been accompanied by a process of intermittent reforms and debates in the political arena 
which included pro-Kurdish political parties as important actors. 
2.2 Enter Pro-Kurdish political parties 
Pro-Kurdish political parties comprise the most important legal component of the Kurdish 
movement. In this section, I first mention major electoral trends in the period before the pro-
Kurdish parties emerged in the early 1990s and then focus on the experiences of these parties 
within the limits of the post-1980s legal and political setting. A turning point which deserves 
attention is the success a pro-Kurdish party showed in the 1999 local elections and started 
ruling a number of municipalities in the Kurdish region since then. This success was to be 
followed by the entrance to the national parliament in 2007 and 2011 standing as independent 
candidates, in spite of ongoing legal obstacles and rivalry with the AKP government. The 
section details major demands, as well as opportunities and constraints that the pro-Kurdish 
parties have been faced with.  
Kurds and electoral politics before the 1990s 
As mentioned before, the left-wing Labor Party of Turkey had been successful in its short life 
to attract Kurds; however, with a premature organizational structure, it received only about 3 
per cent of votes in the region for the general elections in the 1960s (Alış 2009: 128). The 
majority of Kurdish votes before the 1980s were distributed among the mainstream political 
parties. Social structure of the region was influential in this. By the year 1965, the rural 
population was 65 per cent both nationwide and in Diyarbakır (see Table 2.1). Parties would 
have clientelist relations with aghas, shaykhs (religious leaders), and other local elites who 
could control electoral behavior.23 Thereby, two strong mainstream parties in the region were 
the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP) at center left and the Justice 
                                                          
23 Thanks to the processes of urbanization in the region especially since the 1980s, the direct influence of 
traditional elites on electoral behavior appears to have gradually decreased. In the city of Diyarbakir, I heard 
only about the Ensarioğlu family as a voting bloc of some 2,000 persons. Galip Ensarioğlu, the ex-president of 
the Chamber, is the contemporary deputy from this family for the AKP. For more information, see Ch. 5.  
34 
 
Party (Adalet Partisi) at center right (McDowall 1997: 395-417). ‘Without necessarily 
representing themselves as radicals, Kurdish nationalists participated, for long decades, in the 
political game’ (Bozarslan 1996: 146). 
 
Table 2.1 Population in Diyarbakır 
Year Urban Rural Total 
1965 162,467 313,449 475,916 
1985 472,055 462,450 934,505 
2000 817,692 545,016 1,362,708 
2011 1,132,351  438,592 1,570,943 
Source: TÜİK24 
 
With the rise of the National Outlook (Milli Görüş) movement and hence political Islam, 
another important political actor emerged (see Ch. 3). Its representative party in the 1970s, the 
National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi - MSP), attracted Kurds, receiving about 18 
per cent of votes in Diyarbakır for general elections. The party was closed down, like other 
parties, by the military intervention in 1980. Yet, successor parties were established and 
Kurdish votes were divided again among a number of mainstream parties and an 
unconventional party, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi - RP), the new representative for the 
National Outlook. The Welfare Party obtained a similar ratio of Kurdish votes in general 
elections, except in 1991 when it made an electoral alliance with a far-right party. The party 
gradually increased its power nationwide and also came to the power at the Diyarbakır 
Metropolitan Municipality in 1994. While the Welfare Party could not go on its political 
career, getting closed down by the Constitutional Court after an indirect military intervention 
in 1997 against the coalition government of which it was a part, its tradition was to go on to 
some extent. The AKP has a share in this tradition; however, it got beyond it, as can be seen 
                                                          
24 Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu - TÜİK). All TÜİK data used in the dissertation was 
compiled from its online database at http://www.tuik.gov.tr. Access dates 10.07.2012-01.09.2012. 
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in the electoral results for Diyarbakır (see Table 2.2).25 Yet, electoral politics was to change 
significantly with the emergence of a tradition of pro-Kurdish political parties.  
 
Table 2.2 Parties rooted in political Islam and Diyarbakır in general elections (% of votes) 
 
1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2007 2011 
MSP 18.5 17.9 - - - - - - - - 
RP - - - 24.5 12 18.8 - - - - 
FP - - - - - - 14.6 - - - 
SP - - - - - - - 2.5 2.3 1.3 
AKP - - - - - - - 16 40.9 32.2 
Source: TÜİK 
Between the parliament and the prison: First pro-Kurdish political parties  
In the late 1980s, some Kurds engaged in politics within the Social Democratic Populist Party 
(Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti), the post-coup successor of the Republican People’s Party 
until it integrated with the latter in 1995. Yet, nationalist ‘outbidding’ by mainstream parties 
was to pose troubles for Kurds in a context of increasing tension (cf. Horowitz 1985: 357). 
The Kurdish issue has been frequently abused among and sometimes within these parties to 
accuse each other of supporting ‘terrorism’ and leading to the fragmentation of the country. 
Claims for Kurdish political and cultural rights were risky in such a context. Accordingly, the 
SHP expelled its several Kurdish deputies and party members in 1989 for their pro-Kurdish 
activities. Several others resigned following this event (Ölmez 1995). 
These events led to the founding of first legal pro-Kurdish political party in 1990: People’s 
Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi - HEP). The HEP set out as a left party, explicitly 
                                                          
25 It was not only the Welfare Party who used religious themes, but also the Turkish governments and the 
Hizballah (an underground Kurdish Islamist group which emerged in the post-1980 period and was reputedly 
supported by the state). They used these themes in their propaganda against the PKK, depicting it as composed 
of infidels. Thereby, the PKK at times found itself in need of revising its critical approach to religion and 
appealed to some religious themes to counter this challenge. Accordingly, it supported the formation of a number 
of groups organizing ‘patriotic’ imams and religious men (Çalmuk 2001; van Bruinessen 1999). Similar contests 
around religious themes took place also in the 2000s as mentioned below. 
36 
 
committed to find a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue and to support Kurdish culture 
and language. The party formed an electoral alliance with the SHP in the 1991 general 
elections and sent its 22 deputies to the parliament. However, a major crisis emerged in the 
parliament because of the deputies’ use of accessories with Kurdish national colors (yellow-
red-green) and one deputy’s (Leyla Zana) additional statement in Kurdish about the fraternity 
of Turks and Kurds following her oath which was spontaneously protested by the rest of the 
parliament (Ölmez 1995).  
The HEP was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1993, on the grounds of alleged 
separatism; a faith which was shared by several other pro-Kurdish parties founded later to 
replace one another. These parties included the Democratic Party (Demokrasi Partisi, 1993-
1994), the People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi – HADEP, 1994-2003), the 
Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi – DEHAP, 1997-2005),26 and the 
Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – DTP, 2005-2009). Today the 
tradition is upheld by the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi – BDP, 
2008).27 During the course of the 1990s, HADEP and DEHAP took part in two general 
elections. They obtained high rates of votes in Kurdish provinces, for instance, above 40 per 
cent in Diyarbakır; however, they got about 4 per cent nationwide and could not send deputies 
to the parliament because of the 10 per cent national threshold introduced after the 1980 coup 
(see Tables 3 and 4). Obstacles facing the pro-Kurdish parties were not restricted to electoral 
thresholds and closure files; party members were also faced with a variety of oppressive 
measures common to the 1990s: arbitrary detention, imprisonment, bombing attacks to party 
headquarters, dismissal from the parliament, bans to stand as a candidate in elections, forced 
disappearances and murders by unknown perpetrators under the Emergency Rule (Ölmez 
1995; Demir 2005; Watts 2010).  
 
Table 2.3 Pro-Kurdish parties in general elections (%) 
                                                          
26 The DEHAP faced a closure trial, but before it was finalized the party dissolved itself to go on working within 
the latter pro-Kurdish party.  
27 There have been also pro-Kurdish parties outside of the ‘PKK-led’ Kurdish movement; however, their 
electoral base has been very limited. Today, they consist of the Party for Rights and Freedoms (Hak ve 
Özgürlükler Partisi – HAKPAR, 2002) and the Participatory Democracy Party (Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi – 
KADEP, 2006). They collaborated, to varying degrees, with the major pro-Kurdish party, BDP, in general 
elections of 2011. By using ‘pro-Kurdish parties’ within the text, I refer to the parties that followed one another 
and formed a continuous tradition as the major pro-Kurdish party. 
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1995 1999 2002 2007 2011 
HADEP 4.2 4.7 - - - 
DEHAP - - 6.2 - - 
DTP-led bloc - - - 3.8 - 
BDP-led bloc - - - - 5.8 
Source: TÜİK and Yeğen (2011). 
 
Table 2.4 Pro-Kurdish Parties and Diyarbakır in general elections (%) 
 
1995 1999 2002 2007 2011 
HADEP 46.3 45.9 - - - 
DEHAP - - 56.1 - - 
DTP - - - 42.7 - 
BDP - - - - 58.2 
Source: TÜİK and Yeğen (2011). 
 
The parties have been usually successful to bring together Kurdish politicians from different 
social backgrounds, including figures who were traditionally-oriented elites and already 
integrated to mainstream parties; university-educated professionals such as lawyers; 
businesspeople, and many non-elite others who were brought by the movement activism. 
Claims concerned major issues such a general amnesty, recognition of Kurdish identity and 
cultural rights, education in mother language, changes in the electoral system, and an end to 
the Emergency Rule. Although the pro-Kurdish parties were not merely a legal flank of the 
PKK, Hamit Bozarslan (1996) argues that they could not develop independent policies, as 
their space of action was restricted under the dominance of the PKK within the movement; 
they instead proposed to become a mediator between the Turkish authorities and the guerillas. 
Even so, the Kurdish activism and events of the period made an impact on other political 
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actors: for instance, Kurdish politicians from mainstream parties tried to distinguish 
themselves from the state policies that targeted the region, in order to not lose electoral 
support (Bozarslan 1996). Major political actors also made some steps: during the presidency 
of Turgut Özal, the Kurdish language was legally allowed to be spoken in non-official 
situations. Other leaders such as Süleyman Demirel would not go further but state that Turkey 
recognized the ‘Kurdish reality’ (McDowall 1997). One facet of the Kurdish reality was to 
become crystallized in the local office. 
Victory at local elections  
Although the 10 per cent threshold closed the channels of parliamentary politics for the pro-
Kurdish parties, until the recent resort to independent candidacy, the HADEP could win the 
control of municipal offices in the 1999 local elections in most of the cities and towns of the 
Kurdish region, including the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality. However, the party 
officials, members and a couple of mayors were detained by police and some of them were 
prisoned after the elections. Yet, it was difficult to undo the electoral success, and this set the 
beginning of a Kurdish municipal tradition, which was consolidated in the elections of 2004 
and 2009, in spite of rival efforts by the AKP to win Kurdish municipalities, especially that of 
Diyarbakır (see Table 2.5). Municipal offices opened up a legal space for the movement, to 
reclaim the Kurdish identity and to provide services in line with its political goals as well as to 
stand for Kurds. Especially in the city of Diyarbakır, the municipal office welcomed guests 
from not only the rest of the country but also abroad including the members of the European 
parliament, diplomats, writers and activists. 
 
Table 2.5 Local elections in Diyarbakır28 (% of votes) 
 
1999 
 
2004 
 
2009 
Pro-Kurdish parties 40.9 
 
43.4 
 
59.2 
                                                          
28 Numbers show the votes for provincial councils (il genel meclisi –a component of special provincial 
administrations). Local elections include voting for not only provincial councils but also municipalities, 
metropolitan municipalities, village and neighborhood councils. The reason for highlighting the votes for 
provincial councils in within-text tables is the fact that they are known to be better reflecting partisan behavior 
whereas votes for single municipalities might rest also on personal factors as regards the mayor candidate. Still, 
vote ratios are pretty similar, so the tables reflect the success in winning both types of seats. 
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AKP - 
 
32.2 
 
30.5 
Source: TÜİK 
 
The increasing focus of the movement on language and culture in the post-1999 period has 
been most visible at the municipal site. Mayors made various efforts to use the Kurdish 
language in municipal services and written sources such as posters and calendars – efforts 
which met judicial sanctions. Some carried out, for instance, restoration projects which aimed 
to emphasize the Kurdish as well as Armenian and non-Muslim chapters of the history of 
Diyarbakır, in contrast to the homogenizing approach of Turkish historiography. In addition, 
numerous cultural and educational projects were initiated for inhabitants of the city to 
increase feelings of belonging and mobilization (Gambetti 2009; Watts 2010). Projects also 
targeted municipal workers as detailed in Chapter 7. 
Other activities too took place, especially in rivalry with the AKP government in the 2000s. 
The Sarmaşık (ivy) Association was initially founded by the Mayor of Diyarbakır 
Metropolitan Municipality to fight against poverty. This initiative presented itself as an 
alternative to poverty-alleviation activities vigorously carried out by the AKP. The association 
was, however, faced with judicial obstacles and had to be closed down, because the decision 
by the municipality’s assembly to contribute to the association was not seen permissible 
according to laws.29 However, it was re-founded in 2007 again in the municipality’s 
leadership but on the basis of a large board of founders composed of a number of 
associational leaders, including those of the associations this study examines. As detailed in 
other sections, the initiative has implications concerning both the nature of power the Kurdish 
movement exercises in the region and the variation in relationships between associations and 
the movement. 
Since the 1980s, municipalities in Turkey have enjoyed an increasing autonomy, financial 
resources, and socio-economic power (Erder/İncioğlu 2008; Bayraktar 2007; Buğra/Savaşkan 
2010). Nevertheless, the Kurdish municipalities appear to have encountered several obstacles 
in enjoying these powers. Many municipal officials complained about an ‘economic embargo’ 
from the national center (Watts 2006). Then Minister of Justice for the AKP government, 
                                                          
29 To found an association eligible for municipal contribution, they would need to get the approval of the 
Cabinet, which would probably not happen. 
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Mehmet Ali Şahin, validated this before the local elections by stating that the municipalities 
who fight with or contradict the government cannot get all of their projects approved in 
Ankara (Milliyet, 23/02/2009). Official data also show that the provinces under the AKP 
dominance had received more EU funds for social projects (see Ch. 3). My fieldwork also 
shows that an opinion that the provinces which give more electoral support to the AKP have 
better access to sources is common in Diyarbakır. 
Obstacles concern not only the access to resources, but also the creation and redistribution of 
resources. As mentioned before, poverty-alleviation projects of municipalities run by the pro-
Kurdish party were faced with judicial obstacles. In addition, the DİYAR A.Ş., a company 
founded by the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, was subjected to judicial investigation 
because of alleged links to the PKK and had to be privatized although it has been recently 
common for non-Kurdish municipalities across the country to establish enterprises for the 
provision of local services and hence to have additional sources of income. During the 2009 
local elections, on the other hand, Prime Minister Erdoğan pointed at bad quality of municipal 
services in his rallies in Kurdish provinces, especially in Diyarbakır. Erdoğan presented the 
AKP as a better alternative, providing politics of ‘service.’ A dichotomy of ‘service versus 
identity’ took place in public debates with regard to the Kurdish issue (also see Ch. 3, §3); 
however, the AKP ended up with a lower electoral support in the region (see Table 2.5). 
Other forms of pressure too targeted mayors, as outlined above with regard to first pro-
Kurdish parties. However, in the post-1999 process, especially following the complete end of 
the Emergency Rule in 2002, there has been a more reliance on judicial measures to deal with 
the Kurdish movement, while physically violent methods were employed only occasionally, 
excluding the armed combat (Watts 2010). Mayors and staff of municipalities had their share 
in investigations, detentions, surveillance, and imprisonments, increasingly following the 
2009 local elections when votes for the pro-Kurdish candidates highly increased to the dismay 
of the AKP. This wave of judicial obstacles constituted the ‘KCK operations’ which targeted 
the civilian wing of the movement, on the grounds of alleged membership to the PKK’s urban 
organization KCK and establishment of a ‘parallel state.’ 
Back in the national parliament  
In the 2007 general elections, the pro-Kurdish party (DTP) led a left-wing bloc of independent 
candidates and sent 22 deputies to the parliament for the first time since the mid-1990s. In the 
next general elections of 2011, the BDP-led bloc increased pro-Kurdish votes and obtained a 
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higher number of deputies, that is, 36 (see Tables 2.3 and 2.6).30 The major rival has been the 
AKP whose electoral support rocketed in the region in 2007 while it got lower in 2011, as a 
result of changes in the political context, as detailed in next chapter. In the meantime, pro-
Kurdish deputies voiced opposition in the parliament to the AKP government’s policies 
concerning a variety of topics, especially the Kurdish issue.  
 
Table 2.6 Pro-Kurdish parties and the AKP in general elections (Diyarbakır, % of votes) 
 2002 2007 2011 
Pro-Kurdish Parties  56,1 42,7 58,2 
AKP 16 40,9 32,2 
Source: TÜİK and Yeğen (2011). 
 
Similar to the ideas developed by Öcalan in the post-1999 process, the programs of the pro-
Kurdish parties emphasized goals such as education in mother language, constitutional 
recognition of the Kurdish identity, legal safeguards for linguistic and cultural rights, 
women’s empowerment, social rights, improvement of uneven regional development, support 
for Turkey’s membership to the EU, lifting of the electoral threshold, and other institutional 
reforms for democratization (DTP 2005; BDP 2008). Several deputies pointed at Öcalan as 
the addressee (muhatap) for negotiations on the Kurdish issue while acknowledging that the 
pro-Kurdish parties have the same social base with the PKK. They also rejected the pressures 
by Prime Minister Erdoğan and parties in the parliament to make them publicly declare the 
PKK a terrorist organization, as a condition to engage in negotiation. It is a less known topic 
to what kind of pressures by the PKK pro-Kurdish politicians have been subject; however, 
they too at times appeared as caught in crossfire, especially when the PKK carried out 
unexpected attacks such as the one in Reşadiye, in northern Turkey, right before the 
Constitutional Court was going to give a decision about the closure case against the pro-
Kurdish party in 2009. 
                                                          
30 The cooperation between pro-Kurdish parties and extra-parliamentary left-wing parties dates back to the 
1990s. Candidates were run mainly in the Kurdish region and several big provinces such as Istanbul and Mersin, 
which have a significant amount of Kurdish population. In the end deputies have been mostly Kurdish. 
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Pro-Kurdish deputies kept making claims with regard to the right to education in mother 
language, introduction of constitutional safeguards for Kurdish identity, and strengthening of 
local governments. These formed the minimum common demands through which the pro-
Kurdish parties could articulate social groups, including the associational actors, to its 
political project, as detailed in Part II. Let’s note here that the idea of strengthening local 
governments is advocated in the form of reconfiguration of territorial-administrative 
organization, according to the proposal of ‘democratic autonomy.’ This proposal was offered 
first in a party congress of the DTP in 2007 and has been advocated since then as a political 
goal. The concept advocates a model to realize above-mentioned goals, with a restructuring of 
the state. It is argued that the model of nation-state based on centralism disregards cultural 
differences and leads to various problems. The proposal supports decentralization, with an 
introduction of new administrative units between the central government and provinces. This 
way the country would have about 20 regional parliaments, which would represent a number 
of neighboring provinces and have responsibilities in areas such as education, culture, health, 
agriculture, and industry. While police and judicial units would be coordinated by the central 
and regional governments, the central government would be still responsible for foreign 
affairs, fiscal policy and defense (DTP 2007). If the proposal was not accepted for the whole 
country, it would be adopted only for the Kurdish region.31  
The empowerment of local governments has been advocated by various actors in Kurdish 
politics, including the PKK, associational actors, and NGOs, although with variation in its 
interpretation and naming. For instance, Öcalan elaborated on the idea of local ‘self-defense 
forces’ (ANF, 20/08/2010). The idea was interpreted differently in Diyarbakır; some seeing it 
as a step for the rehabilitation of current guerillas, and some as a threat to Kurdish opponents 
of the movement. In addition, there has been also a critical approach to private property and 
capitalist economy in certain formulations of democratic autonomy. This approach, mostly 
advocated by Öcalan and PKK circles but also pronounced by some pro-Kurdish deputies, 
emphasizes the coordinating role of consumer and producer cooperatives, in an alternative 
economy composed of both private and self-managing public sectors (ANF 2010; Haber-
Merkezi 2011; AÖSBA N/A). 
                                                          
31 This option was stated by pro-Kurdish politicians and there was one attempt of declaring democratic 
autonomy in the region in July 2011 which coincided with attacks of the PKK, leading to a division among 
Kurdish deputies concerning the timing and manner of the declaration. As a result, the declaration was given up.  
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In 2010, a similar draft was proposed in a workshop on democratic autonomy organized by 
the Democratic Society Congress (Demokratik Toplum Kongresi, DTK – see below §3) in 
Diyarbakır, advocating an ‘egalitarian solidaristic economy driven by not profit maximization 
but use value’ (DTK 2010). This economic approach was opposed by some Kurdish actors, 
especially business representatives who participated in the workshop. Business groups 
supported strengthening of local governments and decentralization of economic decision-
making in a fashion similar to the processes of state rescaling, which have already been 
underway during the AKP period (see Ch. 3 and 5). Against the background of such conflict 
of views, the pro-Kurdish parties kept some ambiguity on the economic dimension in the 
proposal as recognized by the DTP’s declaration (2007) and still upheld by the BDP (BDP 
2008; also see EDÖB 2011). Despite the controversies in the workshop, ambiguity seems to 
have made it possible for the pro-Kurdish party to build a coalition of actors with different 
perspectives and interests, while leaving the project open to future contests (cf. 
Streeck/Thelen 2005: 26-27; McAdam/Tarrow/Tilly 2008). 
Another challenge for the pro-Kurdish parties relates to the AKP’s initiatives concerning the 
Kurdish issue. During its first term in power the AKP government speeded up the reform 
process for EU candidacy, as detailed in Chapter 3. Some of these reforms related to linguistic 
and cultural rights, legally enabling the private teaching of and audiovisual broadcasting in 
Kurdish. During the second and third terms these reforms were continued by enabling 
Kurdology institutes in universities, setting up a state TV channel in Kurdish and recently 
planning Kurdish elective courses at schools. The reform process, however, depicted an 
irregular nature, interrupted by periods of conflicts on the ground, Turkish nationalist debates 
in the parliamentary and public spheres, and obstacles to enjoy the rights in practice. The pro-
Kurdish parties interpreted the positive steps as advances of the struggle by the movement and 
responded to the process by advocating full rights (e.g. education in mother language, rather 
than symbolical steps) and taking direct action to challenge the government, for instance, via 
the use of Kurdish language in the municipal realm despite judicial sanctions, as mentioned 
before.  
Mobilizing a network of public, private and voluntary actors, the AKP government has 
engaged in vigorous charity activities across the country. As mentioned before, these 
activities also targeted the Kurdish region, with a rhetoric which emphasized ‘positive 
discrimination’ for the region and solidarity with the needy and prioritized a politics of 
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‘service,’ as opposed to ‘identity politics.’32 As one response to these attempts, pro-Kurdish 
politicians often emphasized that the Kurdish issue could not be solved through in-kind 
assistances, which were symbolized with pasta and coal,33 and interpreted as making Kurds 
dependent on social aids by making them first poor and then subjects of assistance.34 Kurdish 
politicians instead argued that the real needs of Kurds were peace, recognition of identity and 
linguistic rights, which could be realized only by a new constitution.35 On the other hand, the 
municipal governments by the pro-Kurdish parties also were to engage in alternative charity 
activities, as mentioned before. 
The 2010 referendum on constitutional amendments by the AKP government, on the other 
hand, led to calls by the pro-Kurdish party to boycott it, on the grounds that the amendment 
did not take into account Kurdish demands for a democratic solution via a new constitution. 
More concrete demands included the following: non-ethnic definition of citizenship in the 
constitution; pause to military operations; release of detainees of the KCK operations; 
lowering the electoral threshold; and starting negotiations for a political solution.36 Some 
associational actors in Diyarbakır, however, took a different stance and called for voting in 
favor of the referendum, as discussed in Part II. Here, the AKP’s challenge at Kemalist elites, 
including military and judicial bureaucracy as well as the ‘deep state,’ appears to have 
gathered some support from Kurds. To challenge this, pro-Kurdish deputies interpreted the 
emerging situation as an indicator that the AKP just became ‘the state.’37 
Civil disobedience has become an important form of protest advocated by the pro-Kurdish 
politicians during the last few years. One essential topic that has led to the use of this form of 
protest relates to the religious appeals by the AKP. Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized 
                                                          
32 See, for instance, ‘Vatandaş devletin şefkat elini hissetti,’ Yeni Şafak, 07/08/2007; ‘Hükümetten kurban 
bayramında Güneydoğu’ya pozitif ayrımcılık,’ Sabah, 21/12/2007; and ‘Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’den doğudaki 
muhtaçlar için “gönül seferberliği” çağrısı,’ Zaman, 13/.12/2007. 
33 In a protest against the AKP upon a brutal police intervention to demonstrations in Batman, protesters left 
pasta, coal and truncheon in front of the AKP’s headquarters, see ‘DTP'lilerden, AKP'ye makarna, kömür ve 
cop,’ Milliyet, 18/02/2008. 
34 ‘Yoksullaştır, yardım et, kendine bağımlı kıl,’ Özgür Gündem, 01/04/2008. 
35 ‘Türk: AKP'nin Kürt paketinde makarna var,’ Radikal, 12/03/2008; ‘Makarna değil, yeni anayasa,’ Sabah, 
12/03/2008; ‘Kürtlerin Makarna, Kömür, Televizyona Değil Barışa İhtiyacı Var,’ Bianet, 21/03/2008. 
36 See Cengiz Çandar, ‘Kürtler için “Evet”; boykota “Hayır,”’ Radikal, 21/08/2010. 
37 There has been a perceived distinction between the government and the state in Turkish politics, prioritizing 
the latter as the real ruler behind the curtains. Accordingly, the state was composed of civilian and more 
importantly military elites, in addition to the conception of ‘deep state’ which relates to state-supported 
organized crime, as mentioned in next chapter. The claim about the AKP becoming the state was voiced by 
deputies, for instance, in the May 1 (2011) demonstration in Diyarbakir when I was there for my fieldwork.  
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several times the religious fraternity of Turks and Kurds and their common history dating 
back to fights against the crusades, in the leadership of a Kurd, while claiming that the 
members of the Kurdish movement were not Muslim but Zoroaster and consider Öcalan as a 
prophet, to discredit the movement among pious Kurds (see also Candaş/Buğra 2010). The 
movement, on the other hand, mobilized ‘civilian Friday’ sermons so that people would do 
their weekly collective praying outside of mosques which were claimed to carry out the 
government’s propaganda. These alternative prayers were headed by ‘patriotic imams.’ 
Pro-Kurdish parties have encountered similar judicial obstacles, in addition to exclusionary 
attitudes by the government, mainstream parties, and military bureaucracy. The most vital of 
these has been the KCK operations, as mentioned before in relation with the municipalities. 
The operations included recurring mass arrests since 2009 onward of a variety of persons such 
as party affiliates, mayors, unionists, NGO activists, journalists, lawyers, and so on.38 The 
arrests were grounded on the alleged links to the KCK, as a civilian wing of the PKK. 
Different cases were opened in several provinces within and outside the Kurdish region, with 
indictments some of which consist of several thousands of pages. Indictments were based on, 
inter alia, wiretap evidence of phone calls and conversations carried out in office spaces, as 
well as statements by secret witnesses (see, for instance, the indictment for the major trial in 
Diyarbakir, TC 2010). Thousands of people were taken into custody so far, many ending up in 
years-long detentions. According to my informants, arrests have been highly arbitrary, also 
targeting many people who were not really linked to the KCK. This has contributed to 
grievances also of Kurdish actors who have been relatively distanced to the movement and 
encouraged associational cooperation with the Kurdish movement on this topic. 
2.3 The situation of dual power  
Neşe Düzel: Do you feel free to express all of your thoughts, as the leader of the 
Diyarbakır Bar and as a Kurd?  
Mehmet Emin Aktar: Of course, I do not feel free. Because we live in Diyarbakır 
under conditions of dual power. On the one hand, there are constraints presented by 
                                                          
38 According to the pro-Kurdish party BDP, professional distribution of some 2000 detainees by 2012 is as the 
following: 6 members of the parliament (they were elected after taken into custody); 111 members of non-
governmental organizations; 38 lawyers; 111 journalists and newspaper distributors; 326 municipal personnel 
including mayors; 17 members of central executive board of the DTP and the BDP; 52 members of the BDP 
party assembly; 452 executives of the BDP; 800 members of the BDP; 6 elected heads of neighborhoods; and 28 
unionists (Radikal, 01/07/2012). 
46 
 
the Kurdish political movement with its armed and non-armed components such as the 
PKK, the KCK and the BDP. On the other hand, there are constraints of the state. 
Therefore, most people in Kurdish territory take into account this situation of dual 
sovereignty. ‘I would be excluded by the Kurdish political movement if I made this 
statement,’ one says. Or he feels the same way with regard to the state and thinks that 
‘public prosecutors would file an investigation about me if I made this statement.’39 
The growing power of the Kurdish movement at both illegal and legal sites has led to a 
situation of dual power in the Kurdish region. This section elaborates on the manifestations of 
this situation with a focus on Diyarbakır. First, I point at the emerging claims to sovereignty 
during the armed conflict of the post-1980s period. This has led to the creation of alternative 
institutions and sources of legitimacy. Second, a moral economy emerged as a by-product of 
the dual power situation. This moral economy emphasizes ‘patriotism’ and political 
‘sacrifice,’ overriding calculations of self-interest. It helps create bonds for intra-group 
solidarity, as well as norms of conduct between the movement’s leaders and the locals; hence, 
it serves political integration (cf. Salzmann 2010). 
Alternative claims to sovereignty 
Already in 1986, the PKK declared that ‘liberated zones’ were in the making (van Bruinessen 
2005: 371). The term meant that the PKK was taking control of the places and asserting itself 
as the sole authority. As the conflict escalated in the early 1990s, the PKK increased its power 
in many parts of the Kurdish region (Ölmez 1995: 109; Bozarslan 1996: 147). This process 
has produced a situation of ‘dual power’ in the region, with two rival claims to sovereignty 
(cf. Tilly 1978), by the Turkish state and the PKK-led Kurdish movement.40 A shifting 
political configuration of space resulted: each power had spatial segments under their control, 
and there were zones in which control was contested and hence limited sovereignty was 
exercised (cf. Kalyvas 2006: 88-89; Scott 2009). Contemporary Diyarbakır as a province and 
its associational site can be thought in these terms, as a ‘contested zone.’ 
                                                          
39 My translation and my emphasis. See Neşe Düzel’s interview with Mehmet Emin Aktar, ‘Emin Aktar: Kürtler 
ilk kez Öcalan’ı tartışıyor,’ Taraf, 27/12/2010.  
40 Tuğal (2009) also uses the conception of dual power with regard to the growing power of the Islamist 
movement in municipal governments in Turkey since the 1990s. The Islamist dual power situation at the 
municipal level was not as strong as the Kurdish one in the regional level; yet, it seems interesting for 
understanding the situation in the 2000s when the Islamists, albeit in a different guise, came to power at the 
national level and found themselves in a kind of another dual power situation vis-a-vis the secularist-nationalist 
elites (see Ch. 3).  
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The movement’s claim to power led to the creation of alternative institutions and sources of 
legitimacy which were respected by some part of the population despite obstacles by the 
central government. The PKK undertook state-like functions such as justice (‘popular 
courts’), fiscal policy (‘taxation’), welfare (charity for survivors), national symbols (flag and 
celebration days such as Newroz), and military recruitment and security (guerilla forces) 
(Bozarslan 2003: 864; van Bruinessen 2005: 364).41 A former PKK commander explains the 
situation as the following: ‘The idea was that whatever the state does, we do, that we should 
sort of share authority, they operate during the day, and we operate at night . . . So if the state 
taxes, then we have to tax too’ (quoted in Marcus 2007:182). 
Two references were recognized legitimate: guerilla leader Abdullah Öcalan and martrys 
(Bozarslan 2001). Although the PKK got militarily weaker by the mid-1990s and officially 
quitted the goal of an independent Kurdish state by 1999, the situation of dual power has 
persisted. One means of this has been the movement’s hold of municipal offices since 1999, 
an event which opened up new opportunities and institutional mechanisms for asserting 
alternative power, as mentioned before. In addition, the city headquarters of the pro-Kurdish 
party appears to be important as well: İrfan Aktan (2010), a well-known journalist from the 
region, informs that the party’s legal commissions play a role in the solution of economic and 
social disputes in many Kurdish cities and towns while the Turkish state’s courts deal only 
with smuggling and political trials (also see Geerse 2011: 279-320). 
Another site has been civil society. In his theoretical writings, Öcalan emphasizes the need to 
get organized in the ‘third domain,’ i.e. ‘the organization of all elements of civil society 
according to their own identities and needs as an alternative to the ruling system’ (Öcalan 
2003: 23, emphasis mine). Founded in 2007, the Democratic Society Congress appears to be 
an example initiative, aiming to bring together and mobilize NGOs and political actors in 
Diyarbakır within an umbrella platform. The platform involved at times also the associations 
this study focuses on. Those who are critical of the movement interpret the initiative as an 
effort of the PKK to standardize and discipline the behavior of actors in civil society.42 In a 
similar but more positive manner, Öcalan also stressed the significance of the DTK for 
articulating common demands and including pro-government-looking associations such as the 
                                                          
41 Some of these activities such as ‘taxation’ are mentioned also in the indictments for the KCK trials and in 
informal conversations I had in Diyarbakir. 
42 Based on fieldwork.  
48 
 
Bar and the Chamber, inter alia, when he commented on daily politics.43 These can be 
thought as political articulation efforts. 
A more vital step in asserting alternative sovereignty, on the other hand, appears to be the 
founding of the KCK. According to indictments for the KCK operations and Prime Minister’s 
arguments, the KCK implies a process of state building (see TC 2010). Öcalan, however, 
depicted his proposals as a part of his ‘stateless solution,’ i.e. as an alternative within the 
existing state. He stated that the experience of liberated zones during the conflict had already 
made them question the state power (Öcalan 2004: 311).44 Still, the KCK unilaterally suggests 
a radical re-configuration of sovereignty, although not in a mutually exclusive manner, by a 
seemingly ‘shadow administrative infrastructure,’ as mentioned in the first section (cf. 
Kalyvas 2006: 218-219). Central to the situation of duality, however, is not only claims to 
political power, but also a moral economy. 
Moral economy as an integrative framework  
The PKK has used an ideology of patriotism since its emergence. This helps articulate its 
members and supporters, i.e. ‘interpellating’ them as subjects (‘patriots’) of the national cause 
to take appropriate action (Althusser 2008; De Leon/Desai/Tuğal 2009). In more practical 
terms, it enables to induce cooperation and to deter defection (Kalyvas 2006). A number of 
categories are employed in this respect: patriots, friends, martyrs, collaborators, and traitors. 
For instance, those who have cooperative relations with the AKP may be called collaborators, 
something which creates reputation problems, if not fear, for the persons in question and may 
yield hostile attitudes even from relatives, according to one of my interviewees. Patriotism 
therefore provides an important normative framework of legitimacy and integration, which 
can be observed in both certain practices by the movement actors and everyday practices in 
the moral economy of Diyarbakır. 
The moral economy can be best observed in the conception of sacrifice (bedel ödemek – to 
pay a price/cost). It usually refers to losses such as death and injure in war and sometimes also 
                                                          
43 ‘Öcalan: Müzakere olmadan çözüm olmaz,’ 30/07/2010 dated meeting notes by Öcalan’s lawyer. Available 
online at http://www.rojacivan.com Access date is 15/12/2012.  
44 In pragmatic terms, this approach should make it easier for Öcalan to advocate such proposals from his prison 
while negotiating with the state. In theoretical terms, on the other hand, his orientation in this period show a shift 
from the earlier Marxist-Leninist approach, which would see dual power as a transitional situation before 
revolution (Tilly 1978) to an approach which sees it as a model of gradual transformation through the creation of 
alternative institutions or the capture and change of existing ones. Concerning the latter approach, we know 
Öcalan and some members of the Kurdish movement read Murray Bookchin who developed similar ideas with 
an elaboration on confederalism and ‘libertarian municipalism’ (see Rockefeller 2007). 
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to imprisonment for political reasons. The person making a political sacrifice ‘obtains a moral 
superiority over the community, leaving them indebted, a particular kind of moral debt to be 
paid in the form of a commitment to the ideal for which he/she had died; the Nation’ (Ozsoy 
2010: 59). War veterans and survivors, called as the family of worth (değer ailesi), gain a 
special importance in this regard. Sacrifice is taken as an indicator of ‘loyalty to the national 
cause’ and may make it easier for survivors to access material resources and power as it 
brings ‘status, value and prestige.’ Ozsoy argues that many of Kurdish politicians and 
executives are members of martyr or guerilla families (Ozsoy 2010: 78).  
However, many survivors are in need of basic survival necessities, let alone political power. 
They may then enjoy positive discrimination for social aids and employment opportunities 
provided by the municipalities and the party headquarters. Then, sacrifice appears to be a 
criterion for defining the ‘deserving poor.’ This is, for instance, the case with the Sarmaşık 
philanthropic association, which has to set a target group anyway since its resources are 
limited while poverty rates are quite high in the city (see Table 2.7 and YG 21/Sarmaşık 
2007). As mentioned elsewhere, the association is funded by donations from diverse groups 
and associations in the city, including contributions by municipality workers, according to 
collective agreements (see Part II). The initiative takes place against the background of 
vigorous activities for poverty alleviation by the government and allied non-governmental 
organizations, and uses a rhetoric of ethnic solidarity against the humiliating approach of the 
rival actors. Considering its funding method and target group, Sarmaşık can be seen as an 
example of redistribution on the basis of national solidarity. Insurance for war veterans and 
survivors is an old institution, linked to the legitimacy needs of war-making states. The 
Turkish state as well has had such arrangements for veterans and survivors of martyrs, as a 
part of its Anti-Terror Law. Against this background, it appears to be an obligation for the 
Kurdish movement, but it also might serve it by helping political integration.  
 
Table 2.7 Poverty in Diyarbakır  
Daily household expenditure per capita 
(excluding rent for accommodation) 
% of total population  
Below $1  7.5 
Below $2.15  35.2 
Below $4.3  37.3 
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Above $4.3 20.0 
Source: EKOSEP (2009) field research (N: 18721) 
 
Political sacrifice and patriotism creates a moral economy of mutual rights and obligations, 
with a specific source of legitimacy. Having made no sacrifice might have negative 
implications for one’s position in society and politics in such an environment then. During my 
fieldwork in Diyarbakır, for instance, a local who criticized the mayor for not always acting in 
conformity with the Kurdish movement added as a supporting argument that he had not made 
any sacrifice. Another local’s statement, in a different context, that ‘living here is a sacrifice 
too’ appears to be an effort to counter some consequences of this moral economy. 
The moral aspect can be seen in other activities, such as the compromise in collective 
bargaining in the municipal sector, which includes workers’ donations for Sarmaşık and wage 
moderation, as well as the introduction of social and political entitlements; hiring practices in 
the municipal sector (see Ch. 7); ‘taxation’ activities for businesspeople; debates on whether 
capital can be ‘patriotic;’ and shop closures as a form of protest (see Ch. 5). Of course, moral 
commitments are not necessarily the only or major motivation for such behaviors. 
Furthermore, patriotic appeals can be used by actors other than the movement’s leading 
figures. Examples include lawyers’ reluctance to undertake the cases of the PKK defectors 
and physicians’ combination of the themes of patriotic struggle with professional struggles 
(see Ch. 6). Overall, the moral economy appears to provide bonds for intragroup solidarity, 
under the hard conditions affecting the Kurdish region, as well as norms of conduct between 
the movement’s leaders and the locals, as a by-product of the dual power situation. 
Conclusions 
The Kurdish movement, with its legal and illegal components, has developed partly because 
the political channels of the Turkish nation-state were either closed or unresponsive to pro-
Kurdish demands, in addition to its periodical oppressive practices. Thereby, the movement 
engaged in armed struggle as ‘politics by other means’ and created alternative spaces of 
politics. This has led to a situation of dual power in the Kurdish region, with the creation of 
alternative state-like institutions and sources of legitimacy. Yet, the political landscape 
changed tremendously in the transitional period of the 2000s: the capture of the guerilla leader 
brought a pause to the conflict to restart later a lower intensity; Turkey’s EU candidacy set in 
motion a process of reforms increasing hopes; and the AKP’s rise to the government brought 
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about fundamental changes in the system as well as a major rival to the Kurdish movement. 
While uncertainty increased even more, new channels were getting opened for Kurdish 
politics. Pro-Kurdish political parties first began to rule municipalities in the Kurdish region 
and then entered the national parliament standing as independent candidates. These provided 
the movement with new opportunities for increasing its power and mobilizing Kurds. 
However, Kurdish politicians also were faced with severe constraints on their representational 
function. As the AKP government and the Kurdish movement contested for hegemony over 
the Kurdish population, Diyarbakır turned into a contested zone. The rise of the interest 
associations was to come partly as a result of this contestation.  
The Kurdish movement engaged in various efforts to integrate Kurds under its leadership. The 
most important of these has been the articulation of common demands along which Kurdish 
groups come together in an encompassing coalition. Organized and individual Kurdish actors 
make diverse rights claims. However, the pro-Kurdish parties played a leading role in 
articulating a set of common demands by highlighting the shared collective identity: the right 
to education in mother language, constitutional safeguards for the recognition of Kurdish 
identity, and strengthening of local governments. In addition to political campaigning, local 
platforms such as the Democratic Society Congress of the Kurdish movement which brings 
together civil society organizations and the movement’s actors in Diyarbakır have been 
helpful in negotiations for formulating the common demands. Kurdish actors have different 
ideas and interests with regard to these demands, as seen in the two opposing approaches to 
the economic dimension of decentralization demands. However, the pro-Kurdish parties kept 
a degree of ambiguity in framing such demands in order to obscure conflicting differences 
and, hence, to form a political coalition of groups with disparate interests. While ambiguity 
leaves proposals open to future contests, it can also be argued that internal struggles are 
delayed this way (cf. Streeck/Thelen 2005: 26-27; McAdam/Tarrow/Tilly 2008). On the other 
hand, the ambiguity kept in the party programs was not enough to avoid clashes with local 
business actors and, hence, the instability of coalitions (see Ch. 5). 
In addition, the dual power situation and the moral economy seen in the Kurdish region also 
help integrate Kurds under the leadership of the Kurdish movement. The roles they play in the 
economic life and the involvement of economic actors in local affairs also can be observed in 
the associational environment under scrutiny. The moral economy underlines ‘patriotism’ and 
political ‘sacrifice’ as sources of legitimacy. It underlines certain conceptions of mutual rights 
and obligations. Accordingly, calculations of interests can be outweighed by ‘passions.’ This 
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normative order provides bonds for intragroup solidarity: this can be seen in the financing 
method and target groups of Sarmaşık philanthropy association. As further explored in Part II, 
the moral economy may lead to diverse compromises for different social groups. Also, it has 
become more contested as a result of economic and political changes in the last decade, with 
impacts on associational politics.   
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Chapter 3: The AKP government 
The AKP is a new party, founded in 2001 and elected to the government in 2002. However, it 
has roots in political Islam, which has developed since the late 1960s and had troubles with 
the Turkish state opposing its secularist orientation and experiencing party closures in turn. 
When it first came to the power, the AKP claimed to differ from the Islamist tradition, 
depicting itself as a European-oriented conservative democratic party; however, it too has 
problematic relations with secularist-nationalist bureaucratic elites in the military and the 
judiciary. In its three terms, the AKP government struggled to consolidate its power against 
two major challengers: first, secularist-nationalist forces within and outside the bureaucracy 
and, second, the PKK-led Kurdish movement. Both struggles, however, were complemented 
by or even advanced through a process of reforms; hence, enabling the government to depict 
it as a matter of democratization. The AKP’s increasing concern for asserting its power over 
Diyarbakır, as well as Kurdish interest associations, can be understood only in relation with 
this process of struggles for hegemony. The chapter gives an overview of the AKP rule in the 
last decade from this perspective. 
First section draws attention to the party’s roots in political Islam, with an account of the rise 
of the latter since the late 1960s. This historical background provides an understanding of 
continuity and change in party politics in general and relationship to the Kurdish electorate in 
particular. Second section glances at the three terms of the AKP rule. The section elaborates 
on the party’s rise to power in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis; political and 
economic reforms and initiatives as partly triggered by the EU candidacy process; and the 
confrontation with the bureaucratic elites, which ended up with the AKP’s victory. Third 
section focuses on the government’s approach to the Kurdish issue. I outline major practices 
targeting Kurds, from political reforms to repression; political articulation attempts along the 
rhetorical lines of material interests and collective identity; and socio-economic policies. The 
chapter ends with conclusions. 
3.1 Roots in political Islam 
The leading cadre of the AKP has its roots in political Islam. This background appears 
important for understanding the party politics through continuity and change. It can help 
understanding also the electoral support the AKP has received across the country and within 
the Kurdish region, albeit in higher rates than the past representatives of the tradition had. 
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This section sheds light on the AKP’s roots in political Islam, with an elaboration on the 
emergence of the latter in the late 1960s, its short-lived power and reception among Kurds 
during the 1990s and later retreat towards the end of the decade, which has led to the 
emergence of a conservative-liberal party line, embodied in the AKP but still troubled with 
the political regime. 
Emergence of Islamist political parties 
The late 1960s witnessed not only the rise of the left movement, but also the emergence of a 
significant movement of political Islam: the National Outlook (Milli Görüş). The movement 
brought together a number of successive political parties, associations, charitable foundations 
as well as actors from religious orders. It stood against the rigid understanding of laïcité by 
the Kemalist regime. The first representative party, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam 
Partisi, 1970), emphasized an identity based on the Ottoman-Islamic heritage against 
westernization and supported industrialization. Necmettin Erbakan, the movement’s leader 
and party chairperson until the late 1990s, was first elected in 1968 as the president of the 
national union of chambers of commerce. Yet, he was not ratified for the position by the 
ministry, because of the opposition by chambers of Istanbul and Izmir, which represented big 
enterprises. The MNP, on the other hand, supported small to medium size enterprises, whom 
it described as discriminated, against the background of political-economic privileges enjoyed 
by big enterprises (Sarıbay 2005). The party was closed down by the constitutional court, 
after the military intervention in 1971, on the grounds that it threatened the secular regime. 
The movement was represented by a new party in the 1970s: the National Salvation Party 
(Milli Selamet Partisi – MSP). The MSP received a noteworthy electoral support and took 
part in almost all the coalitional governments of the decade. The support it received from the 
Kurdish region, including Diyarbakır, was way above the support at national level (see Tables 
2.2 and 3.1). One reason for this seems to be the party’s emphasis on religious values. The 
party had links to religious groups and Sufi spiritual orders such as the Naqshbandi order 
which were strong among pious Kurds and had integrated to the system through mainstream 
politics (Yavuz 2005: 279-286; Tan 2011: 461-463). This party too was closed down, as a 
result of the coup in 1980. A whole different context was going to accompany the successor 
party. 
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Table 3.1 General elections and parties linked to the National Outlook (% of votes) 
 
1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2007 2011 
MSP 8.6 11.8 - - - - - - - - 
RP - - - 7.2 16.9 21.4 - - - - 
FP - - - - - - 15.4 - - - 
SP - - - - - - - 2.5 2.3 1.3 
AKP - - - - - - - 34.3 46.6 49.8 
Source: TÜİK 
 
The late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the rise of Islamic movements and revolutionary 
changes in the Middle East region. Turkey also experienced an increasing visibility of Islam 
in political, economic and cultural realms. The Welfare Party gradually enlarged its social 
base across the country, as the new Islamist party (Gülalp 2001). It showed a significant 
success first in the 1994 municipal elections, winning about one-third of votes, and then came 
out as the first party in the 1995 general elections. The municipal success included important 
metropolitan areas such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Diyarbakır. This experience provided the 
party with an organizational base for the mobilization of associations, local businessmen and 
other societal actors, which enabled, inter alia, the organization of vigorous charity activities 
(White 2002: 178-211). Municipal services appeared so better than former times that the 
municipal offices are still held by the heirs of this movement in Istanbul and Ankara, whereas 
Diyarbakır was lost to the Kurdish movement. The parliamentary experience, on the other 
hand, turned out to be brief and problematical. The party formed a coalition government in 
1996; however, following year, the party leader and Prime Minister Erbakan had to resign, 
because of an indirect intervention by the military, with the support of certain media, business 
and union circles. In 1998, the constitutional court closed down the Welfare Party for 
threatening the secular regime and banned the decades-long leader Erbakan from political 
activity. Bans were enforced also with regard to the place of religion in public sphere, such as 
prohibiting the use of headscarves in universities. The headscarf issue was to become 
symbolical for grievances articulated by Islamists. 
The Welfare Party voiced a rhetoric of victimhood, based on the idea of oppression and 
discrimination of Muslims throughout the Republican process of modernization (Buğra 
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2002b). It criticized laïcité and the state’s cooperative relations with the West and Israel. It 
advocated instead building political and economic relations with Muslim countries. Another 
central theme of the party’s discourse was concerning the economy. The post-1980 era 
underwent economic liberalization and led to new forms of poverty and wealth (Buğra 2002b; 
Buğra 2007). In a vacuum left by the retreat of the Left which was severely oppressed by the 
1980 coup, the Welfare Party undertook to address issues of economic injustice (White 2002: 
123-129). By its proposal of a ‘just order,’ it aimed to articulate diverse social segments, 
including the urban poor and the so-called ‘Anatolian tigers’ – newly rising provincial 
entrepreneurs which were neglected by the policy makers until the 1980s. The proposal 
suggested an alternative model of market economy on the basis of certain Islamic principles, 
emphasizing ‘reciprocal obligations of trust, loyalty and solidarity that bind the community of 
believers’ and therefore enabling an encompassing coalition of social groups with diverse 
interests (Buğra 2002b: 129). 
The Welfare Party received a considerable amount of support also from the Kurdish region 
(see Table 2.2). According to Altan Tan, a former member of the party and current deputy for 
the bloc led by the pro-Kurdish party, pious Kurds then looked for an alternative against both 
the state’s oppressive and assimilative approach and the secular leftist Kurds led by the PKK 
and pro-Kurdish parties (2011: 465). In such a context, the Welfare Party used rhetoric of 
Islamic fraternity, in addition to networks of religious orders. The party appeared independent 
from the state’s policies toward the Kurdish region, it itself being critical of the Kemalist 
establishment, and hence assumed no responsibility for the historical misdeed against Kurds 
(Bozarslan 1996: 145-146). However, the party pursued a pragmatic approach, to 
accommodate both pro-Turkish and pro-Kurdish constituencies at different localities. The 
electoral alliance it formed with a Turkish far-right party in 1991 led to a significant decrease 
in Kurdish votes. In the same year, Tayyip Erdoğan as the party’s provincial chairman for 
Istanbul led the preparation of a significant report on the Kurdish issue, which involved 
Kurdish party members. The report acknowledged the state’s oppressive and assimilative 
policies and advocated the recognition of linguistic-cultural rights for Kurds (Çakır 1994: 
151-155). However, Erbakan’s approach in the following period was inconsistent: he both 
promised rights for Kurds and supported preemptive security measures to fight terror, in 
addition to pointing at the importance of ‘affection’ by the state personnel (Çakır 1994: 150-
160; Çalmuk 2001). 
The founding of the AKP: retreat of political Islam? 
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The Welfare Party took its closure decision to the European Court of Human Rights, despite 
its former anti-Western discourse. Olivier Roy interprets this as one indicator of post-
Islamism. By the concept of post-Islamism, Roy argues that Islamic movements in the region 
have integrated to the political system and shifted away from Islamism toward conservatism 
and nationalism since the late 1990s. He links this trend to the participation in the political 
game.45 Resulting pragmatism re-places Islamists along the center right (Roy 2004). In a 
similar vein, the closure of the Welfare Party led to two new parties: the Felicity Party (Saadet 
Partisi - SP) upholds the tradition but received extremely low rates of vote (see Table 3.1). 
The AKP, on the other hand, was formed in 2001 by reformists under the leadership of 
Tayyip Erdoğan – the former mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. The AKP has 
depicted this newly evolved approach characterized with cultural conservatism, economic 
liberalism, and, gradually, political nationalism.46 Its electoral support was to be higher than 
that of previous Islamist parties. 
The experiences of political Islam yielded significant resources and lessons though: a tradition 
of municipal rule; networks of NGOs, businessmen and pious communities mobilized for 
charity and political-economic reasons; articulation of grievances along conceptions of 
discrimination and victimhood; pragmatism concerning the Kurdish issue, and the 
understanding of the need to deal with concerns and threats of the secularist regime (Gülalp 
2001; Öniş 1997). Former anti-western attitudes were replaced by a realization of the 
opportunities Western actors such as the EU could provide. The discourse of an alternative 
economy on the basis of Islamic principles also withered away and left its place to the initial 
efforts to convince the secular elites that ‘money has no religion, no faith, no ideology’ 
(Buğra 2002b: 135), in addition to the increasing integration to the market economy (Tuğal 
2009). 
Up to the 2000s, the parties of political Islam had already built up a considerable social base 
across the country and within the Kurdish region. They employed a discourse of Islamic 
fraternity and religious networks to articulate Kurds under their leadership. Their anti-
systemic stance helped them look not responsible for the state’s oppressive policies, but as an 
alternative option. The AKP also benefited from such moves, clearly delineating itself away 
                                                          
45 On post-Islamism see also Bayat (2007). For an alternative account of the transformation of political Islam in 
Turkey from a hegemony perspective, see Tuğal (2009). 
46 As political predecessors, Erdoğan refers to two political leaders in the center-right tradition: Adnan Menderes 
from 1940s-1950s and Turgut Özal from the post-1980s. As to Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the National 
Outlook tradition, he was to publicly criticize the AKP on several occasions before his death in 2011. 
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from the ‘state tradition’ and appealing to a set of marginalized concerns, such as the 
religious. Yet, the AKP’s electoral support has been way higher than those of the previous 
parties in question (see Tables 2.2 and 3.1). The historical overview helps understanding the 
fact that the higher support for the AKP governments, particularly by the Kurdish voters, has 
a lot to do with the contemporary context, rather than merely religious identity or old 
promises. 
3.2 Three terms in power: opportunities, reforms, and challenges  
The AKP has depicted an unprecedented success in Turkish history, ruling the national 
government on its own for successive three terms, with an increasing electoral support. The 
party’s rise to power shows the significance of timing; yet, its preservation and consolidation 
of power relates to more than that. This section provides a detailed account of the AKP 
government, starting from its rise to power in the aftermath of the 2011 financial crisis. 
Afterwards, the attention is paid to major opportunities and their use by the government, 
focusing on political reforms and the economic environment that have been partly shaped by 
the EU candidacy process. Various efforts also aimed to consolidate the party’s power in state 
and societal realms, targeting two major rivals: Kemalist bureaucratic elites and the Kurdish 
movement. The second section concludes with an elaboration on the former, whereas the third 
section details the latter. 
The 2001 financial crisis and the AKP’s rise to power 
Turkey in the 1990s had witnessed a series of economic crises, accompanied with high rates 
of public debt, inflation and interest. Governments undertook stabilization programs by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), furthering the liberalization of economy. Income 
distribution deteriorated and corruption was seen as a major political problem in this process. 
A most severe financial crisis took place in early 2001, caused by successive speculations and 
immense outflows of capital. This brought about the dramatic devaluation of Turkish lira (by 
about two-thirds against the US dollar), massive layoffs, bankruptcies of small and medium 
sized enterprises, and a sharp decline in per capita income. Another program was undertaken 
by the three-party coalition government, with loans from the IMF, to achieve fiscal discipline 
and structural reforms (Pamuk 2008; Keyman/Öniş 2007). The country did not witness violent 
protests, as in similar crises in other countries such as Argentina or Greece; but, a significant 
popular response came one year after the crisis: in the general elections of November 2002, 
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all parties of the previous parliament remained below the 10 per cent threshold and therefore 
could not enter the parliament. Three of these decades-old parties even appear to have gone 
into the dustbin of history. Only two outsider parties, however, came in the parliament: the 
AKP and the CHP (see Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 Parties in the parliament since 2002 (% of votes) 
 
2002 2007 2011 
AKP 34.3 46.6 49.8 
CHP 19.4 20.9 26 
MHP (8.4)* 14.3 13 
Pro-Kurdish Party (6.2)* 3.8** 5.8** 
Source: TÜİK and Yeğen (2011). 
* Given for comparison; parties did not win seats because of 10 % threshold. 
** Parties could win seats, thanks to standing as independent candidates. 
 
Let’s start with the second. The CHP is an old player back in the game: it is the first political 
party of the republican Turkey, representing the Kemalist tradition. It could not enter the 
parliament in previous elections because of the threshold.47 Since 2002, it has comprised the 
main opposition party in the parliament, although other parties also gradually gained seats in 
the parliament. The CHP voiced mostly secularist and nationalist concerns against the AKP 
government. The party as led by Deniz Baykal contributed to a politics of ‘outbidding’ in 
which political leaders, including those from the far-right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi – MHP) and gradually the AKP, competed against each other in making 
nationalist claims and, hence, in a manner against pro-Kurdish politics (cf. Horowitz 1985: 
357). However, there have been significant changes in intra-party politics and political 
leadership since 2010. As Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has become the new leader, the CHP started 
stressing its old social-democratic stance, with appeals on issues such as corruption and social 
justice and with a more moderate rhetoric on the Kurdish issue than before. However, this 
                                                          
47 All mainstream parties in Turkey have been subscribed to the Kemalist ideology in one way or another; 
therefore, the fact that the CHP was outside the parliament in previous term does not mean that Kemalists were 
outside. 
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shift has been an inconsistent one. Coupled with its historical identity, the CHP’s overall 
performance during the last decade was not helpful to win the support of Kurds; thus, leaving 
the competition for Kurdish votes mainly to the pro-Kurdish party and the AKP.48 
In some regards, the AKP is a new player in the game. Against the background of secularist 
suspicions and threats, the AKP defined itself as a party supporting ‘conservative democracy’ 
and committed to political and economic reforms, with a pro-Western and pro-globalization 
approach. Thereby, it was welcomed by western countries such as the USA, as a model of 
‘moderate Islam’ for the Middle East in the aftermath of September 11 (Tuğal 2007). 
However, the AKP’s rhetoric and policy approaches have not remained the same, but depicted 
important changes and swings in its three terms as a result of changing political context and 
the need to accommodate diverse groups in its constituency. Especially first three years were 
marked with reforms which appeared progressive as regards democratization. But the party 
has gradually embraced a more nationalist and less pluralist approach. An increasingly 
authoritarian tone has been used against political opposition while the depiction of Prime 
Minister Erdoğan as a charismatic leader figure has become stronger. The party’s claims of 
advancing democracy have not stopped though, as the confrontation with Kemalist elites and 
the initiatives about the Kurdish issue continued in following years. Before elaborating on the 
party’s confrontations with these two challengers, let’s focus on two processes which were 
inherited from the previous government and provided the AKP with important opportunities 
to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the established elites, as well as its electoral support across 
the country and among Kurds: the political-reform process triggered by the EU process and 
the post-crisis economic performance. 
Political reforms on the road to the EU 
In December 1999, after a long time of wait, Turkey was accepted as a candidate for EU 
membership. To be a member it had to conform to the conditions prescribed by the 
Copenhagen criteria. The criteria require political conditions such as stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, rights for and protection of minorities; economic 
conditions such as the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope 
with market forces within the union; and legal conditions such as the acceptance of the acquis 
communautaire. To start accession negotiations, the political criterion must be satisfied. The 
                                                          
48 Following the changes in the party politics, I asked many of my informants in Diyarbakır also about potentials 
of the ‘new’ CHP for the Kurdish issue; however, the majority of them did not seem optimistic, depicting a 
problem of trust. The electoral results of 2011 also indicate this general lack of support. 
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three-party coalition government then launched a process of reforms. This process was soon 
undertaken by the AKP government, who carried out a more comprehensive set of reforms 
mostly during its first term in power. The AKP was to enjoy the fruits of the accession 
process in forms varying from financial aid to political legitimacy in its struggles for 
hegemony against two challengers – the bureaucratic elites and the Kurdish movement. 
Political reforms were usually linked to the 1982 Constitution and other legislative 
arrangements of the post-coup period. The coalition government implemented a set of 
constitutional amendments and reform packages between 2001 and 2002, with regard to the 
political-legal system and human rights, inter alia. Among these, the lifting of capital 
punishment might be the politically most important and timely one since it took place after 
Öcalan’s capture in 1999. Another reform aimed to enable radio/TV broadcasting in 
languages other than Turkish – hence, Kurdish. Initiatives concerned also the freedom of 
expression in laws; civil-military relations; and the reform of the judicial system as well as 
measures against torture. In addition to these, the same period also witnessed the start for 
gradual lifting of the Emergency Rule in Kurdish provinces.49 However, the reforms had 
certain limitations and their implementation was another problem. The succeeding 
government was to undertake this unfinished process. 
After coming to power in late 2002, the AKP government initiated a set of six reform 
packages, and all except one of them were legislated in its first two years. These initiatives 
concerned different facets of the state and society: institutional power of the military was 
undermined, especially through restructuring of the National Security Council, which had 
enabled the military to exert influence over civilian politics (see the sub-section after next). 
State Security Courts, which had formed an exceptional framework of criminal adjudication 
and were heavily used for terror suspects, political and ‘thought criminals,’ were abolished in 
2004.50 In a similar vein, the Penal Code was first amended and then replaced with a new one 
in 2005. Coupled with the constitutional amendments, these steps were claimed to improve 
the freedom of expression and fair trial despite the inclusion of contradictory articles.51 
                                                          
49 To reconstruct the reform period, I use the regular reports (also known as progress reports) by the European 
Commission, which provide assessments of reforms and political-economic situation of the country, with regard 
to the (pre)accession process. The reports are annually published since 1998 and the latest one was released in 
2012, by the time of writing this dissertation. For the above-mentioned reforms, see the 2002 report (EC 2002). 
50 State Security Courts were first introduced in 1973, as special courts responsible for ‘crimes against the state 
security.’ They were headed by military judges until 1999. For more details, see İnanıcı (2011b).  
51 Article 301 of the Penal code, which includes ‘insulting Turkishness’ as a crime, is illustrative for the 
regressive aspects of the reform. For more details, see the sub-section after next. 
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Another important reform concerned the public administration, through restructuring of the 
state and devolution of power to local governments. Further legislative arrangements took 
place concerning publishing, broadcasting and private teaching in Kurdish language. 
Numerous other arrangements were carried out for the harmonization of the legislation with 
the acquis communautaire, concerning political parties, foundations, social policies, the Civil 
Law, and so on (EC, (European Commission) 2003; EC 2004; EC 2005). 
As a result, the European Council decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey in 
October 2005. Negotiations still go on, however, in a much slower fashion than the beginning, 
as there have been disagreements on certain political issues such as the Cyprus problem, as 
well as a decline in interest. The AKP government has continued with legislative initiatives, 
though. One recent significant initiative was the 2010 Constitutional Referendum which led to 
the further polarization of society and brought about significant changes, inter alia, in the 
judiciary to the disadvantage of Kemalist bureaucratic elites (see the sub-section after next). 
Another significant initiative was related to the Kurdish issue leading, for instance, to the 
introduction of a state channel in Kurdish and allowing the establishment of Kurdish institutes 
at universities. 
The EU candidacy process provided the AKP with an important opportunity to legitimize 
itself and to consolidate its position. The party’s initial pro-European stance and commitment 
to political reforms worked against some worries about its Islamist roots and increased the 
hopes for democratization (see İnsel 2003). Furthermore, the reform of certain institutions 
was to strengthen the party against the military and civilian Kemalist elites, who had an 
antagonistic approach to the AKP. Aware of the threat to their position, Kemalist elites, 
hence, maintained an ambiguous stance concerning the EU process and attempted to obstruct 
several legislative initiatives through appeal to the Constitutional Court, presidential vetoes, 
etc. (Cizre 2008; Gülen 2009).52 
One should also note that reforms did not automatically translate to practice and some of them 
meant new institutions functioning in old ways. An example for the problems in 
implementation is that despite the legal reforms on broadcasting in Kurdish language, the 
initiatives by Kurds for broadcasting met judicial blockage. As to the old-wine-in-new-bottle 
                                                          
52 Note that the veto behavior appears to be fuelled by not only concerns about the balance of power, but also 
political differences in the understanding of relations among the state, society and economy. For the latter cause, 
one may think of the vetoed law which suggested the private provision of education through public finance 
(Gülen 2009). 
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problem, reforms in the judiciary have been exemplary: the replacement of State Security 
Courts by specially-authorized heavy criminal courts has served politically quite the same 
purpose. According to a Kurdish lawyer interviewee, things got even worse than the 1990s as 
regards the right to fair trial. This situation was supported by the new Code of Criminal 
Procedure in 2004 and the amendment of the Anti-Terror Law in 2006. Coupled with 
specially-authorized prosecutors and the highly mobilized policing apparatus, the new 
exceptional criminal-adjudication framework has enabled the increasing repression of 
political dissent.53 I will come back to the political effect of reforms in the sections below on 
the confrontation with the bureaucracy and the Kurdish movement. But before that, let’s focus 
on the political-economic environment which has also hosted important changes and appears 
to be crucial for both electoral and associational politics. 
Political economy of the AKP period 
The 2001 financial crisis was a significant opportunity contributing to the AKP’s rise to 
power. The post-crisis economic performance, on the other hand, appears to be significant for 
the party’s repeated success in subsequent elections. Before the AKP rule, the coalition 
government had invited Kemal Derviş, a top-level bureaucrat at the World Bank, to become 
the minister of economy and to handle the crises. Derviş launched a program based on fiscal 
discipline and budget surpluses and initiated some structural reforms (Pamuk 2008). The 
process involved the IMF and the EU as powerful actors pushing for further reforms and 
continued under the AKP rule (Keyman/Öniş 2007: 131-158). In its first term, the AKP aimed 
to eliminate legal and institutional obstacles to foreign direct investment and has been 
successful in increasing these investments (see Table 3.3). Following this was a massive wave 
of privatization. Privatization has been already on the policy agenda since the 1980s, but 
depicted a slow progress before because of political resistance; however, this resistance has 
been pretty much marginalized in the AKP period (Öniş 2011).  
The economy experienced a remarkable recovery in the AKP period (see Table 3.3). There 
has been a sustained economic growth, only to be interrupted by the international financial 
crisis in 2008. The GDP per capita increased from $3,492 in 2002 to $10,067 in 2010. Annual 
inflation declined to 8 per cent, against the background of previous decade which witnessed 
levels above 60 per cent. Indeed, single-digit levels were not seen in three decades. Interest 
                                                          
53 For detailed accounts of such changes in the judiciary and their political implications, see the collection by 
İnanıcı (2011c).  
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rates and the debt burden also declined significantly (Pamuk 2008). In a similar vein, the 
government came to a point not to sign any other agreement with the IMF. All these were 
publicized by the AKP as signs of economic strength and national autonomy, in line with the 
new assertive foreign policy approach (Öniş 2012). One major negative feature of the period, 
however, has been the situation of unemployment, which has been steadily on the rise since 
2001 (see Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 The macroeconomic performance (%), 2001-2010 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP Growth -5.6 6.1 5.2 9.3 8.4 6.8 4.6 0.6 -4.8 9.0 
Inflation (CPI) 54.2 45.1 25.3 8.5 8.1 9.5 8.7 10.4 6.2 8.5 
Unemployment 
Rate  8.3 10.3 10.4 10.2 10.5 10.2 10.2 10.9 14.0 11.8 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(billion $) 
3.3 0.5 0.6 1.0 8.1 16.9 18.3 14.7 6.1 6.2 
Current 
Account 
Deficit/GDP 
1.9 -0.2 -2.4 -3.6 -4.6 -6.0 -5.9 -5.6 -2.1 -6.3 
Source: IMF54 and State Planning Organization55 
 
The government has used a variety of (re)distributive mechanisms which too helped enlarge 
its electoral base. One important target group has been small and medium sized enterprises. 
This group had been historically ignored by the state’s economic policies until the 1990s (see 
Buğra 1998: 523-524). However, in the AKP period, the enterprises increasingly benefited 
from incentives, ranging from monetary supports with and without the condition of paying 
back to loan-interest supports up to 100 per cent (KOSGEB 2011). Supports took the form of 
both universal programs and specific programs which targeted the Kurdish-populated 
southeastern region and particularly Diyarbakır (see §3 below and Ch. 5). By 2011, the total 
                                                          
54 See the April 2012 edition of the World Economic Outlook Database; available at http://www.imf.org. Access 
date is 15/09/2012.  
55 Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı. See Economic and Social Indicators; database is available at http://www.dpt.gov.tr. 
Access date is 15/09/2012.  
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number of supported enterprises was 655,000 while it was only 4,000 in 2002, and the 
maximum limit for credits increased to 100,000 TL from 5,000 TL in the same time span 
(AK-Parti 2012: 48). 
In addition to the above-mentioned waves of privatization and supports, there has been a 
variety of other opportunities for capital accumulation. An example is the private-sector 
collaboration with the state in large infrastructural investments such as the construction of 
roads thanks to ongoing urbanization. Public-private partnerships also increased in the AKP 
period, such as in healthcare, social assistance and social housing sectors. Public tenders for 
contracts, on the other hand, contributed to particularistic relations between the state and 
businesspeople (Buğra/Savaşkan 2012). These entrepreneurial activities have taken place in a 
context of state rescaling, which led to devolution of power and responsibilities to 
municipalities and other local state bodies such as special provincial administrations and 
agencies of regional development. This process was to encourage local entrepreneurs to play a 
more active role in policy making as well as in political alignments (Bayırbağ 2010; 
Buğra/Savaşkan 2012). As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 5, Kurdish business actors support 
this type of decentralization, with a stronger role for themselves, as opposed to the radical 
interpretation of ‘democratic autonomy’ proposal, which is relatively critical of market 
economy. 
Through its policies of investment and service provision, the AKP government could hit two 
birds with one stone: while supporting business circles – especially those close to the 
government and the allied pious communities – Prime Minister Erdoğan also publicized the 
benefits of such initiatives for whole society. For instance, one recurrent theme of electoral 
campaigns has been the construction of ‘double roads’ across the country. Another broader 
theme related to social policies. The AKP government intensively used social policy measures 
in realms such as healthcare and poverty alleviation.  
The healthcare sector witnessed significant changes in two dimensions: changes in one 
dimension benefited healthcare providers thanks to the increase in public-private partnerships 
and, hence, in the private provision of publicly-financed healthcare services. However, 
attempts at preventing physicians’ concurrent employment at both public and private sectors 
faced significant opposition and could not get finalized (see also Ch. 4 and 6). Changes in the 
other dimension benefited healthcare users: the government first improved the benefits of the 
Green Card (a means-tested healthcare program), which covered about 14 per cent of total 
population and 40 per cent of the Kurdish region (Günal 2008). Then, it introduced a system 
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of universal healthcare financed by compulsory premiums on behalf of citizens earning above 
the poverty line. Before the reform, the public healthcare system was a part of the multi-
fragmented corporatist social-security system in which separate insurance schemes were 
established for different occupational groups and significant variation existed in norms and 
benefits (Buğra/Keyder 2006). Thanks to the reforms, however, patients gained improved 
access to a variety of public and private services (Günal 2008). 
The government has rigorously engaged in poverty-alleviation activities, using a range of 
formal and informal measures. As mentioned before, the legacy of Islamist parties regarding 
the municipal rule included charity activities which benefited from cooperation with pious 
communities and local businesspeople. The municipalities run by the AKP have continued 
with this tradition. In addition, the government made great use of the General Directorate of 
Social Cooperation and Solidarity (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü – 
SYDGM), an umbrella organization covering over 900 local foundations to provide means-
tested social aid to the poor. The aid has been given usually in kind and sometimes in cash. Its 
amount increased during pre-electoral periods; for instance, it increased three times before the 
2009 local elections (Buğra/Candaş 2011: 528, fn. 35). On top of these, the distribution of 
school books free of charge and the expansion of conditional cash transfers56 appear also 
important for the popularity of the government’s social policies, as well as for decreasing 
poverty rates suggested by official statistics (see Table 3.4). Note that numerous foundations 
have also engaged in poverty-alleviation activities, either in direct cooperation with the 
government or on their own, leading rival actors to engage in similar activities (see the last 
section). 
 
Table 3.4 Poverty rates (% of total population) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Food poverty 1.35 1.29 1.29 0.87 0.74 0.48 0.54 0.48 
Complete 
poverty 
(food+nonfood) 
26.96 28.12 25.60 20.50 17.81 17.79 17.11 18.08 
                                                          
56 The program of conditional cash transfers was introduced initially in cooperation with the World Bank after 
the 2001 crisis. It provides social assistance to the poorest 6 per cent of the population conditional on the 
improved use of basic health and education services. For more details, see Kılıç (2010: 173). 
67 
 
Below $1 per 
capita per day 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.01 - - - - 
Below $2.15 
per capita per 
day 
3.04 2.39 2.49 1.55 1.41 0.52 0.47 0.22 
Below $4.3 per 
capita per day 30.30 23.75 20.89 16.36 13.33 8.41 6.83 4.35 
Source: TÜİK 
 
From confrontation with the bureaucracy to its capture? 
As mentioned before, the parties of political Islam had troubles with the Kemalist bureaucracy 
under the guise of secularism issue. Kemalist elites constituted important segments of the 
state such as the military, the judiciary, and other higher ranks of civilian bureaucracy. In the 
post-1980 period, Kemalist elites defined Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism as 
the major threats to the regime and derived their legitimacy from their ‘guardianship’ against 
these threats. As manifested in its historical interventions to parliamentary politics, the 
military had been the leading actor of them. 
The AKP too was faced with challenges by the military and the judiciary in its first two terms 
in power. During the first three years, the confrontation took place on the site of reforms for 
EU accession. As mentioned before, one set of the reforms concerned the composition and 
role of the National Security Council – an institutional channel of the military for exerting 
power over political life including the government.57 The council was restructured to be 
headed by a civilian person and to function as an advisory body. In addition, military 
representatives in some supreme boards were removed and the competence of military courts 
was narrowed. Despite this challenge to its power, the military tried to continue exerting 
power over politics through informal channels (EC 2004: 15; EC 2005: 138).  
From 2005 to 2007, tensions increased between the government and the anti-government 
forces, and the country found itself within a political turmoil. Events such as the re-start of 
clashes with the PKK, the increasing autonomy of the Kurdish regional government in 
northern Iraq, and somewhat conciliatory approach of the AKP government as regards Cyprus 
and Kurdish issues contributed to the increase in secularist-nationalist reactions to which the 
                                                          
57 For detailed accounts of the military’s place in Turkish politics, see the collection by İnsel/Bayramoğlu 
(2004). 
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government responded by ‘backslide into an undemocratic discourse’ (Cizre 2008: 155). 
Military commanders continued publicly expressing their opinions on domestic and foreign 
policy issues in a manner critical of the government, media and some non-governmental 
organizations (EC 2006; EC 2007; EC 2008). Illegal activities by security forces took place in 
the Kurdish region, but a trial was hindered thanks to efforts by the military and higher 
echelons of the judiciary.58 Prominent journalists and writers were sued by nationalist public 
prosecutors and charged by courts for insulting ‘Turkishness,’ thanks to the notorious Article 
301 of the Penal Code the AKP government put into force in 2005. Series of violent attacks 
across the country targeted civilian Kurds (Gambetti 2007) as well as representatives of non-
Muslim minorities. 
However, the control over the state apparatus started to change hands from 2007 onwards 
while political instability continued. One triggering event was the presidential elections in 
April 2007. The AKP nominated its then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as the new president. 
The candidacy of Gül drew strong opposition from Kemalists: the constitutional court 
interfered to the parliamentary voting process and the military warned by issuing a 
memorandum expressing concern as regards the weakening of secularism. A series of anti-
government rallies also took place in major cities. As a solution, the AKP government re-
arranged the upcoming general elections to an earlier date. In July 2007, it came up again as 
the first party increasing its votes by 12 per cent (see Table 3.2), and Gül became the new 
president to have a future of highly cooperative relationship with the government thanks to 
the voting in the new parliament. In July 2008, another significant attempt against the AKP 
failed too: the Constitutional Court dismissed the application by chief public prosecutor for 
the closure of the party on the grounds that it had become ‘a focal point of anti-secular 
activities.’59 While the AKP had appeared (and depicted itself) to be the ‘victim’ in this 
process, the electoral result in 2007 was interpreted as a sign of widespread support for the 
party against the military. Motivated by the popular support, the AKP increased its counter-
                                                          
58 A bookstore was bombed in Şemdinli (southeastern Turkey) in 2005, leading to the death of one person. The 
local court found two gendarmerie officers and one PKK defector, who now became an informer, responsible for 
the bombing. The then Land Forces Commander publicly expressed his support for the accused and later the 
Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors dismissed in April 2006 the prosecutor who had included accusations 
against high-ranking commanders in the indictment concerning the bombing (EC 2007). The case was finalized 
only in 2012, by the imprisonment of the three initially accused (Bianet, 11/01/2012). 
59 For details on these judicial processes, see Bali (2012). Bali’s take is a typical example of the Turkish liberal 
approach that interprets the process simply as a Kemalist resistance to democratization efforts by the AKP, rather 
than struggles for power. 
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attacks, under the banner of ‘democratization,’ which depicted a revanchist approach as well 
as a quest for the consolidation of power. 
An investigation started in 2007 into the Ergenekon, an allegedly criminal network composed 
of far-nationalist Kemalists and embodying a part of the ‘deep state.’ The investigation has 
led to the waves of mass arrests of retired generals, lawyers, journalists, academics, 
representatives from NGOs and even from compulsory associations such as the Ankara 
Chamber of Commerce (Grigoriadis/Özer 2010). The indictment accuses them of forming a 
terrorist organization and attempting to overthrow the government. Other investigations 
followed this, such as the Revolutionary Quarters (2010), which (apparently) targets the Left, 
and the Sledgehammer case (2010), which targets military officers (of whom many on active 
duty) for charges of alleged coup plans dating back to 2003. 
The 2010 Constitutional Referendum also was depicted by the AKP government as a step to 
further its struggle for ‘democratization’ and against the ‘military guardianship’ as it used a 
discourse of victimhood for not only the pious but the common people. The constitutional 
amendment was actually a package of quite diverse articles; yet, the government emphasized 
those such as the removal of immunity recognized to the generals of the 1980 coup.60 
Accordingly, the referendum was held on September 12, the date when the junta constitution 
was put in a referendum in 1982, and resulted in approval of amendments by 57 per cent (see 
Table 3.5). The process was accompanied by an increasing polarization in society, where four 
responses were advocated: yes, ‘not enough but yes,’ no, and boycott61 – the last one being 
supported by the Kurdish movement. 
 
Table 3.5 Constitutional referendum results (% of population), 2010 
 
Participation rate Yes No 
Turkey 73.71 57.88 42.12 
Diyarbakır 34.80 93.92 6.08 
                                                          
60 Other articles concerned the restructuring of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, restructuring of 
the Constitutional Court, the recognition of collective bargaining rights for public sector unions, the closure of 
political parties (making it more difficult), and so on. So far, the first one proved to be the most influential 
amendment in practice as mentioned below. 
61 Conformity with the call to boycott prevailed in Hakkari, which is a stronghold of the Kurdish movement (the 
participation rate was only 9 per cent), whereas it was partly observed in Diyarbakır, a fact which again shows 
the contested nature of the province.  
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Source: Supreme Board of Elections62  
 
The military’s resistance ended with the resignation (in the form of early retirement) of 
several generals and colonels, including the Chief of the General Staff and commanders of 
three forces in July 2011 (see Gürsoy 2012). The overall process of reforms and investigations 
was applauded by the AKP and pro-government social circles for ending military 
guardianship and instituting ‘advanced democracy.’ However, in truth, the AKP used these 
cases and the KCK case (see Ch. 2 and next section below) as opportunities to strengthen its 
own position and to discredit opponents of the government by accusing them of being either 
participants in or supporters of coup plots and ‘terrorist’ organizations. Demonstrators, 
including university students and Kurdish children, were treated alike (see HRW 2010). 
Thousands across the country have been kept in prolonged pre-trial detentions; several 
thousands of pages were included in indictments for major trials based on, inter alia, wiretap 
evidence, unreliable digital documents, and secret witnesses; and violations of the right to a 
fair trial have been abundant.63 Turkey came up as the number one country in a global survey, 
as regards terror convictions around the world since September 11 attacks in New York 
(Bianet, 06/09/2011). 
The AKP came to override not only the military, but also the judiciary. As mentioned above, 
the judiciary was an important mechanism through which the Kemalist establishment could 
pursue a struggle against the government and dissidents in society. Yet, by taking control of 
the judiciary, the AKP too started using the judiciary against its opponents. How could this 
become possible? As mentioned in a previous sub-section, the legal reforms of 2004-2006 
were influential in the restructuring of the judicial system to the advantage of the government: 
the new Penal Code and the amendments to the Anti-Terror Law provided broad ambiguous 
definitions for terrorism and political crime. Specially-authorized heavy criminal courts and 
specially-authorized prosecutors possessed important prerogatives and appeared as the major 
actors of political investigations, in addition to the police force. The 2010 referendum 
completed this portrayal by restructuring the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors who 
is responsible for the nomination and promotion of its members. In addition to the 
institutional re-dressing, there is a widely-held assumption that the judiciary and the police 
                                                          
62 Yüksek Seçim Kurulu. Data available at http://www.ysk.gov.tr. Access date is 01/10/2012.  
63 For analyses on problematic aspects of these processes from a legal perspective, see İnanıcı (2011a), Kanar 
(2011), and Cimmen (2011).  
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have been infiltrated by members of the Gülen community,64 and targets of the investigations 
are selected accordingly (TESEV 2012; Ertekin 2011).65 Such a politically unstable and 
uncertain environment has influenced also the government’s approach to the Kurdish issue, as 
well as Kurdish actors’ political behavior over time. 
3.3 Approach to the Kurdish issue 
In its three terms in power, the AKP has paid a specific attention to the Kurdish issue. Despite 
swings in the party’s approach, the period witnessed several reform initiatives, which appear 
historically significant for the recognition of Kurds by the state. This section provides an 
account of the AKP government’s policies and rhetoric as regards the Kurdish issue. I first 
outline the political steps: the first years in power brought about positive steps such as EU 
reforms and visits to Diyarbakır for negotiation with organized actors. However, things 
started getting more complicated especially in the second term, thanks to simultaneous 
processes of reform initiatives and mass incarceration. Second, I briefly discuss the AKP’s 
rhetorical efforts to articulate Kurds. These efforts include references to specific sources of 
identity and solidarity, the party’s anti-systemic claims, and interest. Finally, I point at socio-
economic policies targeting the Kurdish region in general and Diyarbakır in particular.  
From progressive reforms to mass incarceration 
The AKP depicted a strong pro-EU stance in its especially first three years, as mentioned 
before. This stance appears to be one of the major reasons for the Kurdish support to the AKP, 
as the party increased its votes in the 2004 local elections and the 2007 general elections (see 
Tables 2.2. and 2.5).66 The Kurdish movement too advocated the idea of EU membership, for 
its potential effect for the democratization of the country and for the legitimatization of 
Kurdish rights claims. Coupled with the PKK’s ceasefire until summer 2004, the reform 
process brought about a normalization of life in the region as well as some important 
                                                          
64 The community has been collaborating with the AKP government. However, when the AKP succeeded in 
pacifying the secularist-nationalist challenge, the cracks started to appear between the Gülen community and 
high-rank party officials. For an account of the changing relationship, see Ruşen Çakır’s interviews with Ali 
Bayramoğlu (Vatan, 22/02/2012 and 23/02/2012).  
65 For instance, Ahmet Şık, a journalist who wrote a book about this issue, was detained on charges of being part 
of the Ergenekon network while his book draft was destroyed by the police force before it could be published. 
66 Note that the tables present data for either whole country or only the province of Diyarbakır. The same trend 
also is seen in the Kurdish region (which has an unequal distribution of Kurdish population among provinces): 
there is a sharp increase in the AKP’s rate of votes in the 2007 general elections whereas it significantly declines 
in the 2009 local elections. It increases again in the 2011 general elections but cannot reach to the level of 2007 
(see Yeğen 2011). Also note that different logics apply to voting behavior in local and general elections.  
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initiatives for the legal recognition of linguistic-cultural rights to Kurds, despite problems in 
implementation. The gradual lifting of the emergence rule in Kurdish provinces was finalized 
in the AKP period, by its lifting in Diyarbakır in November 2002. Next year, further 
legislative initiatives took place to enable radio/TV broadcasting in Kurdish and to open 
private courses for the teaching of Kurdish. Some amendments were realized to permit 
parents to name their children in Kurdish. Newroz celebrations were authorized (EC 2004), 
and the first legal demonstration took place in Diyarbakır after twenty-four years (Radikal, 
22/06/2003). In 2004, a new law introduced a compensation mechanism for those who 
suffered material damages under the emergency rule in the region (see Ch. 6 for more on 
this). Other reforms that took place in the period also appear to be relevant for the Kurdish 
electoral approach to the AKP government; i.e. those targeting civil-military relations and the 
State Security Courts. Significant legal restrictions and judicial prosecution were seen in 
practice especially in the initial phases of the introduction of linguistic-cultural rights; 
however, there has been such a visible degree of normalization and rise of hopes in the region 
that the electoral support for the AKP increased, to the disadvantage of the pro-Kurdish party, 
in the 2004 local elections. 
Although the EU reform process was to slow down, the AKP went on with some initiatives to 
articulate Kurds to its political project in competition against the Kurdish movement. In 
August 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan made his first visit to Diyarbakır. During this visit, 
Erdoğan gave a speech in front of a mass where he said that the ‘Kurdish question’ is a 
problem of the whole nation, including him, and promised to further democratization for all 
citizens, while he acknowledged that the state had made mistakes in the past (Bianet, 
12/08/2005). This step was made against a background of a number of events: intermittent 
clashes with the PKK; increasing nationalist reactions from the military and the opposition 
party;67 calls by a group of important public figures (including representatives from interest 
associations) for a solution to the Kurdish issue;68 and a special interest paid by European 
Union representatives to the Kurdish issue in relation with Turkey’s candidacy. Thereby, the 
                                                          
67 Earlier that year, the tearing of the Turkish flag by two children during Newroz celebrations in Mersin led to 
an official release by the army forces in which the event was described, in a threatening manner, as a betrayal of 
‘pseudo-citizens’ (Milliyet, 23/03/2005). Furthermore, Deniz Baykal, the chairperson of the main opposition 
party CHP, maintained a critical approach to the government’s initiatives, arguing that the issue could not be 
solved by negotiation and democratization (Bianet, 19/08/2005).  
68 Before Erdoğan’s visit to Diyarbakır, about 150 intellectuals, journalists, and (former) leaders from organized 
groups (including Istanbul’s Medical Association, the Bar Association, and the KESK) made a press statement, 
asking the PKK to lay down weapons and the AKP to take initiatives for a democratic solution to the issue 
(Bianet, 15/06/2005). A number of them, headed by Gençay Gürsoy, also had a meeting with Prime Minister 
Erdoğan concerning this call, before Erdoğan’s visit to the city (Bianet, 10/08/2005; see also Ch. 4).  
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year 2005 marked the beginning of two important ongoing trends.69 First, the AKP has started 
oscillating between pro-Kurdish reformist and Turkish nationalist positions, in order to 
manage its heterogeneous social base and to deal with political rivals. Second, associations 
from the Kurdish region have started to become more visible as political actors, especially 
following Erdoğan’s visit to Diyarbakır. Not only visits by high-level political figures 
continued, but also activism by associational leaders has increased since then. 
Starting with 2007, the AKP engaged in cross-border operations into Iraq to fight the PKK. 
Cross-border operations is not unique to the AKP period; however, what is unique is that the 
AKP began to develop good relations with both Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan 
regional government in northern Iraq, as opposed to the past foreign-policy approach strictly 
against the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous formation in Iraq. This was going to lead to a 
cooperative relationship among the actors as regards the PKK, in addition to the strengthening 
of their economic ties (see Barkey 2011). The AKP increased its votes from the Kurdish 
region in the 2007 general elections; however, the situation got more complicated in 
following years: the urban realm hosted protests by Kurdish citizens against the government’s 
policies towards Kurds and particularly Abdullah Öcalan’s prison conditions. Protests met 
excessive use of force by the security forces. Furthermore, prosecution and incarceration of 
demonstrators, including children, under terrorism laws started to increase by 2008 (HRW 
2010). 
In 2009, the two-sided approach got stronger: on the one hand, the KCK operations started in 
April right after the local elections. One the other hand, the AKP soon started to talk about a 
‘democratic opening’ project as a solution to the Kurdish issue. The KCK operations, as 
mentioned before, has resulted in ongoing waves of mass arrests of several thousands of 
people at total, for alleged membership in or collaboration with the PKK’s urban wing, the 
KCK (see also Ch. 2). Targets have included locally elected representatives (including 
mayors), party officials, activists, members of NGOs, unionists, lawyers, students, and so on. 
Majority of them has ended up with prosecution, prolonged pretrial detention, and/or 
conviction. The AKP government has given its support to the process, as Prime Minister 
Erdoğan repeated the claim of indictments that the KCK is an attempt by the PKK to build a 
‘parallel state’ (TC 2010: 1/56-70; Radikal, 07/11/2011). 
                                                          
69 This year appears to be significant in other regards too, such as the changes in the EU process, rise in 
confrontations between the judiciary and the government (as mentioned in previous section), and rise in the 
attention the Gülen community has paid to the Kurdish issue (Tan 2011: 460).  
74 
 
As to the ‘democratic opening,’ the AKP kept some ambiguity about the content of this 
project. However, general idea was to take further initiatives as regards democratization, the 
recognition of Kurdish identity and regional economic concerns. Already in the beginning of 
the year, the public broadcaster TRT launched an all-day Kurdish-language channel, and the 
Prime Minister spoke a few words in Kurdish at the launching ceremony. During the 
‘opening,’ a regulation was introduced to lift obstacles to all-day broadcasting by private TV 
channels. Initiatives were taken to enable the establishment of Kurdish language institutes at 
universities. Original names of some places were restored. Allocation of additional sources 
was also declared for socio-economic development of the Kurdish region (see next sub-
section). The government initially depicted the process as to be ‘participatory,’ by having 
consultations with representatives of organized groups (see Ch. 4 and Part II) and other public 
figures. In recent two terms in the parliament, the AKP usually rejected to negotiate with the 
pro-Kurdish party unless it would declare the PKK as a terrorist organization; however, 
parallel to the opening, some negotiations took place both with representatives from the pro-
Kurdish party and with Abdullah Öcalan behind the curtains. In October 2009, during another 
short period of ceasefire by the PKK, a number of former guerillas entered the country from 
Iraq as a ‘peace group,’ upon the call by Öcalan and approval signals by the government.  
The peace group was let free by the security forces at their entry. However, passionate 
welcoming by masses in Diyarbakır led to Turkish nationalist reactions in the political arena. 
Prosecution of members of the group was to follow this later (Radikal, 17/02/2010). The 
unexpected course of the event should have added to the trust problem. Other events in the 
process also changed the course of the ‘opening.’ The pro-Kurdish party DTP was closed 
down by the Constitutional Court in December 2009. The AKP has re-named the project of 
‘democratic opening’ by ‘national unity and fraternity’ (see, for instance, AK-Parti 2010). The 
party’s nationalist rhetoric has increased since then: this has been symbolized in the motto of 
‘one nation, one state, one flag’ often used by Prime Minister Erdoğan. He at times added 
‘one language’ or ‘one religion’ against the demands by the Kurdish movement for autonomy 
and bilingualism and for underlying religious unity; however, Erdoğan would later argue that 
it was a misunderstanding when he received criticisms (Bianet, 27/12/2010). Keeping such 
ambiguity has been instrumental for the AKP in its quest for building a coalition of groups 
with diverse interests and commitments. 
During the 2011 elections, the pro-Kurdish party met legal obstacles in running its candidates 
(see Çakır 2011) and the Prime Minister declared that there is not a Kurdish issue in Turkey 
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anymore, but a PKK issue (Bianet, 15/07/2011). Advocates’ demands for meeting with 
Abdullah Öcalan were not responded for about a year. In November 2011, Prime Minister 
apologized on behalf of the state for its massacre in the Kurdish-Alevi dominated province 
Tunceli (Dersim) in 1937, while pointing at the CHP as the ruler of the period (Milliyet, 
11/10/2012). Thereby, the AKP government claimed to be separate and challenging an 
authoritarian state tradition. However, in December 2011, Turkish jets fired at a group of 
smugglers in Uludere (Roboskî), near the Turkish-Iraqi border, killing 34 civilians, and the 
government accepted no responsibility, arguing that the strike was based on information that 
they could be PKK guerillas. Between the swings in rhetoric and conflict, uncertainty has 
prevailed. 
Appeals to identity and interest: unite, or divide and rule? 
The simultaneous process of confrontation with the Kemalist elites and reform initiatives 
concerning the Kurdish issue helped the AKP not assume any responsibility for the state’s 
historical mistreatment of Kurds. Rather, the AKP deployed a populist rhetoric, as if it stood 
for (majority of) the nation against the elites (within and around the state). The party has 
relied also on specific strategies to articulate Kurds to its political project. In the first term of 
the AKP rule, discussions took place in the public sphere on a supra-identity, with references 
to geographical belonging, constitutional bonds, and religion. Among these the AKP made 
repeated references to Islam as a shared historical identity and a source of solidarity 
(Candaş/Buğra 2010). Initially, the rhetoric on religion appeared as an instrument of unifying 
different ethnic groups within the country. However, especially as the policy against the 
Kurdish movement became harsher, the rhetoric developed into an instrument of dividing 
Kurds among themselves. On several occasions, Prime Minister Erdoğan accused the 
movement members of being Zoroastrian (read as perverse) and considering Abdullah Öcalan 
as a prophet while Erdoğan made his regular references to the glorious Islamic history shared 
with pious Kurds and traced back to the times of fights against the Crusades.70 Hence, 
Erdoğan differentiated between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ passions. 
The religious repertoire, however, was not the only instrument of the AKP in its approach to 
Kurds. Parallel to the post-Islamism literature mentioned before, the AKP also emphasized 
democratization and economic development. To fight the Kurdish movement, the AKP 
attempted to categorize Kurds into ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ ones, especially since the entry of 
                                                          
70 See, for instance, Erdoğan’s speech at electoral rally in June 2011 in Diyarbakır (Erdoğan 2011).  
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Kurdish politicians into the parliament in 2007.71 ‘Good Kurds’ were to be those who 
opposed the armed struggle and supported the policies of democratization and development 
(read as those who supported the AKP). ‘Bad Kurds,’ on the other hand, were to be those who 
supported ‘terrorism,’ or even were ‘terrorists’ themselves, and were disturbed by the 
development of the region (read as followers of the Kurdish movement).72 Remember that 
there have been waves of mass incarceration under terrorism laws especially since 2008, 
targeting members and supporters of the Kurdish movement. The AKP leaders also usually 
resisted meeting the members of the pro-Kurdish parties unless they declared that they 
recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization. The mainstream media also played a role in the 
formation of such categorizations, also thanks to the process when Kurdish associational 
actors and intellectuals have become highly visible as third actors. While these actors made 
frequent press statements and gave interviews as regards the Kurdish issue and, sometimes, 
other national topics such as the referendum (see Part II), a notion of ‘white Kurds’ emerged 
in the Turkish media: this usually meant the idea of a rising Kurdish middle class who is 
‘moderate’ in political terms. The AKP’s efforts to eliminate the Kurdish movement from the 
contestation to undertake the leadership of Kurds, inter alia, helped indeed the rise of these 
actors, particularly from the associational site.  
Although what was subsumed under the theme of democratization included also initiatives for 
the introduction of linguistic-cultural rights and the recognition of Kurdish ethnic identity, the 
Prime Minister came up with another dichotomy during the 2009 local elections: ‘identity’ 
versus ‘service.’ As mentioned in Chapter 2, Erdoğan pointed at allegedly bad quality of 
municipal services in Kurdish localities run by the pro-Kurdish party. While Erdoğan 
presented the AKP as a better alternative focused on politics of ‘service,’ he accused the pro-
Kurdish party of doing ‘identity politics.’ The AKP’s appeals to interest under the garb of 
service relate, in practice, not only to its general economic performance, as mentioned in 
previous section, but also to specific policies targeting Kurdish provinces. 
                                                          
71 The dichotomy was often openly but critically used in public debates, by journalists and pro-Kurdish 
politicians. For instance, see the columns by Ece Temelkuran, ‘Açılım ve Kadınlar’ (Milliyet, 18/10/2009); Oral 
Çalışlar, ‘İyi Kürt, kötü Kürt’ (Radikal, 24/09/2010); Cengiz Çandar, ‘İyi Kürtler’in Nevruz’u, kötü Kürtler’in 
Newroz’u’ (Radikal, 20/03/2012), and the statement by the Member of Parliament Sebahat Tuncel ‘Başbakan’ın 
İyi Kürdü’ (Milliyet, 21/02/2011).  
72 The argument regarding development policies relates to the assumption that the Kurdish issue is an outcome of 
the regional underdevelopment and that the PKK benefits from this situation for recruitment. Following lines by 
Prime Minister Erdoğan summarizes his usual rhetoric pretty well: ‘Do you know what the terror says? “Why do 
you come and invest in Muş, Van, Hakkari, and Diyarbakır? Why do you raise the life standards here?” The 
terrorist organization and terrorists are disturbed by this. The investments will continue, out of spite. Life 
standards of my people will increase. There will be more advanced democracy, out of spite’ (Milliyet, 
25/10/2008, my translation).  
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Socio-economic policies for ‘positive discrimination’ 
Regional disparities have been a persistent problem during the Republican period. While 
industrialization was concentrated in the west of the country, the Kurdish-populated eastern 
and southeastern regions have been characterized by underdevelopment and poverty, lacking 
in public services and infrastructure, and less successful as regards the commercialization of 
agriculture. The post-1980 era contributed to disparities because of the armed conflict and the 
deterioration of the terms of trade against agriculture (Pamuk 2008). Historically, the problem 
of regional underdevelopment was depicted as one major reason for the Kurdish issue and 
Turkish governments promised to take measures against it (Yeğen 2003; Sönmez 1992). The 
AKP too promised ‘positive discrimination’ for the Kurdish region and found an economic 
environment conducive to this promise, thanks to the recovery from the 2001 crisis at national 
level and from the 1990s’ armed conflict at regional level. According to official statistics, 
public investments increased under the AKP rule in regional provinces such as Diyarbakır, 
Mardin and Urfa (see KB 2012: v-vi). Many of these investments have been concentrated in 
agricultural sector and became possible largely through the decades-old South-East Anatolia 
Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi – GAP). As a regional development project, the GAP 
originally focused on agricultural and energy sectors, but gradually integrated also other 
sectors such as transportation, health, education, and infrastructure (Çarkoğlu/Eder 2005). In 
the AKP era, the GAP’s share in total public investments increased from 5.9 % in 2002 to 
14.2 % in 2010, speeding up by 2008 (GAP-BKİB 2010: 5). 
There were other governmental initiatives targeting the regional economy. Province-specific 
incentives for private-sector investments, another old mechanism, were also offered by the 
AKP, although studies suggest that they do not have any positive impact for investments in 
the region (TESEV/UNDP 2006: 19). Another mechanism has been the targeting of small and 
medium sized enterprises by the ministerial agency KOSGEB, which provides monetary 
supports with and without the condition of paying back and loan interest supports. In addition 
to programs with nationwide coverage, the mechanism included special loan-support 
programs for the southeastern region73 and for Diyarbakır in particular. Diyarbakır was 
promoted as a ‘center of attraction’ from 2009 onwards. In this vein, a project was initiated 
including, inter alia, loan interest supports up to 100 per cent, for the period of 2009-2010 
                                                          
73 In 2010, southeastern Turkey was the second region as regards the allocation of loan interest supports, with 
20.6 % of the total. Its share of loan supports amounted to 30 million Turkish Liras and created a loan volume of 
208 million Turkish Liras in the region (KOSGEB 2010: 38).  
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(KOSGEB 2010).74 Note that this coincided with the 2009 local elections when the AKP put 
its major goal as to win over Diyarbakır, which was called by pro-Kurdish politicians as the 
‘fortress.’ Furthermore, the Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry was an important 
channel for access to these supports while its president later became an MP from the AKP 
(see Ch. 5).  
Social policy has been another important realm, where the AKP developed policies with 
significant impact on the Kurdish region. As outlined in the previous section, the government 
took some initiatives which improved access to and quality of healthcare services across the 
country. One initiative was to re-introduce mandatory professional service for physicians 
(2005), aiming to increase the number of physicians in the Kurdish region, where the number 
has been below the national average. Another initiative was to expand the benefits of the 
Green Card, which is a means-tested health care program. By 2008, the program covered 40 
per cent of population in the Kurdish region while it was only 14 per cent for the whole 
country (Günal 2008).75 However, it should also be noted that such means-tested programs 
can lead to problems in practice as regards the definition of ‘deserving poor.’ According to a 
field study, there were many complaints in the regional provinces that those who had a family 
member convicted or searched for a political crime were not granted the card (TESEV/UNDP 
2006: 126). A more publicized example is the approach of the Adana governor to Kurdish 
child demonstrators in 2008: the governor stated that it was not acceptable for children to 
participate in a protest organized by supporters of ‘terrorism’ while their families benefited 
from social aids by the state; therefore, he would cancel the entitlements of these families 
(Radikal, 29/10/2008). Note the parallelism between this policy approach and the poverty-
alleviation activities by the Kurdish movement, which too emphasize loyalty as criteria of 
deserving, albeit under different conditions (see Ch. 2).76 
                                                          
74 From the start of the project in 2009 until the end of 2010, 2,449 enterprises applied in Diyarbakır and 2,008 
of them benefited from the loan-interest support program, which cost 8.2 million Turkish Liras to KOSGEB and 
created a loan volume of 58 million Turkish Liras, see (KOSGEB 2010: 46). Thereby, Diyarbakır came the 
second province in 2010 across the country, as regards allocation of loan-interest supports, with a share of 7.9 % 
of the total amount, whereas the number one province Istanbul had a share of 12.8 % (KOSGEB 2010: 35).  
75 In Diyarbakır, 37.9 per cent of the population used the Green Card in 2009 (Karacadağ 2011: 86).  
76 A historical trend is that Turkish governments promised economic measures for the region conditional on 
Kurds’ giving up support for the PKK; hence, a policy of carrot and stick. The positive discrimination policy of 
the Kurdish movement, on the other hand, targets those, who are (likely to be) subjected to negative 
discrimination by Turkish political authorities; hence, a compensation for the double disadvantaged position. 
Yet, there is a similarity in the requirement/goal of loyalty.  
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There are also other social assistance programs, which were vigorously used in the AKP 
period. As mentioned in the previous section, the state agency SYDGM has been an important 
institutional mechanism. Its foundations across the country provide aids, mostly in kind, as 
regards healthcare, education, food, coal, vocational training, income-generating activities, 
and so on. With regard to the regional distribution of total transfers by the directorate, the 
shares of eastern and southeastern regions have depicted an important increase since 2008: 
they received the largest shares, while their combined share amounted to some 44 per cent of 
the total transfers between 2008 and 2011.77 Conditional cash transfers are also included in 
total transfers by the directorate and largely enjoyed by eastern and southeastern regions 
whose combined shares amounted to approximately 67 per cent of the total conditional cash 
transfers between 2003 and 2011. As to the distribution of transfers among provinces in the 
Kurdish region, Diyarbakır’s share has been among the top (SYDGM 2007; SYDGM 2008; 
SYDGM 2009; SYDGM 2010; SYDGM 2011; SYGM 2012). 
Pious communities linked to the AKP, such as the Gülen community,78 have also been active 
in the realm of poverty alleviation. The Gülen community paid a special attention to the 
Kurdish region by mobilizing its philanthropic associations and business associations, and its 
activities were openly praised by the government members.79 Especially following the 2007 
general elections, the AKP’s electoral success was interpreted as an effect of such poverty-
alleviation activities that not only the other political parties started to make more claims as 
regards social-policy matters, but also other organized actors joined the contest in provision.80 
The Kurdish movement led the establishment of Sarmaşık philanthropic association as an 
alternative to the pro-government activities and as a form of intragroup solidarity; however, it 
was faced with judicial obstacles (see Ch. 2 and Part II). 
While the AKP introduced some policies targeting the Kurdish region, the Kurdish movement 
claimed that the municipalities run by the pro-Kurdish party and the linked associations 
                                                          
77 The total transfers amounted to 1.3 billion Turkish liras in 2008 and 1.8 billion Turkish liras in 2011.  
78 The Gülen community consists of followers of the cleric Fethullah Gülen. It has been active mainly in realms 
of education, media, and charity within and outside the country. The community has had quite a different 
political outlook, as opposed to the strands of political Islam mentioned above, in that it has had a more Turkish 
nationalist, pro-state, and pro-USA stance. In the 2000s, it became more active in the political and economic 
realms, as mentioned below. For information on the formation of the community, see Yavuz (2005: 242-278). 
79 See, for instance, the statement by the then Minister of Education: ‘Çelik: Kimse Yok Mu’nun Güneydoğu 
atağına şapka çıkarıyorum,’ Zaman, 23/12/2007. 
80 In Diyarbakır, this contestation is exemplified by the following non-governmental organizations: Sarmaşık by 
the Kurdish movement, Mustazaf-Der by the Hizballah circles, local branch of the nation-wide Kimse Yok Mu by 
the Gülen community, and Gönül Köprüsü by local pro-AKP circles. Kemalists had also their associations active 
in the region, if not in Diyarbakır, most notable one being Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (ÇYDD). 
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encountered negative discrimination when it came to allocation of governmental sources. The 
then Minister of Justice for the AKP government, Mehmet Ali Şahin, validated this claim 
before the 2009 local elections apparently to influence electoral behavior: he stated that the 
municipalities who fight with or contradict the government cannot get all their projects 
approved in Ankara (Milliyet, 23/02/2009). In addition to the examples of the Sarmaşık 
Association and the DİYAR A.Ş. Company which faced judicial obstacles, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the allocation of EU and governmental funds provide some insights to the 
situation. The official data supports the claim that the provinces under the AKP rule had 
received more EU funds for social projects. Projects are carried out by a number of local 
organizations such as municipalities, chambers, universities, local state offices, associations, 
cooperatives, etc. The variation in access exists across the country and within the region as 
well as among organizations of different political alignment. For instance, Van comes up as 
the number one province as regards accepted contracts, and received funds more than double 
of what Diyarbakır received. Van’s population is two thirds of Diyarbakır which has a more 
vibrant civil society; however, Van gave more electoral support to the AKP (albeit with a 
decline in 2011, see Table 3.6).81 During my fieldwork, I could see that the provinces which 
give more electoral support to the AKP have better access to resources was a common 
opinion. 
Another claim by the Kurdish movement concerns a within-province differentiation in the 
allocation of resources on the basis of partisanship. Data is not available as regards allocation 
of social aids, except the above mentioned remarks on the Green Card program; however, the 
distribution of funds for social projects in Diyarbakır by the SODES, which is another 
targeting program coordinated by governorships mainly for the eastern and southeastern 
regions, show a supporting trend whereby several pro-government local associations appear 
among the beneficiaries while almost no association visibly aligned with the Kurdish 
movement does.82 Variation in relations between the government and associations are, of 
course, more complicated than this, as Part II investigates. 
                                                          
81 EU funds are the mechanisms of financial assistance of the EU to candidate and potential candidate countries. 
The importance of this example relates to the variation in allocation patterns for different beneficiary targets: the 
previously mentioned resources targeted ordinary individuals and economic enterprises; so it makes sense that 
Diyarbakır usually comes up as the first because of its political significance and large population. However, the 
EU project funds target organized groups and local governmental bodies (their monetary effect is mainly on 
these organizations). For the allocations of funds, see the database of the Central Finance and Contracts Unit 
(Merkezi Finans ve Ihale Birimi). http://www.mfib.gov.tr/. Access date is 09.08.2012.  
82 This argument is based on the data by SODES for 2008-2011 on the distribution of funds according to 
provinces and organizations. The majority of beneficiaries are the local agencies of the state. See 
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Conclusions 
The AKP has been the culmination of historical challenges by political Islam to the Turkish 
state. The period under the AKP rule has been characterized with significant political reforms, 
economic improvement, social polarization, and extreme uncertainty. The party’s stance 
evolved from an initially conservative-liberal approach to an increasingly nationalist-
authoritarian one. Yet, the government employed a rhetoric of democratization and economic 
development to legitimize its fight against the major challengers at two fronts: secularist-
nationalist bureaucratic elites and the Kurdish movement. Such a general way of framing the 
issues helped the AKP maintain an encompassing coalition of social groups with diverse 
interests and identities. Increasingly, however, its rhetoric oscillated between pro-Kurdish 
reformist and Turkish nationalist positions to appease these diverse groups and to compete 
with its political rivals (both the pro-Kurdish party and the other Turkish nationalist parties). 
In this respect, the AKP leaders too made use of ambiguity in framing issues and formulating 
policies, as they made promises to solve the Kurdish issue but without proposing clear 
projects (e.g. the ‘democratic opening’ in its changing names and unclear content) and denied 
making some political statements when they received reaction (the nationalist motto with and 
without ‘one language’). In its struggle against political opponents, the government leaders 
engaged in constructing social divisions along general lines such as supporters and opponents 
of democratization, accusing the party’s opponents of supporting either coup plots (referring 
to secularist nationalists) or terrorism (referring to Kurds). 
The AKP’s efforts to articulate Kurds to its political project showed a great variety. The 
government took numerous initiatives through discursive strategies, political reforms and 
repression, and socio-economic policies. On the discursive level, appeals were made to the 
shared identity of Islam. This was first to be a common ground, a ‘supra-identity,’ for the 
different ethnic groups in the country. However, it was later used to depict a division within 
the Kurdish group in the form of the ‘pious’ versus the ‘perverse.’ The members-supporters of 
the Kurdish movement were depicted to be the latter. This effort led to a broader 
categorization of Kurds which could be observed in the discourses of the AKP, the 
mainstream media and even some associational leaders (see Ch. 5): its vulgar formulation is 
‘good Kurds’ versus ‘bad Kurds.’ The claim is that the former corresponds to those who 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.sodes.gov.tr Access date is 03/01/2013. The exception for the Kurdish movement is the Diyarbakır 
Metropolitan Municipality, which received funds for three projects, among the total 182 projects accepted by 
SODES. For more information, see Ch. 5, §1. 
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support democratic means and the latter to those who support violent means or even 
‘terrorism.’ This was complemented by the definition of the AKP doing ‘service’ politics in 
the sense of working for economic development and satisfaction of social needs and of the 
pro-Kurdish party doing ‘identity politics’ in the sense of pursuing illegitimate, dangerous 
passions. Thereby, the AKP tried to ‘disarticulate’ segments of Kurds articulated by the 
Kurdish movement and ‘rearticulate’ them to its political project (cf. De Leon/Desai/Tuğal 
2009: 210). 
In this respect, the AKP employed various economic and social policy measures at both 
national and regional levels, claiming to offer ‘positive discrimination’ for the Kurdish region 
because of its underdevelopment. In this respect, special programs also were developed for 
Diyarbakır and it was prioritized in the distribution of some governmental resources, as the 
AKP aimed to win over the province in elections because of its symbolical importance 
summarized in its calling as the ‘fortress’ by the Kurdish movement. These policy measures 
contributed to the improvement of the local economy in Diyarbakır, with diverse implications 
for the associational groups under scrutiny (see Part II). They complemented the rhetoric on 
‘interest versus identity,’ by presenting concrete economic incentives and pressures.  
The reform process triggered by EU candidacy process increased the support for the AKP, not 
only for its components with regard to the linguistic-cultural rights for Kurds, but also its 
implications for the general democratization of the country. Even if the latter goal became 
dubious at times, the AKP’s confrontation with the Kemalist elites contributed to the support, 
helping the AKP claim to differ from the oppressive state tradition. Yet, the AKP also 
deployed oppressive measures against the Kurdish movement, including the pro-Kurdish 
parties and the municipalities they run. As the pro-Kurdish politicians were faced with serious 
constraints and not recognized as the representatives of Kurds, the process helped opening up 
the space for interest associations in Diyarbakır. In its rivalry against the Kurdish movement, 
the AKP turned its face to these associations as the ‘third actor’ starting with the year 2005. 
Whether or not it could articulate them to its political project in the following process is the 
subject of the next Part; but before that, let’s have an overview of the national environment of 
organized interests in Turkey.   
83 
 
Chapter 4: Organized interests  
Organized interests form another important ‘partial regime’ for the political representation of 
social groups in Turkey. Although historically they have been pretty much under the influence 
of other two regimes (political parties and social movements), it is hard to ignore the peculiar 
dynamics of this site. Both the institutional setting for interest representation and historical 
political coalitions appear to be highly significant for the contemporary Kurdish associational 
activism: they present certain opportunities and constraints for the AKP government and the 
Kurdish movement, as well as local associational actors, in their quest for influencing this 
activism. Yet, contemporary politics also matter, and one aspect of this relates to 
developments that influence social groups represented by associations on the basis of their 
class or professional positions. Therefore, it is informative to look also at contemporary 
relationships between the AKP government and peak associations, parallel to important policy 
matters. This chapter, hence, provides a background for the study of associational activism in 
Diyarbakır, by highlighting historical legacies, institutional setting, main lines of cleavage 
among peak associations, and major policy developments concerning social groups 
represented by associations. It provides also an overview of historical processes that opened 
up the space for Kurdish associational activism. 
First section outlines the origins of interest associations and the changing legal framework as 
regards issues such as structure and status vis-à-vis the state. The focus is on the peak 
associations which represent businesspeople, professionals (lawyers and physicians) and 
labor. The second section elaborates on diverse associational experiences of politicization. It 
gives a broad overview from the late 1960s onwards, highlighting both political coalitions in 
general and approaches to the Kurdish issue in particular. The third section focuses on the 
associational environment during the AKP period. It points at the diverse patterns of 
interaction between the government and associations; associations’ take on the Kurdish issue; 
and the processes that opened up the space for Kurdish associational activism. The chapter 
ends with conclusions, to proceed with Part II, which focuses on the Kurdish associational 
activism at the intersection of the local and the national.  
4.1 Historical origins and contemporary legal setting  
Although interest associations share a number of similar aspects, their origins date back to 
different moments in history, and legal frameworks vary by time and by association. To trace 
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back these diverse histories, the section is organized around three types of associations that 
the dissertation investigates with regard to the Kurdish issue. First, I give the account for 
business associations. The focus is on compulsory business associations, that is, the chambers 
of commerce and industry; yet I also mention the rise of voluntary business associations. 
Second, I give an account for professional associations, focusing on the bar and medical 
associations. Finally, I elaborate on labor unionism. Overall, interest associations follow a 
similar historical trend in their relationship to the state: there is a transition from the 
authoritarian period to a period of relative autonomy (mainly the post-1960s), which was 
interrupted by the 1980 coup, but generally characterized by corporatist (compulsory 
associations) and pluralist elements (voluntary business associations and unions). 
Contemporary trends display efforts both to increase political influence over the associational 
environment and to liberalize it though legal changes. 
Business associations 
With roots in the traditional guild system, the chambers of commerce and industry emerged 
during the Empire period, in the late 19th century. The chambers then served mostly an 
advisory-mediating role, between the state and merchants, and were based on voluntary 
membership (Koraltürk 2002: 27-38; Toprak 1994b). They increased in number and changed 
in properties in the following century. Founders of the Republic (1923) supported a 
corporatist ideology, influenced from the interpretation of Durkheimian ideas by Ziya Gökalp, 
a theorist of Turkish nationalism. Accordingly, Kemalist elites asserted that classes did not 
exist in Turkish society and society was instead composed of interdependent occupational 
groups (Parla/Davison 2004). As chambers had played a role also in the Turkification of the 
economy in the Young Turk era (Koraltürk 2002: 65-83), they appeared as important 
instruments for the state. 
Inspired from European examples, the 1925 law attributed chambers the legal status of ‘public 
corporate bodies’ and placed them under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce. As 
membership became compulsory, chambers had to regulate members and carry out the duties 
prescribed by laws and official bodies (Öncü 1980; Toprak 1994b). In 1943, the jurisdiction 
of the ministry over chambers further increased: the ministry could establish or dissolve 
chambers and appoint their secretary generals. Chambers’ council members were elected in 
two rounds while half of the second voters was decided by the ministry (Koraltürk 2002; Bora 
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2002).83 Hence, the single-party period which lasted until 1946 shaped the interest regime in a 
fashion similar to ‘state corporatism.’84 
Yet, there was a shift in the political regime toward multi-party politics and in economic 
policies toward liberalization from 1950 onwards, and this brought about some changes for 
chambers too. By the 1950 law85 a peak association was established: the Union of Chambers 
and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği – TOBB). The law 
had been in force until 2004, albeit with several amendments. It attributed to the union a 
public status and an advisory-mediating role to be played before government, in addition to 
interest representation. Furthermore, chambers gained relative autonomy from the ministry, 
with regard to the election of their executive bodies and administration. 
Political changes in following decades brought along some amendments in the legal 
framework, and the prerogatives of chambers shifted according to the model of economic 
development (see Öncü 1980; Heper 1991). Yet, chambers have preserved their corporatist 
structure up to now. Note that the effects of the 1980 coup were seen also at the site of 
organized interests. The 1982 Constitution aimed to depoliticize interest associations and 
restrict their autonomy which had been expanded by the 1961 Constitution. The constitution 
banned compulsory interest associations from engaging in political activities and taking joint 
action with political parties, labor unions and voluntary associations. These external actors 
were not allowed to nominate candidates or engage in propaganda for and against candidates 
for the bodies of compulsory associations. Also, decree-laws increased the ‘tutelary powers’86 
of relevant ministries over compulsory associations (Özbudun 1991: 49). The bans did not 
always translate into practice though, and the constitution was amended in 199587 to lift the 
bans on political activities and joint action, while keeping the ban on the nomination of 
                                                          
83 This arrangement was justified by the view that ‘the crises-ridden years we have been going through made it 
apparent that there is an absence in Turkey of professional morality and discipline on the part of businessmen 
and industrialists. . . [to] induce them to function with a view to general interest’ (quoted in Heper 1991: 15). 
84 For an elaboration on the subtypes of corporatist interest representation, see Schmitter (1974). As to the case 
of Turkey, Robert Bianchi too defines the interest regime of the single-party period as one of ‘limited state 
corporatism’ whereas the following multi-party period as swinging between pluralism and corporatism (1984: 
138-146). For alternative approaches, see Heper (1991) and Buğra (1994), who argue for one dominant pattern 
of interest group politics, with a discussion on the nature of state intervention to economy, and see Makal (2002) 
for a discussion on the single-party period. 
85 Law by No: 5590, dated 08/03/1950.  
86 ‘The organs, decisions, contracts, budgets, and by-laws of local and functionally decentralized agencies are 
controlled a posteriori by central authorities explicitly designated by law, such as ministers, Council of 
Ministers, Council of State, governors and sub-governors, in a manner which is known as “administrative 
tutelage”’ (quoted in Özbudun 1991: 48, emphasis original).  
87 Amendment Law by No: 4121, dated 23/07/1995.  
86 
 
candidates by political parties. As Part II shows, however, there is still a de facto involvement 
by political parties. 
Back to the law for chambers, the AKP government replaced the 1950 law with a new one in 
2004,88 in addition to enacting subsequent by-laws and amendments. The new legal 
framework does not bring any radical change. Yet, as seen in the past too, the government 
carried out some arrangements, with the purpose of influencing associational elections. For 
instance, it is no more allowed for the leaders of chambers and TOBB to serve more than two 
terms, without giving a break. Another important change is that the elected members of 
associations (both local and peak) are required to resign only if they become a member of the 
national parliament or a mayor, while it is now possible for them to be, at the same time, a 
member of a party organ or a municipal council.89 It has, therefore, become legally possible 
for party members to get to executive positions in chambers and their union.  
Two different trends are seen in the 2000s: on the one hand, there is the goal of increasing 
political influence by the government over associations. On the other hand, there is the goal of 
challenging the power of compulsory business associations originating from their corporatist 
structure, as seen in the draft law aiming to divide them into different sectors,90 albeit opposed 
by the union of chambers.91 A more radical change in this vein is suggested in the proposals 
by the Presidential Board of Supervision and liberal NGOs to turn the system of corporatist 
interest representation into a pluralist one by ending the principles of compulsory 
membership, representational monopoly, and public status (DDK 2009; LDT 2012).92 The 
significance of these different trends can be best understood by considering the government’s 
aim to build hegemony, neoliberal state restructuring, and the political challenge historically 
presented by compulsory associations, as outlined in next sections. 
                                                          
88 Law by No: 5174, dated 18/05/2004.  
89 The amendment law was initiated jointly by some members of the parliament on the tickets of the AKP and 
the CHP. See Law by No: 5290, dated 03/02/2005. See also the parliamentary minutes (TBMM 2005) and the 
newspaper coverage, ‘Oda’larda siyasetin önü açıldı: AKP, TOBB’u tabandan kuşatacak,’ Hürriyet, 01/03/2005.  
90 See the draft law by No: 1/601, dated 23/03/2012, named ‘Finansal Kiralama, Faktoring ve Finansman 
Şirketleri Kanunu Tasarısı.’  
91 ‘TOBB, üç ayrı birlik kurulmasına karşı çıktı,’ Dünya, 27/05/2012.  
92 A pro-government national newspaper covered the report for three successive days, highlighting themes such 
as the alleged anti-democratic structure, high fees for membership, and politicization in opposition to the 
government. See ‘Örgütlerin yapısı kazancın kapısı,’ Yeni Şafak, 11/01/2010; ‘Siyaset bulaştı haksızlık boy aştı,’ 
Yeni Şafak, 12/01/2010; and ‘Sivil toplum baronları’ Yeni Şafak, 13/01/2010.  
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Also note that pluralism has not been absent in the realm of business associations. Corporatist 
realm of interest representation was historically dominated by commercial interests, as 
opposed to industrial interests, and by small chambers, as opposed to large chambers located 
in a few metropolitan centers (Öncü 1980; Bianchi 1984). Against the background of existing 
channels for state-business relations and the socio-political instability in the post-1960 Turkey 
(Buğra 1994), largest industrialists founded their own voluntary association in 1971: the 
Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları 
Derneği – TÜSİAD). Several other voluntary business associations were founded since then, 
and they became important actors since the late 1970s (Buğra 1994: 237). TÜSİAD continued 
to be the top association among them until recent times, bringing together big businessmen 
who were historically supported by the state, and maintained a secular European-oriented 
outlook (Buğra 1998). Two other peak associations which are significant for contemporary 
political-economic environment signify the rise of political Islam and of provincial small and 
medium sized enterprises in the post-1980 period: first, the Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen's Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği – MÜSİAD) was 
founded in 1990, with links to political Islam (see also Buğra 1998). Second, the 
Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (Türkiye İşadamları ve 
Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu – TUSKON) was founded in 2005, with links to the Gülen 
Movement (see Buğra/Savaşkan 2012). Voluntary business associations have significance 
also at the local level in the Kurdish region, as elaborated in Chapter 5; but, let’s continue 
with other types of interest associations. 
Professional associations 
The formation of modern professional groups dates back to the 19th century Ottoman Empire. 
Several legislative arrangements were initiated by the state to standardize and regulate 
professionals such as lawyers and physicians, while leading also to the emergence of earlier 
forms of professional associations (Toprak 1994a; Özman 2000; Rasimoğlu 2012). However, 
the development of modern professional associations was to occur mainly in the Republican 
period, with inspiration from European examples (Toprak 1994a: 60).  
The 1924 law introduced the contemporary bar associations and made membership 
compulsory. By 1938, bar associations gained the legal status of ‘public corporate bodies’; 
their duties were specified as regards the regulation of professionals while the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Justice over associations was increased. In this period, the profession was 
defined with regard to the purpose of providing public service (Toprak 1994a; DDK 2009: 
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161, 677). A law enacted in 1969 was to provide a new legal framework that is still in force, 
albeit with amendments.93 This law narrowed the powers of the ministry over bar associations 
and led to the establishment of the peak association: the Union of Bar Associations of Turkey 
(Türkiye Barolar Birliği – TBB). Its duties have included the representation of professional 
interests, as well as advisory role for the relevant ministry and official bodies on legal issues. 
Medical associations were introduced by the 1928 law. This law made membership 
compulsory and brought associations under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. Their 
duties were defined as regards the regulation of professionals (TTB 2012b; DDK 2009: 478-
479). By 1953, medical associations were to be regulated by a new law, which is still in force, 
albeit with amendments.94 This law formed a peak association: the Union of Turkish Medical 
Associations (Türk Tabipleri Birliği – TTB). The union was attributed the status of public 
corporate body and the duty of pursuing professional rights and interests, in harmony with 
public interests. This latter duty was to be removed in the AKP period.95 
The legal status of professional associations was strengthened by the 1961 Constitution, with 
the recognition of autonomy as regards the election of their bodies and administration. The 
1982 Constitution, however, aimed to restrict this autonomy and banned associations from 
engaging in political activities, as happened with chambers. Professional associations were 
prohibited to take joint action with political parties, labor unions and voluntary associations. 
Also these external actors were not allowed to nominate candidates or engage in propaganda 
for and against candidates for the bodies of professional associations. Furthermore, 
membership ceased to be compulsory for those who were employed in public corporations, to 
undermine the power of associations. By decree-laws, Ministries of Justice and Health 
enjoyed increasing tutelary powers over respective associations (Özbudun 1991). Yet, the 
constitutional amendments of 1995 lifted the bans on political activities and joint action with 
external actors. As for the 2000s, amendments to the 1969 law for TBB between 2001 and 
2005 improved the social rights of lawyers and expanded the income sources of bar 
associations (Özok 2009). However, a decree law96 was to give additional authority to the 
                                                          
93 Law by No: 1136, dated 19/03/1969. 
94 Law by No: 6023, dated 23/01/1953. 
95 The amendment that took place under the AKP rule in 2011 lifted the duty to develop and practice the 
profession for public and individual benefits (see the amended Article 1). The TTB interpreted this amendment 
as another step for privatization of healthcare services (TTB 2012c). 
96 Kanun hükmünde kararname, No: 663, dated 11/10/2011. 
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Ministry of Health by establishing a board of health professionals and reducing professional 
autonomy (Anonymous 2012). 
The 2009 reform proposal by the Presidential Council of Supervision for turning the 
corporatist system of interest associations into a pluralist one applies also to professional 
associations (DDK 2009).97 Note that there are currently no special labor unions for these two 
professional groups. Only the physicians employed in the public sector can become members 
of unions for the public health sector since the 1990s (see Ülgen 2006). Unionism, on the 
other hand, is quite a diverse environment. 
Labor unions 
Organized labor activities too can be traced back to the late Ottoman period. However, these 
initiatives were very limited, against the background of existing political regime and a vastly 
agrarian society (Makal 1997; Mahiroğulları 2005). In the Republican period, labor unions – 
as organizations based on class – were not allowed under the single-party regime. The 
transition to multi-party regime, however, provided the background for a law in 1947 which, 
for the first time, enabled the establishment of labor unions. Still, unions were banned from 
engaging in strikes and political activities, including relationships with political parties 
(Mahiroğulları 2005; Çelik, Aziz 2010), and they were not allowed to act against national 
interests (Akkaya 2003: 834). Labor unions could be formed on the basis of work branch and 
workplace. Accordingly, many unions were formed in industrial cities (Mahiroğulları 2005: 
78-84), and the first union confederation was established in 1952: Confederation of Turkish 
Labor Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Türk-İş). Türk-İş enabled the 
centralization of labor unions, under the influence of the state (Cizre 1991; Çelik, Aziz 2010), 
and it has become one of the most important actors of the union scene since then. 
The 1961 constitution and following laws changed the nature of the union regime. The right 
to collective bargaining and strike was recognized. It became a constitutional right to form 
labor unions, to become or not to become a member, and to freely choose among unions. 
Hence, the legal framework introduced a pluralistic environment for unionism. While the 
                                                          
97 For a (critical) response by professional associations, see the report by the union of engineers and architects 
(TMMOB 2011) and for ongoing efforts in this line, see ‘AKP, yeni yasayla TMMOB’u parçalamak istiyor’ 
Bianet, 20/11/2012. Indeed, the governmental efforts are two-sided, as in the case of TOBB: there is also the 
intention of changing the electoral system (by turning it into proportional representation) for professional 
associations to challenge their current executive boards. The reason for this can be understood by looking at the 
associational traditions and contemporary opposition elaborated in next sections. For reform intentions, see 
‘Hükümet yasa çıkararak meslek odalarındaki seçimlere de el atıyor,’ Radikal, 05/04/2008. 
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constitution did not include a ban on political activities, the 1963 law on labor unions banned 
unions from forming organizational links with political parties (Özbudun 1991: 51).  
Parallel to the political polarization in the country during the late 1960s and 1970s, the union 
scene witnessed fragmentation into competing confederations, each with close relations to 
different political parties (Cizre 1991). Two of these confederations are still important: the 
Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – 
DİSK) was formed in 1967 and located on the left of political spectrum. The Confederation of 
Just Labor Unions (Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Hak-İş) was formed in 1976 and 
identified with political Islam. Against ‘union inflation’ (quoted in Cizre 1991: 57), a 
representational threshold for labor unions was enacted in 1970. However, the major hit came 
by the 1980 coup. 
The 1982 Constitution brought similar restrictions for labor unions, as for compulsory interest 
associations: unions were banned from engaging in political activities; taking joint action with 
political parties, compulsory and voluntary associations; and receiving support from or giving 
support to political parties. New laws in 1983 on labor unions,98 collective bargaining and 
strikes99 further limited the right to strike and doubled the threshold requirement for a union 
to have the right to conduct collective bargaining: therefore, a union must 1) represent at least 
10 per cent of the total work force in its work branch and 2) have as its members at least the 
absolute majority of the work force in the enterprise(s) where collective agreement is pursued. 
Especially the latter requirement supports a de facto monopoly of representation by one union 
in a workplace. The political bans were removed from the constitution in 1995, as happened 
with compulsory associations.100 The legal framework persisted until recently, that is, late 
2012 when the AKP government enacted a new law on labor unions and collective 
bargaining, which discourages unionization in small enterprises. 
Before this last enactment, a significant change that took place in the 2000s related to 
unionism in the public sector: although it was not officially regulated before, unions were 
being formed, thanks to the legal void, since 1990 (KESK 2010; Üzüm 2011). By 2001, a new 
law allowed the formation of labor unions in the public sector, however, without recognizing 
                                                          
98 Law by No: 2821, dated 05/05/1983. 
99 Law by No: 2822, dated 05/05/1983. 
100 For more details on the relevant legislation up to the 2000s, see Mahiroğulları (2005). The 1995 amendments, 
which seem favorable to organized interest politics, are seen as linked to Turkey’s entry to the European 
Customs Unions and quest for EU membership (Adaman/Buğra/İnsel 2009). 
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the right to strike and collective bargaining.101 The right to conduct collective bargaining was 
recognized only by the 2010 referendum (see Ch. 3). Today, there are three major 
confederations in this sector, all formed in the 1990s: the Confederation for the Public Labor 
Unions (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – KESK) on the left of political 
spectrum; the Confederation for the Public Employees Unions (Türkiye Kamu Çalışanları 
Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Türkiye Kamu-Sen) on the right, and the Confederation for 
Public Servants’ Labor Unions (Memur Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Memur-Sen) for 
political Islam (for an overview of peak associations, see Table 1). While the latter two have 
larger memberships nationwide, the first one is a more significant actor in Diyarbakır, as 
detailed in Chapter 7. This has to do with the political traditions of associations. 
 
Table 4.1 Major peak associations  
 Status/Sector Association Date 
founded  
Membership (approx.) 
Business  Compulsory TOBB 1950 365 chambers and stock exchanges 
 Voluntary TÜSİAD 
MÜSİAD 
TUSKON 
1971 
1990 
2005 
600 members 
3,300 members 
14,844 members 
Professionals Compulsory TTB  1953 65 associations  
  TBB  1969 78 bars 
Labor Private sector TÜRK-İŞ 
DİSK 
HAK-İŞ 
1952 
1967 
1976 
35 unions 
18 unions 
8 unions  
 Public sector KAMU-SEN 
MEMUR-SEN 
KESK  
1992 
1995 
1995 
12 unions 
11 unions  
11 unions  
Source: DDK (2009); ÇSGB (2009) and organizational websites. 
                                                          
101 Law by No: 4688, dated 25/06/2001.  
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4.2 Diverse paths to politicization  
Thanks to changes in the legal and societal arenas, associational environment got larger, 
fragmented and politicized in the post-1960s. Although the environment would experience 
difficulties as a result of the 1980 coup, political identities were to be maintained. This section 
aims to shed light on the diverse political traditions contemporary peak associations belong to, 
by focusing on major patterns of politicization from the late 1960s until the AKP period. It 
also mentions associational approaches to the Kurdish issue, since associations became more 
active as political actors for the definition of and solution to the issue in the 1990s, as a result 
of war conditions.102 The section is organized as the previous one, focusing on each 
associational group separately: business, professionals, and labor. 
Business and mainstream politics 
As mentioned before, the period of 1960s and 1970s are important for the rise of social 
movements and political polarization in Turkey. Interest associations, including chambers, got 
politicized too. The union of chambers was usually on good terms with governments and 
allied with the center-right Justice Party, who had been in power for several times in the 
period. Presidents of chambers enjoyed top positions in the provincial organizations of this 
party (Bianchi 1984: 251). The union also voiced a nationalist, anti-communist discourse, 
against the rising leftist movement. In turn, it appeared as an important spot for right-wing 
politics (Bora 2002).  
The place of chambers in the economic realm, however, was a more complicated issue. The 
private-sector development historically showed a large reliance on state-provided 
opportunities (Buğra 1994). In such an environment, chambers played a role mainly in the 
implementation of policies, rather than formulation (Kalaycıoğlu 1991). Under the import-
substituting industrialization of the post-1960 period, for instance, they were assigned the role 
of administering the distribution of import licenses and foreign exchanges, in cooperation 
with ministries. This provided chambers with ‘precarious’ privileges that governments could 
manipulate to influence them (Öncü 1980; Kalaycıoğlu 1991; Bianchi 1984; Heper 1991). 
                                                          
102 It appears that the associational realm had interacted with the Kurdish movement and had to take into account 
the special situation of the Kurdish region in the previous period; however, there is not any work focusing on this 
topic. For hints concerning the relations among the left, professional associations and labor unions in the region, 
see the memoirs of Tarık Ziya Ekinci (Ekinci 2010), as well as the historical analyses of the Kurdish movement 
by van Bruinessen (2005), Marcus (2009) and Romano (2006). Romano (2006) argues that the Kurdish political 
groupings in the 1970s (see Ch. 2) made use of such existing networks provided by interest associations for 
mobilization.  
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Apart from such privileges, however, chambers do not appear to have played a significant role 
in the pursuit of interests; rather, business people usually bypassed their association and 
sought particularistic and clientelistic relations with the political authority (Buğra 1994; Heper 
1991). As Buğra shows, demands were framed with reference to national objectives, because 
of the problem of ‘social legitimacy of business activity’ and political uncertainty. ‘Business 
community has been extremely cautious not to appear as a class in pursuit of its sectional 
interests’ (Buğra 1994: 31). 
While the economy got an export-oriented look from the 1980s onwards, the place of 
chambers in political life seems to have remained similar. The union of chambers usually had 
good relationships with governments, who were pro-business, by adopting an advisory role, 
while the center-right parties competed for influence over it (Bora 2002). However, especially 
by the late 1970s, voluntary associations appeared as competitors to the union of chambers. 
As the big business became less dependent on the state, it also has become more vocal in 
raising criticisms against government policies, as seen with TÜSİAD (Buğra 1994). As 
mentioned in the previous section, TÜSİAD represents the large business that was historically 
backed or even created by the state. Yet, according to Buğra, this meant an unequal 
partnership with the state, to the disadvantage business people who were expected to act 
according to the rules of the game as defined by the state (Buğra 1998: 526). Against this 
background, ‘rather than forming a forum to promote short-term economic interests of the 
business community, (TÜSİAD) constituted the expression of a desire to contribute to the 
creation of a social environment in which the legitimacy of business activity was assured’ 
(Buğra 1994: 139). TÜSİAD has had a secular outlook and supported a European model of 
development (Buğra 1998; Öniş/Türem 2001). 
MÜSİAD, on the other hand, used a ‘language of social disadvantage’ similar to that of the 
National Outlook movement and partly to the AKP, to articulate provincial small and medium 
sized entrepreneurs historically ignored by the state. The association relied on religious 
references and networks (Buğra 2002b). MÜSİAD then stood for what was called ‘Islamic 
capital.’ However, following the secularist threats in the political environment (see Ch. 3) and 
the increasing incorporation of the association’s members to the market, there was a shift 
from the discourse on merits of Islamic solidarity and norms, to statements on uselessness of 
talking about the ‘religious faith of capital’ (Buğra 1998: 534; also see Tuğal 2009). As 
shown in Chapter 5, similar debates are seen in the Kurdish case, as regards to the ‘patriotic’ 
identity of capital.  
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As for the approach of business associations to the Kurdish issue, the union of chambers 
embraced the state’s take on the issue, by adopting the nationalist discourse on national unity 
and the ‘terror problem’ (Bora 2002). However, by the mid-1990s the union of chambers and 
largest business actors issued reports on the Kurdish issue, calling for a solution as well as 
emphasizing economic measures for the regional underdevelopment and recognition of 
Kurdish identity.103 Their attempts are interpreted on the grounds of economic actors’ need 
for stability and discontent with huge war costs, which were, at the time, a matter of concern 
also for the IMF, who demanded from the Turkish government to reduce its public spending 
as a condition of loan agreements (Bozarslan 1996: 149-150; Ergil 2006).  
On the other hand, the army also tried to influence business behaviour with regard to the 
issue, with its briefings on the PKK and its ‘abuse’ of notions such as human rights, 
democratization and political solution (Cemal 2003: 284-286). Later in the process, NGOs 
also were to be accused by military bureaucrats of such ‘abuse.’ Note that the 1990s were a 
decade of NGOization in Turkey, with an increase in number of organizations and in ‘civil 
society talk’ (Navaro-Yashin 1998). In this regard, the union of chambers claimed to be the 
most powerful ‘civil society organization’ in the country, in spite of its public status (Bora 
2002: 307). The rhetoric on civil society was to be used also in the following decade, as a 
source of legitimacy, by interest associations. 
Professionals and left-leaning activism 
By the mid-1960s and especially in the 1970s, professional associations got politicized along 
the lines of the rising left. The peak association for engineers and architects appears to be the 
leading actor in this period; yet, the bar and medical associations also played diverse roles 
(Bora 2002). The union of medical associations held the view that professional problems and 
social problems could not be separated. The union would get more active in the 1970s, as 
polarization increased in society. Claims were made about topics such as healthcare, 
                                                          
103 First, TOBB sponsored the 1995-dated report The Eastern Question by academic Doğu Ergil, calling for the 
recognition of ethnic identity and improving regional development. However, the report became a controversial 
topic among TOBB’s executive members, as well as the political arena at large (Milliyet, 17/08/1995). The then 
president of TOBB Yalım Erez emphasized, in a speech in the same year, the economic dimension of the issue 
while ignoring or even denying the ethnical dimension (see Erez (1995) 2011). Note that Erez acted as the 
president of TOBB between 1990 and 1995, and became the minister of commerce and industry right after. 
Second, one of the most important businessmen in the country, Sakıp Sabancı sponsored the preparation of a 
report which emphasized again economic measures for regional development, in addition to references to the 
Basque model for administration. Third, TÜSİAD prepared reports in 1997 and 1999, emphasizing the issues of 
identity, constitutional recognition and democratization (Yayman 2011: 407-410, 421-425; Bayer/Öniş 2010: 
186-187).  
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unionization, human rights, and left-right clashes, while engaging in joint actions with other 
left-leaning associations, political parties and labor unions (Bora 2002; TTB 2012b; TTB 
2008a; Soyer 2005). 
According to Bora, bar associations and their union were slower in this process: left-leaning 
lawyers became an important force mainly in the 1970s, defining the profession in terms of 
advocacy for freedom and justice (Bora 2002). Note that legal profession gained a special 
significance thanks to political trials targeting politicians, unionists, and activists (see Köktürk 
2001; İnanıcı 2008).104 In the associational realm, leaders supported human rights with 
reference to international agreements, and the ‘rule of law’ became the motto of the union.105 
Toward the end of the decade, some executives and activists from both associations would be 
the victim of increasing political violence (Bora 2002). 
Restrictive legal arrangements by the 1980 coup, mentioned previously, aimed to prevent 
such politicization. Selective repression was to accompany this: some executives from both 
associations were detained, and activities of the union of medical associations were suspended 
for a few years (Bora 2002). Yet, the return of the union of medical associations was to be 
even more powerful. The union organized several mass demonstrations in the late 1980s and 
1990s, with regard to the working conditions of physicians, which deteriorated especially in 
the public sector (TTB 2012b; Soyer 2005). Positioned still on the left, the union also opposed 
privatization and engaged in human-rights activism. Press statements and other activities were 
carried out, as regards topics such as torture, prisoners’ health situation, forced immigration, 
and the Kurdish issue (Soyer 1996). Note that some of these topics concerned physicians in 
not only political-ethical, but also professional terms; e.g. physicians could be required to 
prepare reports on torture claims under guardianship of and as desired by the police. 
The union of bar associations, on the other hand, became less politically active in the post-
1980 period, with its left-leaning approach gradually fading away (Bora 2002). It expressed 
concerns about human-rights violations and associations’ autonomy from the ministry of 
justice, while defining itself as a ‘pressure group’ (TBB 1994; TBB 1989). In line with the 
main cleavages of the new period, the union emphasized its secularist, Kemalist identity that 
                                                          
104 The distinction between ‘political defense’ and ‘legal defense’ in courts by lawyers appears to be important 
for this period (see Köktürk 2001). It is still an issue, as can be seen in Kurdish trials, and making the boundaries 
between the profession and politics even more blurred.  
105 See the speeches by Faruk Erem, who acted as the president of the union of bar associations in the 1970s 
(TBB 2001: 425-508).  
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kept it close to the Republican People’s Party (Bora 2002). Executives of the union were 
usually members of the party too. 
Although peak associations have depicted political identities, several factions existed across 
and within local associations, leading to the formation of political groups, especially in large 
provinces, which compete against each other by supporting separate lists of candidates in 
elections for associational boards (see İnanıcı 2008; Soyer 2005). These factions usually 
project the nation-wide political cleavages (left–right, secularist–conservative, Turkish 
nationalist–pro-Kurdish). Yet, one general source of contention among memberships has been 
seen in the opposition to the politicization of associations and support for, instead, a focus on 
professional issues (İnanıcı 2008; Soyer 2005). This can be sometimes a way of expressing 
discontent with the nature of political activism in question. 
In this vein, the Kurdish issue has been an important divisive issue in the associational 
environment. The union of medical associations played an active role, supporting a peaceful 
democratic solution to the issue, in addition to drawing attention to human-rights violations. It 
pointed also at several health-related issues by its reports or in its congress declarations: 
issues concerned the health consequences of war conditions and internal displacement; 
language barrier between physicians and patients; and safety of physicians employed in the 
region (Ertem/Ceylan/Özcan 1996; TTB 2000a; Bora 2002; TTB 2008a). 
The union and some local affiliates engaged in joint action with other left-leaning associations 
and labor unions, leading to the formation of platforms for labor and democracy, the latter of 
which appears to have been an important example for joint associational action in the Kurdish 
region (see Çelik, Abdullah 2010). In addition, leading figures from medical and bar 
associations took part in the formation of NGOs in the domain of human-rights advocacy 
(TTB 2008a; Bora 2002; TTB 2000b). Such political activism, however, led to accusations 
within the associational environment, about being a supporter of the PKK (Soyer 2005; 
İnanıcı 2008), and to reactions by official authorities in the form of exiles for public-sector 
employees, as in the case of physicians, and in the form of hostile attitudes in professional 
encounters, as in the case of lawyers (Soyer 2005; Soyer 1996; TTB 2000b; Bora 2002). 
These were to be encountered more often in the Kurdish region. 
The union of bar associations, however, did not play an active role as regards the Kurdish 
issue (Bora 2002). Its rhetoric was similar to that of the state, emphasizing the ‘unitary’ 
structure of the country and expressing support for the armed forces in its war on ‘terror.’ Yet, 
97 
 
we also see that associational leaders criticized human-rights violations – such as torture in 
police detention and murders by unknown perpetrators – and called for respect for the ethno-
cultural difference, including the use of (Kurdish) language in everyday life.106 Furthermore, 
following the reports by business associations and slowing-down of the armed conflict, the 
union of bar associations too prepared a report on the Kurdish issue in 1999. In addition to the 
concerns raised before, the report called for economic measures for the development of the 
region and constitutional-legal reforms with a re-definition of citizenship on the basis of the 
‘supra-identity’ of Turkish citizenship (TBB 1999a).107 The union of bar associations was to 
keep its distanced approach to the Kurdish issue also in most of the 2000s. Before proceeding 
to the contemporary period, let’s have a look also at the historical patterns in the labor union 
environment. 
Different colors of unionism 
As political polarization increased across the country from the late 1960s onwards, the labor 
union scene was to experience fragmentary competition. Up to then, Türk-İş had enjoyed a de 
facto monopoly of representation as the only existing confederation of unions. It also enjoyed 
access to decision-making processes by occupying seats in several official commissions. This 
made the confederation appear as a seeker of ‘corporatist privilege’ though, while it promised 
to be ‘above party politics’ pursuing a pragmatic approach. Some of its top officials, however, 
were to enter the parliament on the tickets of diverse political parties, while political parties 
exerted influence on the confederation (Bianchi 1984; Sakallıoğlu-Cizre 1992; Çelik, Aziz 
2010). 
Against this background, DİSK was formed as a rival confederation by splinter unions from 
Türk-İş. Criticizing, inter alia, the co-optation of Türk-İş by governments (Çelik, Aziz 2010: 
519), DİSK engaged in unionism along confrontational left-wing lines. Its membership 
expanded in the 1970s, coupled with an increasing activism and influence. The confederation 
                                                          
106 See the speeches by Önder Sav in general-assembly meetings (TBB 1993: 16-17; TBB 1995b: 17) and 
speeches by both Sav and Eralp Özgen for the beginning of annual judiciary terms (TBB 1991; TBB 1995a; 
TBB 1996a; TBB 1998). It is interesting to see that Önder Sav had a relatively moderate approach in the 1990s, 
as compared to his approach in the 2000s while serving as a member of the parliament on the tickets of the 
Republican People’s Party. 
107 In general-assembly meetings the idea to have a proposal on the Kurdish issue was supported by some 
delegates on this ground, that is, to not let business associations be the only voice on the issue or determining the 
outcome on their own (TBB 1999c: 99). Yet, the union of bar associations appears to have been pretty slow in 
acting on the issue as the decision to prepare the report in question was first given in a meeting between the 
union’s executive board and the associational presidents from the Kurdish region in Batman in October 1997, 
two years before the report was publicized (see TBB 1999b: 273-276; TBB 1999a: 1).  
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then had alliances with the Republican People’s Party, who adopted a social-democratic 
stance. As a result of competition and changing political environment in the country, Türk-İş 
had to revise its organizational strategies too, while some of its members adopted a social-
democratic approach or left Türk-İş to join DİSK (Bianchi 1984; Sakallıoğlu-Cizre 1992). At 
the peak level, Türk-İş often used Turkish-nationalist references in its rhetoric (Akkaya 2003). 
In such an environment, Hak-İş aimed to mobilize a pious membership, starting in the late 
1970s, with links to the political parties of the National Outlook movement (see Ch. 3). The 
confederation defined its main goal as to ‘instill a moral and virtuous outlook in workers,’ and 
its program was very similar to that of the National Salvation Party of the 1970s 
(Duran/Yıldırım 2005: 231). Hak-İş emphasized harmony, rather than conflict, between the 
interests of workers and employers, by emphasizing the common bond of religion. References 
to religion were used also in competition with other unions (Buğra 2002a). The confederation 
was to expand its membership mainly in the post-1980s, which brought along a new political-
economic and institutional environment (Duran/Yıldırım 2005).  
The biggest impact of the 1980 coup was on labor unionism, compared to other interest 
associations. In addition to the newly enacted legal constraints mentioned in the previous 
section, unions were faced with serious political pressures. The activities of confederations 
were suspended at the time of coup, except Türk-İş who gave an open support to the military 
intervention (Cizre 1991).108 Hak-İş resumed its activities soon after; DİSK, however, could 
do so only in 1992. DİSK’s leaders were put on trial, with charges asking for death penalty in 
some cases (Adaman/Buğra/İnsel 2009).  
Union activism was to revive mainly by the late 1980s; however, unions experienced decline 
in membership and loss of power, compared to the pre-1980s. The public sector, on the other 
hand, was to witness unionization activities in the 1990s. Unions were organized in public 
sectors such as municipality, healthcare, and education. Similar to the private sector, three 
confederations were formed along the political lines of left (KESK), right (Kamu-Sen), and 
religious conservatism (Memur-Sen). Several mass demonstrations and strikes were organized 
throughout the decade. Some were joint actions with other associations, as mentioned before 
as regard the platforms (Üzüm 2011). Political authorities initially called union activities in 
the public sector illegal and attempted to suppress unionists. Especially in the Kurdish region, 
                                                          
108 These three confederations maintained their broad political outlook in the post-1980 period. As for their 
relationship to political parties, see Mahiroğulları (2005: 405-417).  
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unionists were faced with severe problems under the Emergency Rule, including union 
closures, investigations, exiles, and forced disappearances ending up with murders by 
unknown perpetrators (Ülgen 2006; Çelik, Abdullah 2010; Üzüm 2011). These appear to have 
targeted mainly the members of KESK, which has been a significant actor in the Kurdish 
union scene. 
KESK has been quite vocal about the Kurdish issue, calling for an end to the armed conflict 
and supporting democratization. Its affiliate unions were to make more specific rights claims, 
such as the union for the education sector demanding education in Kurdish language or the 
union for the healthcare sector drawing attention to the language barrier between some 
physicians and patients in the Kurdish region (Üzüm 2011). As a result, KESK has been 
accused by rival unions of supporting the PKK – read as ‘terrorism’ (İdemen 2009; Çelik, 
Abdullah 2010). 
Therefore, other confederations depicted a different approach to the Kurdish issue. Still 
having a nationalist perspective in the post-1980 period, Türk-İş voiced concerns about the 
‘division’ of the country (Akkaya 2003). In 1993, however, the confederation prepared a 
report advocating the recognition of the Kurdish ethno-cultural identity and implementation of 
economic measures for regional development, in addition to pointing at human-rights 
violations (Yayman 2011: 404-405). Yet, in 1995, one of its affiliates prepared a report, 
following the reports by business associations, and prioritized the economic dimension of the 
issue, while criticizing the proposals of constitutional and administrative reform (Yayman 
2011: 410-412). Hence, the associational behavior showed some swings depending on the 
political context. Hak-İş too prepared a report in 1996, advocating socio-economic measures 
and better teaching of Turkish language in the region. Furthermore, it made arguments similar 
to those of the Welfare Party in the 1990s and of Prime Minister Erdoğan in the 2000s (see 
Ch. 3): the report defined the Kurdish issue as a problem of whole country and pointed at the 
state’s mistakes (Yayman 2011: 417-419). As the AKP paid a special attention to the Kurdish 
issue, by mobilizing different actors in society, interest associations were to be involved in 
this process too, one way or another.  
4.3 Associational politics in the AKP period 
Interest associations have developed their political identities over a span of decades. Their 
relationship to the AKP government has been driven partly by these identities. However, there 
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have been also novel issues leading to cooperation and conflict between them. This section 
elaborates on the nature of state-association relations in the AKP period, by focusing on major 
political and associational issues. It also mentions the approach of associations to the Kurdish 
issue as re-configured by the contemporary context. The first three sub-sections focus on 
these aims, organized along associational groups. The final sub-section points at the rise of 
Kurdish associational activism against this background and links to Part II, which focuses on 
the activism in Diyarbakır. 
Variation in the business environment  
As detailed in Chapter 3, economy recovered a great deal in the AKP period from the 2001 
financial crisis. While economic stability and sustained growth marked this period, new 
opportunities were provided by the state for private economic actors. Therefore, business 
circles have been fine with the government’s economic policies in general. However, the 
environment of organized interest representation has shown a variety of relations with the 
government, ranging from cooperative to conflict-prone. 
Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, the leader of the union of chambers TOBB during the AKP period, 
usually gave support to the economic policies and called for further commitment to budgetary 
discipline, privatization and structural reforms (see TOBB/Bozkurt 2011; TOBB 2008; TOBB 
2012). The AKP leaders such as Prime Minister Erdoğan regularly took part in the general 
assemblies of TOBB, as a sign of support. Yet, tensions also appeared between the two. For 
instance, the Prime Minister asked TOBB members to increase their employment capacity 
against the problem of increasing rates of unemployment, triggered by the 2008global 
financial crisis. Having been attributed a responsibility on such an immediate social problem, 
Hisarcıklıoğlu (2011b) reacted somewhat negative.  
Furthermore, Hisarcıklıoğlu sometimes complained about the politically-vulnerable situation 
of businesspeople, as observed in ‘unjust’ tax penalties (TOBB/Bozkurt 2011: 807) and 
argued that it was a form of punishment for those criticizing the government (quoted in 
TBMM 2010: 91, also see Vatan, 03/05/2010). Indeed, the tax-evasion charge against the 
biggest media group Doğan Holding in 2009 is an example of this. Maybe in relation with this 
precariousness, a national daily claimed that Hisarcıklıoğlu was involved in the 
Sledgehammer coup plot (Taraf, 22/01/2010); however, he denied it and faced no judicial 
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problem afterwards.109 On the other hand, TOBB gave support to the government on several 
political issues. For instance, it acted in support of the highly-contested constitutional 
referendum in 2010, although somewhat pushed by the Prime Minister to do so.110  
The referendum was a good instance to observe the government-business relations also in the 
realm of voluntary associations. Business associations such as TUSKON and MÜSİAD gave 
a firm support to the referendum.111 Sharing religiously conservative outlooks and a claim to 
represent the ‘formerly discriminated’ provincial small and medium sized enterprises, the 
relations among these associations and the government have been usually very good. 
Members of these associations enjoyed access to the new state-provided resources. Some of 
them became members of the parliament on the tickets of the AKP (Duran/Yıldırım 2005) and 
some grew their business greatly, thanks to particularistic relations with the political authority 
(Buğra/Savaşkan 2010; Buğra/Savaşkan 2012).  
TÜSİAD has, on the other hand, had a conflict-prone relationship with the government, 
especially after the general and presidential elections of 2007. In the previous period, 
TÜSİAD was supportive of the government’s economic policies, with a commitment to IMF 
programs and EU candidacy process. However, the AKP government’s commitment to both 
of them gradually disappeared, as opposed to the wishes of TÜSİAD (Keyman/Öniş 2007: 
197-202; Öniş 2012). Tensions appeared between the two also on several other political 
issues, ranging from presidential candidacy to secularism (Bayer/Öniş 2010). A most 
significant tension appeared with regard to the constitutional referendum: Prime Minister 
Erdoğan said that ‘whoever takes no side gets eliminated’ when he criticized TÜSİAD for not 
publicly stating its choice about the upcoming referendum (Radikal, 18/08/2010). This can be 
seen as another indicator of somewhat politically-insecure situation of businesspeople in the 
AKP period. 
As for the Kurdish issue, TÜSİAD again voiced concerns, more independently from and 
sometimes critical of the government. It advocated improving Kurdish linguistic-cultural 
rights, strengthening local governments, and decreasing the electoral threshold, alongside its 
                                                          
109 See ‘Hisarcıklıoğlu: Darbe yapmayı vatana ihanet kabul ederim,’ Radikal, 22/01/2010. In addition, the then 
leader of Ankara Chamber of Commerce, Sinan Aygün also faced allegations of links to the criminal network 
Ergenekon (see Ch. 3). Aygün was not convicted and later became a member of the parliament on the tickets of 
the Republican People’s Party in 2011. 
110 See ‘TOBB Başkanı Hisarcıklıoğlu da referanduma destek verdi,’ Zaman, 17/08/2010, ‘Referandumda kim ne 
diyor?’ Sabah, 03/09/2010, and ‘Taraf olmayan bertaraf olmasın,’ Radikal, 18/08/2010.  
111 See ‘MÜSİAD’dan referandum bildirisi,’ Hürriyet, 19/08/2010 and ‘TUSKON: Türkiye'nin hızına ayak 
uyduracak bir anayasa için evet diyoruz,’ Zaman, 08/08/2010. 
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proposals for constitutional reform and in harmony with the demands by Kurdish organized 
actors (see TÜSİAD 2006; TÜSİAD 2011). Furthermore, its leaders had meetings with, inter 
alia, pro-Kurdish parties and the mayor of Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, in a manner 
supporting pro-Kurdish politicians against the AKP government, given the latter’s recurrent 
resistance to meet these political representatives (see Radikal, 29/07/2009, 27/10/2010, and 
12/01/2011). 
Other business associations, however, were not this vocal about the Kurdish issue, and when 
they got vocal, they emphasized mostly the economic approach as a solution to the issue.112 In 
this vein, TUSKON members also were involved in charity activities in the Kurdish region, 
organized by Gülen-movement-affiliated Kimse Yok Mu association (Zaman, 02/01/2007, see 
also Ch.3). Such charity activities functioned in a way supportive of and supported by the 
AKP government. On the political front, business associations (TOBB, TUSKON, and 
MÜSİAD) expressed their support for the government’s ‘democratic opening’ in 2009 in their 
meetings with the cabinet members,113 but it was not an active involvement in the process, 
which did not last long either (see Ch. 3). Some other interest associations were more vocal 
about the Kurdish issue though. 
Professionals in opposition 
The relations between professional associations and the AKP government mostly have been 
tense, albeit for different reasons. The union of bar associations, TBB, maintained its political 
tradition until recent times. Özdemir Özok served as its leader from 2001 up to 2010. Under 
the leadership of Özok, also a member of the Republican People’s Party, TBB depicted a 
critical approach to the government in a secularist-nationalist line. In his speeches for the 
general assemblies of the union and annual judiciary terms, which were attended by top-level 
politicians such as the President, Özok frequently voiced concerns about secularism (TBB 
2003; TBB 2006b; TBB 2008), challenges by the European Union to the state’s take on issues 
deemed politically sensitive114 (TBB 2003; TBB 2009), the presidential elections in 2007 and 
                                                          
112 See the speeches by TOBB’s leader Hisarcıklıoğlu (Hisarcıklıoğlu 2003; Hisarcıklıoğlu 2011a) and 
MÜSİAD’s report in 2008 (Yayman 2011: 442-444).  
113 See ‘Açılım turunda umut, destek ve hazır raporlar,’ Radikal, 14/08/2009; ‘MÜSİAD da “demokratik 
açılım”a destek verdi,’ Zaman, 18/08/2009; and ‘TUSKON Başkanı Meral: Kürt açılımını destekliyoruz,’ 
Zaman, 11/08/2009. 
114 These relate to Cyprus, Armenian genocide, Kurdish issue, secularism, and the military’s place in politics. 
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the Ergenekon trial (TBB 2009).115 Note that in this period some bar associations put 
pressures, with the tacit approval of the union, on female lawyers wearing headscarves. 
Criticisms also were raised concerning legal changes in the judicial system, such as the new 
Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes mentioned in Chapter 3 (TBB 2006b). On the other 
hand, Özok (2009) made a highly favorable assessment of another set of legal changes which 
took place between 2001 and 2005, in consultation with bar representatives, and improved the 
social rights of lawyers and revenue sources of bar associations. 
As to TBB’s approach to the Kurdish issue, the union adopted the discourse which 
emphasizes the security dimension and unitary structure of the state (i.e. ‘terrorism’ and 
‘separatism’). It also expressed suspicions toward pro-Kurdish politics even in the legal 
realm, with references to the views of military bureaucrats (TBB 2006c). Furthermore, the 
lawyers of guerilla leader Öcalan were legally warned by TBB for making press statements 
that allegedly aimed to mobilize the PKK (Radikal, 07/09/2003). This event gains its 
significance from the fact that lawyers have been important actors in mediating Öcalan’s 
views about contemporary politics to the public since he was put into prison in 1999 (see Ch. 
2 and 6). What is more revealing is Özok’s response to some 33 pro-Kurdish mayors from the 
region, including Osman Baydemir of Diyarbakır, who visited him to ask for support against 
human-rights violations and unlawful practices: Özok said that he would not cooperate with 
them as long as they were governed by İmralı (prison) – read as Öcalan (TBB 2006a: 114). 
In a similar vein, pro-Kurdish representatives from the region had problems with the union 
from time to time. For instance, Sezgin Tanrıkulu, a former leader of the Diyarbakır Bar, 
complained about the non-cooperative behavior of the union towards the bar and concerning 
human-rights violations that targeted Kurds and religious minorities in the country. Tanrıkulu 
received in turn negative reactions in general assemblies (TBB 2005: 75; TBB 2007-96, 145-
146). With the so-called democratic opening in 2009, on the other hand, Özok was to express 
his support in his meeting with the Minister of Internal Affairs (Bianet, 14/08/2009), while a 
                                                          
115 As mentioned in the previous section, there have been different political groups within and across bar 
associations, leading to different political alignments at the provincial level. As the largest and publicly more 
visible bar association, the Istanbul Bar has been more vocal about other politically-contested issues, such as the 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, in a fashion critical of the trials in themselves. A number of bar 
associations supported the demonstration by the Istanbul Bar against the government’s efforts to influence the 
judiciary, through wiretapping calls by judges (Bianet, 18/11/2009). 
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group of bar associations expressed their support by a joint press statement in Diyarbakır 
(Bianet, 18/01/2010).116 
In 2010, Vedat Ahsen Coşar, formerly leader of the Ankara Bar, was elected as the leader of 
TBB. To date, Coşar has represented a political stance quite different than the associational 
history. During my interviews in Ankara, I was told that he was elected thanks to the coalition 
of pro-AKP lawyers and Kurdish lawyers against pro-CHP and Kemalist candidates.117 Coşar 
depicted a liberal-democratic stance, adopting a more tolerant approach to the headscarf issue 
while also criticizing the drawbacks of Ergenekon and KCK trials with regard to the right to 
fair trial, e.g. long-lasting pre-trial detentions and trials functioning like de facto punishment 
(TBB 2010a; TBB 2011b).118 He participated as an observer in major branches of both trials 
(Silivri and Diyarbakır), as well as the Hrant Dink trial (TBB 2011a). He supported the 
demand for defense in mother (Kurdish) language (Milliyet, 23/02/2011). Coşar attended also 
a commemorative event organized by the Diyarbakır Bar about the old infamous Diyarbakır 
Prison and made a speech, naming the prison as a shame on the state (TBB 2010b). He also 
voiced concerns about the 2010 referendum, in terms of both content and procedure (TBB 
2010a). 
As to the union for medical associations, TTB has maintained its historical democratic-left 
identity in the AKP period, as served by successive leaders all from the same political 
group.119 It depicted such a strong and broad-scope opposition to the government that then 
Minister of Health Recep Akdağ argued that TTB acted like an opposition party, undertaking 
the responsibility of main opposition party in the parliament who was not good at that 
(TBMM 2006: 504). TTB became so active partly because the government carried out a 
program of massive reforms as regards healthcare and medical profession over the decade.  
TTB opposed most of these reforms by issuing critical reports, campaigning, and protests, 
sometimes in joint action with left-leaning peak associations of labor (KESK and DİSK) and 
                                                          
116 The Kurdish issue has been divisive among provincial bar associations. Associations dominated by Turkish 
nationalists, maintained a negative approach to the issue. For instance, the Istanbul Bar legally warned two 
lawyers of Öcalan for making propaganda of the PKK (see ‘Baro’dan iki avukata “mahkeme kararına parallel” 
uyarı,’ Bianet, 05/07/2011; see also Ch. 6). 
117 My interview with Lawyer 1, Ankara, 22/09/2011. 
118 The KCK operations targeted also the lawyers of Öcalan and this led to a press statement in Istanbul by a few 
hundreds of lawyers from different bar associations for professional support, wıth an offer to undertake their 
defense work (Bianet, 10/02/2012; see also Ch. 6). 
119 Etkin Demokratik TTB Grubu. For more information on factions and elections within TTB, see (Soyer 2005). 
Note that the duration of leadership is two years for TTB while it is four years for TOBB and TBB. 
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of other professionals (TMMOB – for engineers and architects). Reforms were about the 
social-security and healthcare system; re-introduction of compulsory service for physicians, 
which in practice require employment mostly in the Kurdish region which lacks medical 
staff;120 and a law that aimed to prevent physicians’ concurrent employment at public and 
private sectors, but was recently annulled by the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, other 
opposed initiatives related to the introduction of performance criteria for physicians, public-
private partnerships in the health sector, and changes in the university-hospital system. TTB 
interpreted these reforms in terms of privatization of health services and expansion of the 
market.121 Indeed, the sector for private hospitals has received a special support in the AKP 
period and significantly enlarged. This has been the situation in Diyarbakır too.  
TTB raised concerns also about other issues such as the violent police intervention in social 
protests; called voting against the 2010 referendum for its lack of steps for democratization 
(Bianet, 15/08/2010); and gave support to trade-union protests (TTB 2010; TTB 2012c). The 
union had tense relations especially with the Minister of Health, who threatened TTB by 
closing it down (see TTB 2010: 184). The decree law adopted later gave additional authority 
to the Ministry by establishing a board of health professionals. This was criticized by TTB for 
reducing professional autonomy (Anonymous 2012). Leaders also have been in a somewhat 
politically insecure situation because of their oppositional stance.122 
As to the Kurdish issue, TTB was very vocal about ongoing problems. It made investigation 
visits and prepared reports on the situation of children in Diyarbakır prisons, the mass graves 
newly found in the region and the Uludere-Roboskî incident (see Ch. 3, §3), in addition to 
many press statements criticizing anti-democratic practices (TTB 2009; TTB 2011; TTB 
2012a). Furthermore, Gençay Gürsoy,123 who was soon to become the leader of TTB, was the 
spokesperson for the group who had a meeting in 2005 with Prime Minister Erdoğan to 
demand a solution to the Kurdish issue (Bianet, 10/08/2005). This group stood for a larger 
group of, inter alia, intellectuals, journalists, and (former) representatives from interest 
                                                          
120 This practice was seen between 1981 and 2003, but lifted for a while until it was reintroduced in 2005. See 
Law by No: 5371, dated 21/06/2005.  
121 For details on the actions taken by TTB and its evaluation of policies in question, see its reports (TTB 2006; 
TTB 2008b; TTB 2010; TTB 2012c). For academic analysis of reforms, see the collection by Keyder et al. 
(2007) and Agartan (2012). 
122 Gençay Gürsoy was taken into custody, after he criticized the intervention to May 1 demo in 2008, albeit 
officially for different reasons, see Ali Bayramoğlu, ‘Gencay Gürsoy Olayı…,’ Yeni Şafak, 06/05/2008. 
123 He was at the time the leader of Istanbul Medical Association and later became the leader of TBB for the 
period of 2006-2010. Note that Gençay Gürsoy was involved in the Labor Party of Turkey (see Ch. 2) in the 
past.  
106 
 
associations,124 who made a press statement asking the PKK to lay down weapons (after the 
end of another unilateral ceasefire) and the AKP government to take initiatives for a solution 
(Bianet, 15/06/2005). It was after these events that Erdoğan made his first visit to Diyarbakır 
and made a speech that gave the start for his Kurdish initiative and that Diyarbakır’s interest 
associations became more visible in the process. 
Unionism between cooptation and confrontation 
The scene of organized labor in the AKP period has been similar to that of organized 
business: it has been characterized by a significant variation in political alignments and their 
consequences. As it can be guessed from the historical account, the confederations linked to 
political Islam (Hak-İş and Memur-Sen) have been quite cooperative with the AKP 
government. For instance, they campaigned for voting in favor of the 2010 referendum for its 
democratization potential while other confederations either advocated against the referendum 
(KESK, DİSK, Türk-İş) or kept their choice ambiguous (Kamu-Sen).125 The former two 
confederations were more cooperative with the government also about labor issues. The then 
leader of Hak-İş, Salim Uslu was even elected as a member of the parliament on the tickets of 
the AKP in the 2011elections, and memberships of both confederations could enjoy certain 
incentives, thanks to the fierce competition by affiliate unions to increase the number of their 
members.126 Of course, incentives for some meant constraints for others in this competition. 
Parallel to global trends, the labor union environment in Turkey has been characterized with a 
decline in union density and a loss of power in the post-1980 period. Connected to this was 
the transition from Fordist to flexible mode of production, which changed the nature of 
employment, increasing the share of temporary and informal jobs (Adaman/Buğra/İnsel 
2009). The AKP government’s policies have contributed to this outcome in diverse ways. For 
instance, temporary jobs in the public sector increased in this period, while the government 
and the allied unions made promises of turning these jobs into permanent positions to enlarge 
their social base. This was visible especially in the electoral period of 2011. 
                                                          
124 They included Istanbul’s Bar and Medical Associations as well as KESK.  
125 See the media coverage by Sabah, 21/07/2010; Hürriyet, 07/08/2010; Bianet, 31/08/2010. 
126 I heard about these in my interviews in Ankara and Diyarbakır, but it can also be observed in the media 
coverage of electoral periods. Incentives concern either the employment relationship (for instance, the promises 
of promotion and permanent positions for those on temporary contracts) or privileged treatment in government-
controlled businesses, such as housing opportunities by the Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ). 
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Privatization activities also gained speed under the AKP rule. Öniş (2011) argues that this 
became possible thanks to the weakening of anti-privatization coalition of the previous 
decade. Yet, the privatization of TEKEL (a state enterprise for tobacco products and alcoholic 
drinks) and the poor labor standards offered to the employees in its aftermath led to a massive 
union resistance in 2009-2010, in the form of strikes and protests. The AKP government, on 
the other hand, was not open to strikes, not allowing other strike attempts by unions affiliated 
to Türk-İş on the grounds that they were contrary to national interests (Adaman/Buğra/İnsel 
2009). Still, numerous protests were organized in the period by unions, sometimes in 
cooperation with professional associations, and responded by violent police intervention (see, 
for instance, Üzüm 2011). 
KESK has been subjected to more political pressures, compared to other confederations.127 
With a strong organization in the Kurdish region, KESK made official decisions to be pro-
active about the Kurdish issue (Üzüm 2011: 493) and participated in press statements, with 
other left-leaning peak associations, to raise concerns about political events. Its affiliated 
unions in the sectors of education, healthcare and municipal services formulated rights claims 
concerning the use of Kurdish language in their respective sectors. As a result, they were 
faced with judicial problems. For instance, a closure case was filed (and failed) against the 
teachers’ union Eğitim-Sen on the grounds that its statute had a clause calling for education in 
mother language. The clause was interpreted as in contradiction with the constitution and the 
case was brought to the court, under the influence of the general staff of the army (Bianet, 
06/06/2004; Sabah, 27/10/2005). Problems such as investigations and exiles mentioned in the 
previous section were seen in this period too. 
During my interviews in Ankara I heard that the pro-Kurdish approach of KESK and its 
affiliates has still been used by rival unions to accuse them of supporting the PKK, in their 
competition at the provincial level. This seems interesting, considering not only as a reflection 
of Turkish nationalism on the labor union scene, but also its implications for the fact that 
Kurds form the most vulnerable group in the labor market across the country.128 In this vein, 
                                                          
127 The other confederations were usually not active about the Kurdish issue. By the 2009 democratic opening, 
then Minister Atalay had meetings with Türk-İş, Hak-İş, DİSK, Kamu-Sen, and Memur-Sen, and they expressed 
support for the government’s initiative (Bianet, 14/08/2009 and 21/08/2009; Milliyet, 18/08/2009). Note that 
DISK is an exeption among them, as it was more active, taking part in joint actions with KESK and TTB, 
including press statements about the Kurdish issue.  
128 The vulnerability results from various factors such as stigmatization, social exclusion, and other socio-
economic effects of the war and forced migration (see Adaman/Keyder 2006; Kurban et al. 2008). According to 
a research, the share of informal workers in the urban area is almost double more for Kurds (BETAM 2009). 
Discrimination of and attacks on Kurdish workers are also seen, as can be observed from the media. 
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it is important to note that similar allegations were held also by employers against some 
unionists (affiliated to DİSK) in Tuzla shipyard, Istanbul, where employees included also 
Kurds and worked under unsafe conditions that led to the frequent cases of death by work 
accidents (Tuzla-Araştırma-Grubu 2009). 
Last but not least, KESK, its affiliated unions and memberships also have been affected by 
KCK operations since 2009: several police raids took place in their offices across the country; 
many executive members were detained, even including the leader of KESK; and some were 
arrested to be tried for allegations of membership in an outlawed organization.129 Operations 
took place also in Diyarbakır, targeting voluntary associations and municipalities (see Ch. 7).  
The rise of Kurdish associational activism 
‘EU delegates invariably want to go to Diyarbakır whenever they come to 
Turkey. I am disturbed by this. Diyarbakır has become the third city after 
Istanbul and Ankara. These visits do not happen because of Diyarbakır’s 
economic, touristic or other accomplishments. This is completely political . . . I 
tell my friends from the EU . . . if you prepare reports about the country on the 
basis of lists of orders you received (there) we will not accept those reports,’ 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Milliyet, 25/12/2004) 
Compulsory interest associations are organized in a hierarchical order and peak associations 
have been more important. Yet, the local associations of significant provinces such as Istanbul 
and Ankara also have had somewhat autonomous identities that made them publicly visible 
and politically influential at the national level. The rise of associational activism in Diyarbakır 
in the 2000s was to add a new center to this associational map of political representation. 
Kurdish associational activism is not a new phenomenon. During the 1990s, provincial bar 
and medical associations, labor unions organized in the public sector, and especially human-
rights organizations were active in the region, trying to find solutions and attract outsiders’ 
attention to human-rights violations and other regional problems within the context of armed 
conflict and the Emergency Rule. In Diyarbakır, such associations formed the Diyarbakır 
Democracy Platform, which organized activities such as press statements. However, 
associational actors were faced with serious obstacles such as judicial investigations, 
employment exiles, imprisonments, threats, and murders by unknown perpetrators. At a time 
                                                          
129 For the media coverage of events, see Bianet, 28/05/2009, 27/09/2011, and 13/01/2012. 
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when both Turkish governments and the mainstream media were focused on a war on 
‘terrorism,’ there were not many opportunities for Kurdish associations to be publicly visible 
at the national level to draw attention to the human cost of the war. 
Following the pause to the armed conflict in 1999, there was a gradual lifting of the 
Emergency Rule and a reform process for EU candidacy, which helped the normalization of 
life in the region and the ‘resurgence of civil society’ (cf. Schmitter 1992).130 EU delegates 
played a special role with their visits to Diyarbakır where they would meet associational 
leaders, inter alia, to have information about the situation of the Kurdish region. These visits 
in turn influenced the EU pressure on Turkish governments to find a solution to the Kurdish 
issue, as well as to democratize political institutions, as noted in Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
speech quoted above. In 2005, however, the Prime Minister made his first visit to Diyarbakır, 
which was influential in opening up the space for Kurdish interest associations.131  
In Diyarbakır, Erdoğan gave a public speech and said that the ‘Kurdish question’ is a problem 
of whole nation, including him, and promised to further democratization for all citizens, while 
he acknowledged that the state had made mistakes in the past (Bianet, 12/08/2005). This step 
was made against the background of the re-start of clashes with the PKK after the end of 
another unilateral ceasefire; increasing nationalist reactions by the army and the opposition 
party (see Ch. 3); and the calls by a group of important public figures, including 
representatives from interest associations, located in the west, for a solution to the Kurdish 
issue as mentioned above. Following Erdoğan’s visit, a number of compulsory and voluntary 
associations in Diyarbakır made a joint press statement, read by Şahismail Bedirhanoğlu, the 
leader of business association GÜNSİAD (see Ch. 5) welcoming Erdoğan’s speech.132 
Since then Kurdish associations particularly from Diyarbakır have become more visible as 
political actors in activities such as the following: making collective or individual press 
                                                          
130 The Emergency Rule was lifted in Diyarbakır in 31th November 2012. According to a national daily, the first 
legally-permitted demonstration took place in the following year (Radikal, 22/06/2003). 
131 From a broad perspective, a number of historical processes appear to have opened the space for associations: 
the most important of these seems to be the political processes I mention in the text above. However, there are 
also other important factors: first, the ‘contention’s cumulative history’ (cf. Tilly cited in Kriesi 2004) – 
exemplified above with the experience of the 1990s and the Democracy Platform, but there is also the Kurdish 
movement’s history, outlined in Ch. 2. Second, there are socio-economic processes. I mean, for instance, the 
processes that led to the increase in professionalization in the region (e.g. urbanization and the improvement of 
educational opportunities). In the past, the number of physicians was so limited that there was a regional Medical 
Association rather than a provincial one. The number of lawyers also greatly increased during the recent 
decades. Furthermore, there is the improvement of commerce, which increased the number of voluntary business 
associations and hence new links to national associations (see Part II).  
132 See ‘Diyarbakırlı sivillerden Erdoğan’a destek,’ Radikal, 20/08/2005. 
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statements; having occasional meetings with high-level politicians (such as the Prime 
Minister, the President, the Chief of the General Staff); appearing on TV channels; giving 
interviews for national dailies; organizing demonstrations; engaging in charity activities; and 
some leaders pursuing political career. There have been cases where hundreds of associations 
from the Kurdish region made joint press statements; however, it was mostly Diyarbakır’s 
associations that came to the front as the third actor in a game of two – that is, the contestation 
between the AKP government and the Kurdish movement.  
The AKP and the mainstream media played an important role in drawing attention to these 
associations and making a portrayal of ‘civil society’ as an alternative to the Kurdish 
movement. A categorization of ‘good Kurds’ versus ‘bad Kurds’ was to accompany this (see 
Ch. 3). The AKP’s aim in supporting associational groups appears to challenge the power of 
the Kurdish movement in the region. However, associations did not always act in harmony 
with the AKP and there were moments of conflict. On the other hand, when they acted in 
harmony with the government, they received negative reaction from the Kurdish movement. 
Yet, the latter too came to recognize the associations as political actors and increase its 
activities with them, as once Abdullah Öcalan warned the movement actors to take into 
account the associations and bring them together under the local platform of the Kurdish 
movement, the DTK (see Ch. 2). Hence, Diyarbakır’s associations arose not only as important 
political actors, but also as sites of contestation between the two political forces, as elaborated 
in Part II. 
Interestingly, it was the interest associations, especially the compulsory ones that received the 
most attention in this process. The reason for this appears to be related to the corporatist 
structure: the properties such as compulsory membership, monopoly of representation, 
internal electoral processes and the public status that opens up some channels provide 
associations with a larger membership, greater capacity and credibility. This gains 
significance against the background of an environment of voluntary associations where each 
political force has ally associations, as publicly known. In compulsory associations, on the 
other hand, competition takes place internally among different factions and associations 
appear relatively neutral or conjecturally aligned. 
There is also the content of the Kurdish issue that gives political advantages to certain 
associations. Hence, the Bar Association appears significant as the Kurdish issue has an 
important legal dimension. Accordingly, its leaders frequently raised concerns about legal 
problems. Or the Chamber of Commerce and Industry appears significant as the Kurdish issue 
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has an important economic dimension, although the Chamber does not speak only about the 
economic dimension. Hence, another interesting point: the Bar and Medical Associations 
were more vocal than the Chamber in the pre-2005 period; yet, the Chamber and voluntary 
business associations became highly active after 2005, becoming the leading actors of 
associational activism and gaining political advantages, as discussed in Part II. This part will 
also consider the relevance of peak-associational history for dynamics at the local 
associational level, as well as the importance of relations between the two levels in terms of 
political integration.  
 
Table 4.2 Selected interest associations in Diyarbakır 
 Status  Association  Peak association Date 
founded  
Membership 
(approx..) 
Business  Compulsory  Diyarbakır 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
and Industry 
TOBB 1907 19,660 firms 
 Voluntary  GÜNSİAD  TÜRKONFED133  1992 634 businesspersons 
  DİSİAD  TÜRKONFED  1996 100  
  DİGİAD  TUSKON 1993 315  
  MÜSİAD  MÜSİAD 1997 41  
  DİYAD  - 2008  35  
Professionals  Compulsory  Diyarbakır 
Medical 
Association 
TTB N/A 1,130 physicians  
  Diyarbakır Bar 
Association 
TBB 1927 610 lawyers 
Labor  Voluntary  Belediye-İş  TÜRK-İŞ  N/A 1,200 workers  
 /Municipal  Genel-İş  DİSK  2010 1,600  
 Sector Tüm-Bel-Sen  KESK N/A  1,100 civil servants  
Source: fieldwork, see also Part II. 
                                                          
133 TÜRKONFED (Türk Girişim ve İş Dünyası Konfederasyonu – Turkish Enterprise and Business 
Confederation) was founded in 2004, in relation with TÜSİAD, as an alternative to other peak associations 
organized in Anatolia such as TUSKON and MÜSİAD (see Buğra/Savaşkan 2012).  
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Conclusions 
Organized interest representation in Turkey has been characterized with both corporatist and 
pluralist elements. Compulsory associations could enjoy some power that came from their 
corporatist properties such as the monopoly of representation and access to political channels; 
however, they have been subjected to legal constraints and political threats from time to time. 
Voluntary interest associations such as labor unions, on the other hand, have been 
characterized by political polarization, loss of power and a more precarious situation before 
the political authority since the 1980s. Interest associations have developed distinct political 
traditions over time, evolving in interaction with social movements and political parties. The 
lines of cleavage between associations have reflected the diversity of political life and society, 
along the axes of left–right, secularist–conservative, and pro-Kurdish–Turkish nationalist. In 
the post-1980 period, the latter two of these axes have become politically more salient thanks 
to the contestation of the state along these lines. With the AKP period, the associational 
environment has also witnessed a broader polarization in relation with the approach to the 
government. Thereby, interest associations of diverse traditions and interests could act in 
harmony at times of significant political events, forming competing blocs. 
Interest associations are still important in political life. In this respect, the AKP period has 
depicted two alternative approaches: first, the government has tried to influence and articulate 
interest associations under its leadership using strategies such as intimidation, social 
networks, clientelism, and legal arrangements which change internal mechanisms of 
associations such as electoral procedures. Second, reform proposals have been developed to 
turn the corporatist environment of interest representation into a pluralist one, by ending the 
monopoly of representation at the first place, so that the power that comes by being united can 
be challenged. These diverse trends constitute an important source of uncertainty for interest 
associations. 
The challenges posed by interest associations come from not merely the representation of 
specific group interests, but their engagement in wider socio-political issues. In this vein, 
associations also attempted to take part in the definition of the Kurdish issue since the 1990s, 
sometimes in competition with each other. Yet, this was not a matter of serious engagement, 
outside the Kurdish region. Within the region, on the other hand, there were severe problems 
facing political activists. It is in the 2000s that a set of processes opened up the space for 
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Kurdish associations, especially those in Diyarbakır, for political activism. This was going to 
add a new important center to the (associational) map of political representation across the 
country.  
  
114 
 
PART II: DIYARBAKIR’S ASSOCIATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AT 
THE INTERSECTION OF THE LOCAL AND THE NATIONAL  
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Chapter 5: Business associations 
Founded in 1907, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry is one of the oldest and largest 
associations in Diyarbakır, serving as the compulsory association for local economic actors. 
While the Chamber was not politically very active in the pre-AKP period, compared to other 
associations, it started playing a leading role in associational activism in the post-2005 period. 
This chapter examines the politicization of the Chamber in the recent process. It aims to 
explore the roles it played in coalition formation among associations and with the political 
actors. This exploration highlights how particular divisions achieved relative salience as a 
result of the associational leaders’ interaction with their memberships and their political 
interlocutors. The cross-pressures of economic interests and collective identity politics 
provide the trajectory to trace these interactions.  
First section gives an overview of associational leadership and properties. The section 
provides brief background about the Chamber’s leadership in the 1990s and then focuses on 
the AKP period. Leaders’ access to new resources is also underlined in this section. Second, I 
highlight two major dynamics in the Chamber’s membership environment that the leadership 
needs to take into account: one relates to the improvement of the local economy in the 2000s, 
thanks to political normalization and new economic conditions within the country as well as 
the Middle East region. The other relates to the nature of the Kurdish business environment as 
characterized by a moral economy and political insecurity, which present opportunities and 
constraints for economic actors. Third, I discuss associational activism. I point at how the 
Chamber’s leaders, as well as the leaders of major voluntary business associations as its 
partners, acted in observance of the balance of power. There were, however, also times of 
conflict, especially with the Kurdish movement, because of strategic and economic reasons. I 
analyze two major examples: the 2010 constitutional referendum and the decentralization 
proposals. Still, the business associations ended up advantaged, adapting their behavior and 
influencing the dual-power contestation. The chapter concludes with a general analysis.  
5.1 Associational leadership and properties 
Elected leaders have been the major actors of the associational activism. A focus on 
leadership also makes it easier to observe continuity and change in associational politics. With 
such a focus, this section first gives a glimpse of the Chamber in the 1990s to better 
understand its changing role and significance in the following period. It then gives an 
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overview of leaderships in the AKP period. It shows that the Chamber started to make 
political claims increasingly since 2005 and outlines the leaders’ political perspectives and 
interactions as background information. Finally, the section outlines associational properties 
such as the number of members, as well as the access to new resources and channels in the 
recent period, as the latter increase the power of the Chamber, while linking its membership 
and its political interlocutors that the other two sections elaborate on.  
A brief historical background 
The armed conflict increased the politicization of associations in Diyarbakır in the 1990s. 
However, this was a limited experience under the conditions of the Emergency Rule (see Ch. 
2). In this period, the Chamber appears to have played a secondary role, compared with other 
actors such as human rights organizations, labor unions, the bar and medical associations, 
who tried to draw public attention to a variety of politically-induced problems especially those 
concerning human rights. The leaders of the Chamber, on the other hand, appeared on the 
national media mostly in relation with economic demands and problems of the region. 
A survey134 of the national daily Milliyet throughout the 1990s supports this impression, 
which was proposed by some of my interviewees, who could observe the Chamber back then. 
The Chamber had two leaders for the most of the decade: Felat Cemiloğlu and Şirin Yiğit. 
Longtime leader Cemiloğlu is exceptional: he belonged to one of the most influential families 
of the province. He was detained and tortured in 1982 in the infamous Diyarbakır prison (see 
Ch. 2) for later-disproved allegations of helping the PKK.135 Therefore, Cemiloğlu could be 
seen in the media about matters other than the economy, as he brought the torture issue to the 
public, while standing as a candidate for the 1989 municipal elections and occupying a seat in 
the central executive board of the TOBB. The Chamber under his leadership prepared a few 
publications, including a report in 1994 on the state’s regional development project, which 
called for a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue (Milliyet, 23/12/1994). But this was all: 
his successor Şirin Yiğit, as well as the leaders of newly emerging voluntary business 
associations, focused on economic issues.136 
                                                          
134 I made a keyword-based search (i.e. the names of the association and its leaders) in the online archive of the 
daily. 
135 My interview with Şeyhmus Diken, Diyarbakır, 28/06/2011. Also see Cemal (2003: 15-34). 
136 As to the Kurdish issue, Yiğit once talked about a ‘terror lobby’ which did not want peace in the region and 
underlined the significance of the army’s determination to fight them. See ‘Terör lobisine karşı gözler askerde,’ 
Milliyet, 16/04/1997. 
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In this respect, GÜNSİAD,137 founded in 1992 as the first local business association, was 
pretty active in the decade through its press statements and lobbying, having meetings with 
high-level political figures including foreign delegates. With a concentration on economic 
problems and demands, it also took the Kurdish issue merely on economic terms: 
The economy is the antibiotics for bringing back those who go up to mountains and 
preventing others from going up there. You shall provide food and job. If (the person) 
had a home, job and food, and could look after his family, who would go up to 
mountains, leaving his warm bed? Why would he go for dying or killing when there is 
(the option of) living? Of course, except a few fanatics.138 
But, of course, one should not forget that this statement was made under the hard conditions 
of the 1990s, detailed in Part I and below in Section 2. Still, it is a good example to compare 
with the approach of Kurdish organized business in the new political environment of the 
2000s. 
Associational leadership in the AKP period  
In the AKP period, the Chamber was led by four leaders up to the year 2012: Kutbettin Arzu, 
Mehmet Kaya, Galip Ensarioğlu, and Remzi Can. First three of these leaders had been 
politically quite active while the last one, who became the leader in the second half of 2011, 
was pretty much invisible in the media. Political activism by these leaders is detailed below in 
the third section, but some general notes on significant leaders, particularly Arzu and 
Ensarioğlu, and associational electoral processes will help understanding this activism, as well 
as the shifting coalitions that underline it. 
In the changing context of the country, the leadership by Kutbettin Arzu exemplified also the 
changing role and increasing significance of the Chamber. An architect by education, Arzu 
took part in lobbying visits to EU countries organized by Diyarbakır Mayor Osman Baydemir 
to support Turkey’s candidacy (Radikal, 07/12/2004). He also developed relationships with 
commercial chambers in Iraqi Kurdistan and took part in fair organizations for the two 
                                                          
137 The Southeast Association for Industrialists and Businessmen (Güneydoğu Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği – 
GÜNSİAD) was founded in Diyarbakır as a regional peak association, but initially focused on Diyarbakır. It 
became a member of the national peak association TÜRKONFED. GÜNSİAD was involved in the latter’s 
foundation, alongside organized business actors such as TÜSİAD (see Milliyet, 18/10/1997 and Ch. 4). 
138 My translation. Its then-leader Vasfı Akyıl quoted by Güneri Cıvaoğlu, Milliyet, 02/03/1999. 
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localities.139 Such activities and the ethno-linguistic bond between these localities appear to 
have given the Chamber an advantage at a time when Turkey aimed to increase its economic 
relations with Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 war: so, for instance, when Iraqi President 
Talabani made visits to Turkey, the TOBB invited Kutbettin Arzu to take part in the meetings. 
Following Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to Diyarbakır in 2005 (see Ch. 3), the Chamber’s 
leader could enjoy more media attention. Kutbettin Arzu made several press statements, 
individually or in cooperation with other associations, to express support for Erdoğan’s 
initiative promising a solution to the Kurdish issue through democratization. More 
importantly, Arzu called the PKK to lay down arms unconditionally, as the PKK was 
considering to have another temporary ceasefire at the time (Milliyet, 21/08/2005). Of course, 
he did not ignore the economic dimension, asking the political authority for ‘positive 
discrimination’ of the region in the form of economic incentives (Milliyet, 18/08/2005). 
However, Arzu talked also about the other dimensions. In a newspaper interview in 2006, 
Arzu defined the Kurdish issue from a broader perspective, than seen in the previous decade, 
in harmony with the political context: 
The region has economic, political, social and cultural problems . . . I do not want to 
reduce it to a single dimension such as the Kurdish issue or the Turkish issue. The 
issue belongs to Turkey. It is an issue of not only the region and Diyarbakır, or just 
Kurds. Because it is Turkey who suffers its outcomes when there is no 
democratization and when there is no environment of peace and trust.140 
In this interview, Arzu also supported the government’s ‘slow but important’ initiatives, such 
as those related to linguistic rights for private education and broadcasting (see Ch. 3), and 
interpreted them as signs of intention for a democratic solution. He added that it used to be 
difficult even to use the word Kurd in the past. Upon a skeptical question that contrasted his 
optimistic take on the government’s policy with the clashes that recently took place in 
Diyarbakır between local protesters and the police following the public funeral of PKK 
guerillas (see Ch. 2), Arzu made an important distinction: ‘there are not only those who 
support a solution to this issue through peace and democracy, but also those who support a 
                                                          
139 My interview with Kutbettin Arzu, Ankara, 27/09/2011. Similar activities across the border were pursued also 
by the succeeding leader Mehmet Kaya. However, Kaya said that he had some difficulties in getting support 
from the TOBB in some of these pursuits. My interview with Mehmet Kaya, Diyarbakır, 26/03/2011. 
140 My translation. See Mehmet Aslanoğlu’s interview with Kutbettin Arzu, ‘Hiçbir şart altında OHAL 
istemiyoruz,’ Evrensel, 07/04/2006. 
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solution through violence. They are the activities of those who support violence.’141 Indeed, 
this distinction was to accompany the media depiction of rising associational actors in 
comparison to the Kurdish movement, and it also seems to be the rationale behind the AKP 
government’s support to these actors. 
In 2007, Kutbettin Arzu was elected a member of the parliament on the tickets of the AKP 
and, in the following term, appointed as the deputy minister for agriculture. At the Chamber, 
Arzu was succeeded by Mehmet Kaya. Kaya, a pharmacist, had acted as the vice chair under 
Arzu’s leadership. During his term of two years, he maintained a similar political approach, 
but also did not avoid raising concerns about some policies or problems related to regional 
development and reforms for pro-Kurdish rights.142 I will not go into details of his leadership 
since it does not present a noteworthy change for associational politics. I will instead focus on 
the next leader who came to power in 2009 and played a somewhat different yet significant 
political role during his two-year term: Galip Ensarioğlu. 
Galip Ensarioğlu has an important background. He belongs to a locally influential large 
family, known with the same surname.143 A number of old family members served as local 
party officials and members of parliament for a center-right tradition of political parties from 
the 1950s up to the 1990s.144 Ensarioğlu, a businessman involved in various commercial 
branches such as contracting for building construction, also served as the leader of the 
Diyarbakır party quarters of the True Path Party since the 1990s up to the 2000s. Note that the 
True Path Party was a center-right party and ruled national governments that were very 
violent in dealing with the armed conflict in the 1990s (see Ch. 2). 
Ensarioğlu, on the other hand, collaborated with the pro-Kurdish party145 when he stood as a 
candidate for the Chamber’s leadership in 2009, against his rival Mehmet Kaya, who was 
                                                          
141 My translation. In Evrensel, 07/04/2006. 
142 For the raised concerns, see ‘Güneydoğu: Paket bizi uçuracak,’ Taraf, 29/05/2008 and ‘GAP'ın bir ayağı hâlâ 
topal,’ Taraf, 12/08/2008. 
143 While in Diyarbakır, I heard familial backgrounds sometimes mentioned, in relation with certain local figures 
such as Ensarioğlu. However, in my interviews with experts and businessmen, I was told that families (especially 
large families as aşiret) do not have a significant place in the urban economy and politics. My interviews with 
Vahap Coşkun, Diyarbakır, 25/03/2011; Celalettin Birtane, Diyarbakır, 04/05/2011; and Şeyhmus Diken, 
Diyarbakır, 28/06/2011. 
144 The tradition includes the successive parties of Democrat Party, Justice Party and True Path Party. For 
information on the political involvement of family members, see Yavuz Donat, ‘DYP’nin lokomotifi Şeyh 
Ensarioğlu,’ Sabah, 01/06/2007. 
145 This collaboration was often mentioned in my interviews in Diyarbakır. Ensarioğlu put it as having received 
support from various circles including the pro-Kurdish party. My interview with Galip Ensarioglu, Ankara, 
23/09/2011. 
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supported by the pro-AKP circles.146 Ensarioğlu won this race; yet, conflicts emerged 
between him and the pro-Kurdish party especially when Ensarioğlu led a joint press statement 
to call for voting in favor of the referendum, despite the boycott call by the party (see Ch. 2 
and §3 below). Here, two things appear interesting: first, the example indicates the active 
involvement of the Kurdish movement in the internal politics of associations. According to 
Kutbettin Arzu, the movement was not interested in the Chamber in the 1990s, but it got 
interested in the 2000s when it realized the significance of the Chamber; thereby, it tried to 
influence electoral processes of both the Chamber and professional associations.147 The 
efforts appear to have increased as a result of the rise of associational activism since 2005, 
somewhat under the influence of the AKP government. With the movement’s involvement, 
associations turned into a significant site of contestation. 
Second, the nature of coalitions at the associational level seems pretty interesting. Ensarioğlu 
appears as an important associational leader in the period because of taking such a strong 
political position explicitly in opposition to the Kurdish movement in the referendum process. 
However, despite occasional problems, Ensarioğlu pursued a balanced approach to both the 
AKP government and the Kurdish movement. He took part in activities in harmony with each 
actor, and sometimes he took steps against the wishes of each actor. He was supportive of the 
government’s ‘democratic opening’ in 2009. He was supportive also of pro-Kurdish common 
demands that the Kurdish movement articulated to bring together Kurdish organized actors 
under its leadership (see Ch. 2). Other examples for Ensarioğlu’s strategic leadership are 
discussed in the third section. Here let’s note also that Ensarioğlu occupied an important 
position at the TOBB, by becoming the head of the national council of chambers of 
commerce, a position which should have given him some advantage. He also took part in the 
TOBB’s visits to Iraqi Kurdistan, an apparently intermediary role played previously also by 
Kutbettin Arzu.148 In the 2011 elections, Ensarioğlu too became a member of the parliament 
on the tickets of the AKP.149 Following him, Recep Can became the new leader. Although 
Can has not been that active, as mentioned before, he is known to be a pro-BDP figure, and 
Ensarioğlu stated in my interview with him that he supported Can’s candidacy.150 Considering 
                                                          
146 I heard about the mentioned support for Kaya in several interviews. 
147 My interview with Kutbettin Arzu, Ankara, 27/09/2011. 
148 My interview with Galip Ensarioğlu, Ankara, 23/09/2011. 
149 This is not an uncommon path for associational leaders: in the same elections, 14 chamber leaders from 
around the country stood as candidates and 8 of them became members of the parliament (Hürriyet, 13/06/2011). 
150 My interview with Galip Ensarioglu, Ankara, 23/09/2011.  
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Ensarioğlu’s shifting relations with the Kurdish movement as well as the AKP, coalitional 
dynamics at the local level appear to be quite fluid and ambiguous than those at the national 
level. 
Finally, note that the number of voluntary business associations increased since the late 1990s 
(see Table 4.2) as well as their political activism since 2005. Among these associations, 
GÜNSİAD and DİSİAD151 have been most visible in the mainstream media, also having close 
relations with the Chamber especially under Ensarioğlu’s leadership. Like Ensarioğlu, they 
too usually pursued a balanced approach to the two rival political actors, while other business 
associations tended to align more with one side.152 Still, voluntary business associations 
played a secondary role, while the Chamber has been the leading actor for business groups 
and usually even for local interest associations in general. 
Increasing resources and improving capacity 
The Chamber is one of the largest organizations in the province, alongside the governorship 
and the metropolitan municipality. By the year 2009, it has 19,661 firms as members, most of 
which engage in commerce while industrialists are a minority (DDK 2009: 23).153 An expert 
of the Chamber told me that the Chamber is Diyarbakır’s biggest ‘NGO’ with regard to the 
projects undertaken. Projects cover a variety of topics such as vocational training for 
provincial residents, research on the informal employment, training and consulting services 
for members, and so on. Some projects are carried out by the Chamber alone, and some are in 
cooperation with other organizations.154 Funds are provided partly by international 
organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations Development 
                                                          
151 DİSİAD stands for Diyarbakır Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği – Industrialists and Businessmen Association 
of Diyarbakır. It was founded in 1996, as a provincial business association, linked to GÜNSİAD, which is a peak 
association for the southeastern region, as mentioned above. 
152 Three associations appear important: DİGİAD (Diyarbakır Girişimci İşadamları Derneği – Diyarbakır 
Association for Entrepreneurial Businessmen) is a member of TUSKON, a peak association linked to the Gülen 
community. MÜSİAD is the local branch of the peak association with the same name (see Ch. 4), with historical 
links to political Islam. DİYAD (Diyarbakır İşadamları Yapı Derneği – Diyarbakır Construction Association for 
Businessmen) is a local association for construction firms and at least its leader by 2011 has a background in the 
Kurdish movement, as a past local executive for a pro-Kurdish party, and acted in a line supportive of the party’s 
boycott call in referendum process, criticizing the chamber’s contrary position (see next section). 
153 Only about 7,000 of these members were told to be active members though. My interview with Expert 1, 
DTSO, Diyarbakır, 04/04/2011. 
154 Partners include voluntary business associations such as GÜNSİAD and DİSİAD, as well as the Diyarbakır 
Metropolitan Municipality and the governorship. 
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Programme.155 Note that EU funds appear to be the most important source of funding, as a 
phenomenon of mainly the 2000s. Most of these funds are allocated through the Central 
Finance and Contracts Unit in Ankara (see Ch. 3) and the Chamber staff expressed no 
experience of problem in accessing these funds, unlike the municipalities in the city. 
Funds are provided also by the state bodies at the local level such as the regional Karacadağ 
Development Agency and also, to a less extent, the ministerial program of SODES.156 As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, several local associations which have usually been on good terms 
with the government, including the Chamber, are among the beneficiaries of SODES, while 
almost no association visibly aligned with the Kurdish movement appears among the 
beneficiaries.157 As to the regional development agency, it deserves more attention. 
Development agencies provide a new channel for organized business for influencing decision 
making processes and resource allocation at the local level.158 Agencies were founded across 
the country since 2006, following Turkey’s 2003 Accession Partnership for EU candidacy 
(EC, (European Council) 2003; cf. Brenner 1999). They appear as attempts for restructuring 
the central planning agency of the developmentalist period, on the basis of new principles 
such as ‘good governance.’ Accordingly, regional development agencies include the leaders 
of chambers of commerce and industry in their executive board, in addition to governors, 
mayors and the chairs of provincial councils. Voluntary associations such as business 
                                                          
155 Based on the data obtained from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, for the period 2006-2010, email 
communication, 07/06/2011 and my interview with Expert 1, DTSO, Diyarbakır, 04/04/2011.  
156 Based on the data obtained from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, for the period 2006-2010, email 
communication, 07/06/2011; Karacadağ Development Agency, for the period 2009-2011, my interview with 
Expert 2 in the agency, Diyarbakır, and email communication, both in 07/06/2011; and SODES (Sosyal Destek 
Programı – Program for Social Support), online data for the period 2008-2011 at http://www.sodes.gov.tr/ 
Access date is 03/01/2013.  
157 This argument is based on the online data by SODES for the period 2008-2011 about the distribution of 
funds, according to provinces and organizations. See http://www.sodes.gov.tr Access date is 03/01/2013. The 
exception for the Kurdish movement is the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, which received funds for three 
projects, among the total 182 projects accepted by SODES. As to associations which have had a more or less 
pro-government stance and received funds, examples include Kimse Yok Mu (charity organization), Diyarbakır 
Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı (cultural organization), KAMER (women’s organization), MÜSİAD, DİGİAD, 
DOGÜNSİFED (all three are business associations), DESOB (compulsory association for craftsmen and 
artisans), and the Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Kimse Yok Mu, Diyarbakır Kültür ve Sanat 
Vakfı, and DİGİAD appear to be close to the Gülen Movement. MÜSİAD has had good relations with the AKP 
government at the national level, as mentioned in Chapter 4. The rest are local associations who occupied a 
somewhat in-between position, but leaned towards the government at important political moments. Due to the 
scope of the dissertation, I focus only on the chamber among them. The expert I talked to in the chamber, 
however, stated a relative difficulty in receiving funds from SODES (my interview with Expert 1, DTSO, 
Diyarbakır, 04/04/2011). Public organizations – such as the local units of ministeries and the police force – form 
the majority among the beneficiaries of SODES funds. 
158 The agency provides monetary and technical support mostly for firms, but also for organizations such as 
interest associations, municipalities and the state bodies at the local level for development of the economy and 
touristic infrastructure. 
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associations also take place in the organization as ‘representatives’ from civil society. In this 
regard, Karacadağ Development Agency159 is responsible for both Diyarbakır and the 
neighbor province Urfa. The significance of the agency for our case is that the Chamber 
leadership and other important business actors support this model of economic development, 
as a part of the state rescaling process, against the alternative decentralization model of 
‘democratic autonomy’ by the Kurdish movement, as mentioned in Chapter 2 and further 
discussed below in the 3rd section. 
The amount of funds provided by each organization or for each project does not matter here. 
What matters is that they indicate the Chamber’s access to new resources160 and improving 
capacity in the recent period, a phenomenon which shows the Chamber to be more 
advantaged than other interest associations under scrutiny. Thereby, the Chamber appears to 
be also an important channel for its members to access funds for projects and investment. It 
hosts an information center concerning the EU since the late 1990s and helps members about 
various sources of funding. For instance, the ministerial agency KOSGEB’s incentives for 
small and medium sized enterprises, detailed in Chapter 3, were mostly channeled by the 
Chamber, especially during the years 2009-2010.161 In addition to national programs, 
KOSGEB introduced special loan-support programs for Diyarbakır. Diyarbakır was promoted 
as a ‘center of attraction’ from 2009 onwards: in this vein, a project was initiated including, 
inter alia, loan interest supports up to 100 per cent, for the period of 2009-2010 (KOSGEB 
2010).162 Note that this coincided with the 2009 local elections when the AKP defined its 
major goal as to win over Diyarbakır, which was called by the Kurdish movement as the 
‘fortress.’ It coincided also with Galip Ensarioğlu’s leadership. In an essay for the Chamber’s 
periodical, Ensarioğlu (2009) noted that it was the first time that the enterprises of Diyarbakır 
could benefit from credits in such an intense volume. This opportunity gains its significance 
                                                          
159 It was founded in 2008 and became functional towards the end of 2009. My interview with Expert 2, 
Karacadağ Development Agency, Diyarbakır, 07/06/2011.  
160 In Fall 2010, Galip Ensarioğlu (2010) wrote for the chamber’s periodical that the total budget of then ongoing 
five projects undertaken by the chamber was approximately 2.5 million Turkish Liras ( about 1.25 million Euros 
at the time). Of course, the total number of projects throughout the decade is much more; the approximate 
number given by an expert was thirty. My interview with Expert 1, DTSO, Diyarbakır, 04/04/2011. 
161 This is not an official requirement and the chamber is told to have no significant economic interest in acting 
as an intermediary between enterprises and KOSGEB; therefore, the intermediary role seems rather political. My 
interview with Expert 3, KOSGEB, Diyarbakır, 10/05/2011.  
162 From the start of the project in 2009 until the end of 2010, 2,449 enterprises applied in Diyarbakır and 2,008 
of them benefited from the loan-interest support program, which cost 8.2 million Turkish Liras to KOSGEB and 
created a loan volume of 58 million Turkish Liras, see KOSGEB (2010: 46). Thereby, Diyarbakır came up as the 
second province in 2010 across the country, as regards allocation of loan-interest supports, with a share of 7.9 
per cent of the total amount (KOSGEB 2010: 35).  
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against the background of the difficulty entrepreneurs have had in accessing credits from 
banks in recent decades because of the high-risk environment. This difficulty was repeatedly 
mentioned in my interviews in Diyarbakır. While there had been such constraints for 
economic actors, recent years witnessed a noteworthy improvement of the economy, in 
addition to access to new resources (mediated) by the Chamber. 
5.2 Dynamics in the membership environment 
The membership environment is important for understanding associational politics. It is not 
only that leaders have to take into account dynamics in this environment, but also that the 
latter reflects well politically-induced opportunities and constraints. In this section, I mention 
two major characteristics of the Chamber’s membership environment: first, the local economy 
considerably improved in the recent period. This became possible thanks to political 
normalization and new economic conditions within the country as well as the Middle East 
region. Second, the moral economy has its reflections in the business environment too. This 
moral economy may require economic actors to prioritize political-moral commitments over 
economic interest. However, this is a contested issue too and the dual power situation causes a 
significant degree of uncertainty and insecurity for Kurdish businesspeople. I give 
contemporary examples to depict the political sources of precariousness in the Kurdish 
business environment, which are important for associational politics. 
Improvement of the local economy in the 2000s 
In 1927, Diyarbakır came up as the 3rd in a ranking of the country’s provinces with regard to 
economic development. This fact, which was expressed by a number of my interviewees, 
stands in sharp contrast to the contemporary situation of uneven regional development, which 
is to the disadvantage of the Kurdish region. In 2003, for instance, Diyarbakır came up as the 
63rd among 81 provinces (DPT 2003). My interviewees from the business community gave 
sophisticated accounts of this underdevelopment: the state’s historical neglect of the region 
was mentioned often. Even some saw the underdevelopment as an intended consequence of 
the state’s policies to manage the Kurdish population and dissent. In a similar vein, policies 
concerning regional development and investment incentives were criticized in that they were 
seen, if not dysfunctional, to be designed according to the needs of the West. Changes in the 
demographic structure were also mentioned. For instance, the negative impact of the loss of 
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Armenian population in the first half of the 20th century was mentioned, as they had an 
important place in commerce and traditional crafts.163 
An important role was attributed to the armed conflict of the 1990s. Here, a number of factors 
was emphasized: the negative impact of insecurity on investment decisions was the most 
mentioned problem. Also mentioned were capital outflow, forced migration, the dissolution of 
agrarian structure and loss of skills in the process of migration from the rural to the urban.164 
These have led to a severe situation of poverty (see Table 2.7 and YG 21/Sarmaşık 2007) and 
unemployment in Diyarbakır while its urban population almost doubled in the course of last 
two decades (see Table 2.1). The official statistics claim that the unemployment rate is 13.5 
per cent for the year 2010165, whereas representatives from local associations suggest that the 
real rate is between 45 and 60 per cent. 
However, the local economy has considerably improved in the 2000s, compared with the 
previous decade. One factor beyond this improvement is the growth of the construction sector. 
The increasing population of Diyarbakır supported the sector for construction of buildings. In 
the 2000s, the number of construction firms nearly tripled (Yüksel 2011: 450). Building 
projects are carried out by local contractors, either privately or in cooperation with the mass 
housing development administration TOKİ166 through public procurement and/or with 
municipalities in case of urban transformation projects. Here, the nature of urban development 
is revealing. While the local economy improved in the 2000s, social inequality appears to be 
still a huge problem: slums are plenty in the old city Suriçi and the Bağlar Municipality, 
especially thanks to the forced migration of the previous decade, while gated communities 
develop within and around the new municipality of Kayapınar, depicting a city of contrasts 
(Bağlı/Binici 2005; Yüksel 2011). 
Overall, the service sector plays a significant role in the local economy while industry has a 
limited share. In this vein, the distributorships of western companies are important as they 
connect local businesspeople to the national market while the expansion of this market 
                                                          
163 In relation with this and for an account of the provincial economy, see (Beysanoğlu 1962: 93-94), Keyder 
(2009), Dağ/Göktürk (1993).  
164 On the forced migration and Diyarbakır, see the reports by TMMOB (1998) and Kalkınma-Merkezi (2010) 
,as well as Yükseker (2008a; 2008b).  
165 TÜİK data. Available at www.tuik.gov.tr. Access date is 14/01/2013.  
166 TOKİ is a state organization. It has played an important role in urban development in the last decade and 
functioned in dual way: the TOKI provides services for social housing and works on the basis of public-private 
partnerships contributing to the creation of ‘a new group of state-created businesspeople.’ See Buğra/Savaşkan 
(2012). 
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appears to have speeded up in the 2000s. At the production site, the sectors of mining 
(especially marble), agro-based food and textiles are important (Karacadağ 2011). These 
connect to the export activities of Diyarbakır, which depict a remarkable increase in recent 
years and, hence, a good indicator of improvement of the local economy. From 2001 to 2011, 
the total exports of Diyarbakır increased approximately 21 times whereas it increased only 
about 4 times for the whole country.167 
In the aftermath of the 2003 US-led war on Iraq, Turkey’s relations with Iraq and the 
Kurdistan Regional Government in its northern parts started to change. In the previous 
decade, Turkey had somewhat tense relations with Iraqi political authorities: Turkey carried 
out, inter alia, cross-border operations to attack the PKK camps and opposed the development 
of an autonomous Kurdish regime in the North. In the post-war period, however, political 
relations have improved between the two countries, symbolized in reciprocal visits by top-
level political figures especially since 2007 (see Barkey 2011). Moreover, economic 
transactions re-started: Turkey’s exports to Iraq increased year by year since 2003, rising to 
more than $8 billion in 2011. Turkish companies made investments in Iraq, notably in 
infrastructure and construction sectors. These were to be followed by recent efforts to import 
oil from northern Iraq by constructing a new pipeline. In this vein, the Prime Minister of Iraqi 
Kurdistan Nechirvan Barzani defined the nature of this partnership primarily in economic 
terms in an interview, when he was reminded about Turkey’s historical opposition to an 
independent Kurdistan (Newton-Small 2012). Yet, it does have something to do with politics. 
Barzani himself emphasizes in the same interview the ‘land locked’ situation of Iraqi 
Kurdistan and the lack of support by regional countries for an independent Kurdistan. The 
United States also played a role in the improvement of relations between two countries, 
especially since 2007, while gradually moving out of Iraq (see Altunışık 2009). To date, this 
rapprochement appears to have ambiguous implications for the Kurdish movement in Turkey, 
and it should be noted that the AKP government’s Kurdish initiative developed against such a 
background of changing regional politics. 
Diyarbakır has enjoyed only a small share in this trade: in 2011, Diyarbakır’s share of total 
exports to Iraq was only about 1 per cent. My interviewees from the business community 
explained this with the underdevelopment of production in the province. One former leader of 
the Chamber also argued that businesspeople from the west (of Turkey) were favored by the 
                                                          
167 In monetary terms (US dollars). Export values are based on TÜİK data. Available online at www.tuik.gov.tr. 
Access date is 14/01/2013. 
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TOBB in its activities for the formation of economic ties, an argument which was rejected by 
other past leaders of the Chamber.168 Yet, even though the share in the country’s total exports 
is small, it came to comprise half of the total exports of Diyarbakır in 2011 (see Figure 5.1). 
In addition to export activities, there are also investments by Diyarbakır’s businesspeople in 
northern Iraq such as in the construction sector and in the service sector via franchising 
contracts with Turkish companies.  
 
Figure 5.1 Export activities of Diyarbakır in the 2000s ($ millions) 
  
Source: TÜİK 
 
While my interviewees emphasized common ethnic and linguistic bonds as advantages for 
developing economic ties with Iraqi Kurdistan, the portrayal depicts a growing and somewhat 
interdependent network among the Turkish national market (both entrepreneurs and 
professionals), Kurdish entrepreneurs in southeastern Turkey and the Iraqi market where 
Turkey’s Kurdish entrepreneurs have the potential to act as intermediaries. This view is 
supported by the above-mentioned intermediary role played by the Chamber’s leaders in the 
                                                          
168 Activities such as group visits to Iraq are organized by the TOBB’s Foreign Economic Relations Board (Dış 
Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu – DEİK). The argument concerning differential treatment was made by Mehmet Kaya 
and rejected by Galip Ensarioğlu (my interviews with Mehmet Kaya, Diyarbakır, 26/03/2011 and Galip 
Ensarioğlu, Ankara, 23/09/2011). Also note the similarity of this perception of discrimination to that of 
MÜSİAD – the business association linked to the political Islam (see Ch. 4 and Buğra 1998). 
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TOBB’s meetings with Iraqi Kurdish figures. Such an interdependent and growing market 
contributes to a kind of integration.169 Yet, political environment matters a lot. 
From moral economy to political insecurity  
As it is the case elsewhere, opportunities for capital accumulation depict a political nature in 
Diyarbakır too. During my fieldwork, I heard a few rumors about who got contracts, say, from 
the TOKİ on the basis of political ties or who got public lands controlled by the central 
treasury department on the basis of favoritism, as well as remarks about the significance of 
the metropolitan municipality for zoning permits. These were sometimes accompanied by 
categorization of businesspeople as AKP supporters, patriots or supporters of the pro-Kurdish 
party. However, it is not a random case that businesspersons of different political alignments 
cooperate in economic activities. For instance, I was told that Galip Ensarioğlu – the previous 
leader of the Chamber and currently an MP for the AKP – engaged in some economic 
activities in cooperation with Altan Tan – currently an MP for the pro-Kurdish party BDP. 
In this vein, Mayor of Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Osman Baydemir emphasized in 
my interview with him that capital has no religion, nationality or political ideology, and that 
capital has no patriotism.170 Baydemir made this argument when I was asking him about a 
procurement activity by the municipality contracted to a businessman who is known in the 
city for his contracts with the Turkish army.171 I had got this information from one of my 
informants, who interpreted the contract in question as a strategic act to observe local 
balances of power. Concerning such contracts, however, Baydemir emphasized the legal 
framework of public procurement processes, which underline principles of economic 
efficiency. In another words, whoever offers a low price gets the job. Yet, Baydemir’s 
response revealed that it was not uncommon for him to receive criticisms about political 
identity of businesspeople with which the municipality has works.172 
                                                          
169 Kurdish columnist Orhan Miroğlu notes the integration effect of the fact that Kurdish businesspeople work in 
Iraq in cooperation with Turkish engineers and workers. See Ezgi Başaran’s interview with Orhan Miroğlu, 
‘Kürt burjuva PKK’yı ne tam olumlar ne reddeder,’ Radikal, 05/12/2011. 
170 My interview with Osman Baydemir, Metropolitan Municipality, Diyarbakır. 16/06/2011. 
171 I had an interview also with the businessman; however, he denied having done business with the municipality 
although his company’s name is seen in some issues of the municipality’s bulletin which the contract is about. 
My interview with Businessperson 1, Diyarbakır, 13/06/2011. 
172 Mayor Baydemir appears to have been under great pressure in the recent process, as the KCK operations, 
inter alia, targeted municipalities run by the pro-Kurdish party (see Ch. 2 and 3). However, Baydemir was not 
detained, unlike many other mayors, a situation which drew more attention to him. One could guess that he had 
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Note the similarity to the debates seen in Islamist circles, outlined in Chapter 4. In the 1990s, 
a discourse on the merits of religious solidarity and norms as well as the category of Islamic 
capital was seen in these circles. Accordingly, the business association MÜSİAD employed ‘a 
cultural frame of reference where Islam significantly contributes to the establishment of a 
shared understanding concerning business ethics, corporate responsibility, and commonality 
of interest’ (Buğra 1998: 529). However, following the secularist threats in the political 
environment (see Ch. 3) and the increasing incorporation of the membership of political Islam 
to the market economy, there was a shift to a discourse on the uselessness of talking about the 
‘religious faith of capital’ (Buğra 1998: 534; also see Tuğal 2009). The Kurdish debate about 
whether capital can be patriotic sounds similar in this regard and it relates to the duality 
between the logics of capitalist business environment and the Kurdish movement, which has 
strong left-leaning components. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, ‘patriot’ is a conception used by the Kurdish movement to refer to 
its supporters. Its use in the economic realm appears to be connected to the moral economy 
(see Ch. 2). This moral economy emphasizes patriotism and sacrifice as sources of legitimacy. 
It contributes to the creation of bonds for intra-group solidarity, under the given difficult 
socio-economic conditions, as well as norms of conduct between the ruler and the ruled. 
However, it seems more contested at the entrepreneurial level, than in other sectors (see Ch. 6 
and 7), especially in the recent period, which witnessed a degree of political normalization 
and economic improvement. Mayor Baydemir’s statement can be thought in this respect. 
There are several manifestations of this moral economy. First, there is the shop closure as a 
form of protest. This form of protest was frequently employed in the 1990s, especially at 
times of public funerals for PKK guerillas. It is a good example of how economic interest 
could be overridden by political-moral commitments and interests of society at large. The 
accounts given by locals during my fieldwork usually emphasize how it was voluntary then. It 
could be spontaneous or coordinated by the movement activists. A shop owner told me even 
that the police too encouraged some shop owners to join the closure protest so that the police 
would not bother with possible attacks on open shops. In the 2000s, however, things started 
getting more complicated. As the conflict ground to a halt until mid-2004, the shop closure 
was not on the agenda. However, it came to be practiced again, with the restart of clashes and 
rising casualties in the following period. Prime Minister Erdoğan was also occasionally 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to take into account such constraints of the dual power contestation, in addition to concerns about the 
municipality’s budget and the legal framework of public procurement for municipal transactions. 
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protested by shop closures when he made visits to Kurdish provinces. Erdoğan criticized the 
protest, accusing the PKK of forcing shop owners to act so.173 The Diyarbakır Chamber and 
other local associations for business and small tradesmen also opposed this form of protest on 
the grounds of its negative economic impact. Hence, once a form of protest under war 
conditions, it became a more complicated issue, as shop owners became subjected to diverse 
pressures by the government and the movement. 
Second, there is the so-called taxation by the PKK of Kurdish civilians. In her account of the 
PKK in the 1990s, Aliza Marcus explains the importance of this activity in that it served not 
only to finance operations by guerillas but also to assert authority. ‘Some people wanted to 
give, others certainly felt forced, but overall, quite a few probably figured that at least it made 
sense to help the rebels, who were fighting for Kurdish rights, rather than the state, which was 
intent on repressing Kurdish identity’ (Marcus 2007: 182). Marcus lists companies, municipal 
authorities and the wealthy as the targets of regular taxation, and notes that Diyarbakır 
province yielded about one million dollars annually in tax revenue.174 She argues that even 
public companies which worked in the region paid to avoid possible attacks by the PKK on 
the work-site (2007: 183). The claim is that taxation activities still go on. During my 
fieldwork, I heard supporting (but somewhat ambiguous) views from a few of my 
interviewees from the business community. The indictments for KCK operations (see Ch. 2 
and 3) also hold this claim.175 
Such an environment presents serious constraints for businesspeople. To act as desired by the 
movement might lead to an accusation by the Turkish government of supporting ‘terrorism.’ 
Not to act so might lead to an accusation by the Kurdish movement of not supporting national 
interests. In this vein, Kurdish businesspeople were faced with a serious danger in the 1990s. 
In 1993, the then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller claimed that businesspeople paid ‘racket’ to the 
PKK and that they would drain the monetary resources of the PKK (Milliyet, 05/11/1993). 
Afterwards, a number of Kurdish businesspeople became victims of murders by unidentified 
perpetrators – murders which are in truth known as carried out by counter-guerilla forces 
                                                          
173 For instance, see ‘Erdoğan: Kepenk kapatılmadı, kapattırıldı,’ Radikal, 21/05/2011. 
174 The involvement of the PKK in the economic realm appears more complicated than this. Marcus argues that 
the PKK rebels played a role when local companies were bidding on a state contract for work in the region: ‘The 
PKK sometimes warned contractors off projects to build police stations or pave roads that Turkish troops used. 
They also fixed bids for a fee that might run 30 percent of the contract. Assuring that a certain contractor 
received the contract was done by warning rival bidders to drop out of the bidding or, more commonly, telling 
them to submit a bid that was too high to win’ (Marcus 2007: 183). 
175 See, for instance, the indictment for the major trial in Diyarbakır (TC 2010), as well as the media coverage, 
‘PKK’nın tehdit dolu devrim vergisi!’ Milliyet, 21/11/2011. 
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under the guidance of the state (see Ch. 2 and Gunter 2011: 120-121). Furthermore, 250 
businesspeople were taken into custody in 1996 with allegations of helping the PKK (Milliyet, 
04/08/1996). Such an insecure environment contributed to the flight of capital to the western 
parts of the country (see Yüksel 2011). 
Businesspeople can still be vulnerable to the state, as mentioned in Chapter 4. This 
vulnerability appears to be felt more strongly by Kurdish businesspeople. One of my 
interviewees described their situation as the following: if the AKP government punishes the 
Doğan Holding (one of the largest in the country) with a tax-evasion case, it can easily label 
someone from here as a traitor, in case he aligns with the pro-Kurdish party BDP or the 
Republican People’s Party. Indeed, two events that have taken place recently appear to be 
supportive of this perception: first, the KCK operations also targeted the DİYAR AŞ, a 
company which was initially founded by the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality in 2005 
and then privatized because of judicial obstacles (see Ch. 2). The company was accused of 
transferring money to the PKK by its bidding of contracts with municipalities.176 Second, the 
AKP government prepared in early 2011 a draft law which was enacted at the time of writing 
and aims to fight ‘financing of terrorism’ by freezing the assets of suspect persons and 
organizations, as well as imprisonment in case of conviction.177 Kurdish businesspeople 
likened this law initiative to the policies of the 1990s and interpreted its aim as to intimidate 
Kurdish businesspeople.178 
The government is not the only source of insecurity for Kurdish businesspeople though. The 
attack by the PKK in Diyarbakır at the marble mining plant of Kurdish businessman Raif 
Türk is important. Machinery and a building were set on fire by PKK members, in addition to 
writing ‘boycott’ on the walls (Radikal, 16/09/2010). The event took place in September 
2010, right before the Constitutional Referendum. The newspaper coverage presented it as a 
punishment for Raif Türk’s participation in the call by business associations to vote for the 
referendum, despite the boycott call by the pro-Kurdish party BDP (see below). Note that 
Türk was at the time the leader of the business association DISIAD. Mayor Osman Baydemir, 
representing the BDP and told to be friends with Türk, criticized this attack, emphasizing both 
                                                          
176 My interview with an executive board member of DİYAR AŞ, Diyarbakır, 22/06/2011. 
177 Law by No: 6415, dated 07/02/2013.  
178 See, respectively, the comments by Şah İsmail Bedirhanoğlu in ‘Kürt işadamlarına Çiller yöntemi,’ Taraf, 
01/02/2012 and by Altan Tan in ‘Erdoğan Kürt işadamlarının ölüm fermanını veren Çiller’in yaptıklarını 
deniyor.’ Online post at http://www.facebook.com/AltanTanSayfasi. Access date 31/01/2012.  
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the freedom of expression and the significance of security for investments in the province 
(Bianet, 17/09/2010). 
However, reasons for the attack seem ambiguous, as other businessmen involved in the 
referendum call received reaction too, but not physical attacks. This draws attention to another 
issue: according to what I heard from some of my interviewees and locals in Diyarbakır, those 
who operate mining plants may be asked by the PKK for contribution. In my interview with 
him, Raif Türk also mentioned problems with peasants over mining plants, despite the fact 
that he had a license from the state.179 Previously, there was also an attack on another marble 
plant (Milliyet, 12/06/2007). In addition to such uncertainty, oppositional political activities 
and unconformity with regard to expectations are among the major sources of insecurity for 
Kurdish businesspeople. The portrayal shows Kurdish businesspeople as thorn between the 
state and the PKK, a view which was expressed by some of my interviewees too and which 
affects associational strategies. 
5.3 Contemporary political activism  
Since 2005, the Chamber has played a leading role in associational activism in Diyarbakır and 
in the region at large. It took part in various activities, which brought together associations of 
different types for joint action for democratic demands. However, it also occasionally led 
narrow groups for oppositional politics, a leadership which caused conflicts sometimes among 
associations of Diyarbakır and sometimes between the Chamber and political actors of the 
dual power contestation. This section discusses activism by the Chamber. I first give an 
overview of the Chamber’s activism in the recent period that usually took into account the 
balance of power, by acting as a moderating third actor, while advocating a set of pro-Kurdish 
demands. I then highlight two major examples which led the Chamber to align more with the 
AKP government and to confront the Kurdish movement: different approaches to the 
constitutional referendum and the economic dimension of decentralization proposals. 
Maneuvering between dual power 
Activism by the Chamber’s leaders, along with other associational leaders, mostly took into 
account the balance of power. The business leaders engaged in efforts to moderate conflicts 
between the AKP government and the Kurdish movement, while taking part in separate 
                                                          
179 My interview with Raif Türk, Diyarbakır, 24/03/2011.  
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projects of each political actor. Yet, there were also times of conflicts and increasing 
alignment with one side. The highly turbulent political conjecture caused these oscillations in 
the associational activism and increased uncertainty, if not insecurity. Still, the leaders could 
stay consistent in advocating a set of pro-Kurdish demands in common such as the right to 
education in mother language, constitutional re-definition of citizenship, and the 
strengthening of local governments (see Ch. 2). 
As mentioned before, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s initiatives since 2005 provided associations 
with important opportunities. The Chamber’s leaders supported these initiatives, be them 
political or economic. They also called for an end to violence by both sides, especially in 
times of increasing clashes or ending of unilateral ceasefire by the PKK. While they tried to 
keep a ‘neutral’ appearance, their appearance usually looked more supportive of the 
government (see the next sub-section). However, this changed when the pro-Kurdish parties 
and activists were under increasing repression. In these times the Chamber took part in joint 
statements, which were more of a critical content. These, for instance, included opposition to 
the closure case against the pro-Kurdish party DTP in 2009 (see Ch. 2; Bianet, 08/12/2009). A 
stronger criticism was concerning the KCK operations that have started in the same year and 
continued to date, resulting in the detainment of thousands of Kurdish activists including 
elected local politicians (see Ch. 2 and 3). This led to calls by associational leaders for an end 
to the operations and the release of politician detainees, as well as calls to the government for 
having negotiations with the pro-Kurdish party. These calls were also suggested the inclusion 
of guerilla leader Öcalan in negotiations for peace (see, for instance, Bianet, 24/07/2009; 
Bianet, 11/01/2010; Radikal, 17/10/2011; Taraf, 21/11/2011).  
The leaders’ involvement in diverse projects and activities carried out by the rival political 
forces provides interesting examples for observing this balanced strategy. For instance, as a 
result of associational status, the Chamber’s leader Ensarioğlu occupied a position in the 
executive board of the Karacadağ Development Agency, which is led by the Governor of 
Diyarbakir. He also had cooperative relations with the KOSGEB, another state organization at 
the local level (see first section above). In a more voluntary and symbolical manner, 
Ensarioğlu, along with Şah İsmail Bedirhanoğlu from GÜNSİAD and Raif Türk from 
DİSİAD, has occupied a seat in the board of trustees for the Diyarbakir Foundation for 
Culture and Arts (Diyarbakır Kültür Sanat Vakfı). Founded in 2008, the foundation is led by 
the poet Bejan Matur and known to be close to the Gülen community and the AKP circles. 
The Chamber and business associations also were favored over other associations such as the 
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Bar and the Medical Association when it came to meetings with the Chief of the General Staff 
in 2008 (Bianet, 05/09/2008). 
On the other hand, business leaders participated in activities also in cooperation with the 
Kurdish movement. Ensarioğlu, along with Bedirhanoğlu, attended meetings of the 
Democratic Society Congress, one of which was on the proposal of democratic autonomy as 
detailed below. A businessperson interviewee suggested that the business leaders would not 
participate in such a platform in the past. In 2009, moreover, these business leaders were 
involved in the organization committee for a demonstration in Diyarbakır named ‘Yes to 
Peace with Dignity.’ The committee included also some other associational leaders (see Ch. 6 
and 7), while the demonstration gave the impression of an initiative by the Kurdish 
movement. Because of slogans and talks made in the demonstration, the committee members 
were put on trial according to the Anti-Terror Law and convicted of making propaganda for 
the PKK (Taraf, 22/12/2010). It is no doubt that the goal of these business leaders was not 
such propaganda. 
An even more interesting example is the case of Sarmaşık philanthropic association (see Ch. 2 
and Ch. 3). Faced with judicial obstacles posed by the national center, Sarmaşık was re-
founded in 2007 in the municipality’s leadership but on the basis of a large board of founders, 
which is composed of a number of associational leaders including the then Chamber’s leader 
Kutbettin Arzu as well as the leaders of voluntary business associations such as Şah İsmail 
Bedirhanoğlu, Raif Türk, Celalettin Birtane (DİYAD), and Ahmet Öcal (MÜSİAD).180 I got 
the impression that the purpose was to prevent another judicial blockage thanks to the 
heterogeneity of the board that makes it look more than a mere affiliate of the Kurdish 
movement. Yet, it also seems as a by-product of the moral economy, a form of national 
redistribution, considering the finance method of the association, as well as the socio-political 
environment it has been situated in.181 Sarmaşık has been financed by monthly contributions 
from associations and labor unions, in addition to individual donations. The Chamber has 
contributed too.  
However, some business leaders who have been involved in Sarmaşık’s founding board 
expressed views against social-aid activities in my interviews, making arguments such as that 
social aids make people lazy. Moreover, at least one of them has not financially contributed to 
                                                          
180 See the list of board of founders at http://www.sarmasik.org/detay/102/ Access date is 15/01/2013.  
181 By this I mean both the severe poverty in the province (mentioned in previous section) and the rigorous 
poverty-alleviation activities carried out by the AKP and the Gülen community (see Ch. 3).  
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the association either. This supports my view that the purpose for some associational actors in 
such dual engagements is to observe the balance of power.182 It also shows that business 
leaders have increased their bargaining power in the recent process. It is because their support 
appears important for the movement to have some immunity from the obstacles posed by the 
state bodies and maybe also by the mainstream media. Increasing associational activism and 
the support it has received at the national level have a role in this situation. And the fact that 
some business leaders do not donate indicate a privileged partnership for them. 
Nevertheless, the Chamber’s leadership, as well as other major business leaderships, gives an 
impression of not only engagement in strategic activism but also experience of political 
change: leaders had to take into account demands from and sometimes intimidation by 
different actors in the new political environment, actors such as the AKP government and the 
Kurdish movement, as well as other associations. Hence, they adapted themselves to the 
changing environment. Their increasing significance has also an influence on the dual power 
contestation. The AKP government was active in supporting business associations as 
alternative Kurdish actors; however, the latter opposed its policies at times. The Kurdish 
movement, on the other hand, also had to change its approach to associations. Öcalan and the 
PKK circles often criticized associational leaders for ‘collaborating’ with the government; yet, 
they also gradually increased their efforts to integrate associational actors to their political 
project (Democratic Society Congress has been one means) and to influence the site (internal 
electoral politics has been one means).183 Moreover, the debates about de-linking business 
activities and patriotic commitments also can be seen as the loosening of the moral economy 
for business actors.  
Support for the constitutional referendum: aligning with the AKP 
In August 2010, Galip Ensarioğlu read out a joint press statement, in the company of 
representatives of fourteen interest associations, which stand for small to large entrepreneurs 
of any kind in Diyarbakır. The statement was about their decision to vote in favor of the 2010 
constitutional referendum (see Ch. 3). Ensarioğlu noted that they did not find the amendment 
                                                          
182 The term ‘balance’ was used by a few businessmen I intervieweed with regard to political activities by 
Diyarbakır’s business actors in general. 
183 For instance, Öcalan once referred to criticisms by Diyarbakir’s NGOs about his ‘guardianship’ and called 
them, particularly the Diyarbakir Chamber, to suggest their proposals. He also noted that they should take place 
within the Democratic Society Congress. See ‘Öcalan: demokratik ulus inşası yapıyoruz,’ 11/12/2010 dated 
meeting notes taken by Öcalan’s lawyers. Available online at http://www.rojaciwan.com Access date is 
15/12/2012. Concerns were also raised by other pro-Kurdish actors about the rise of Kurdish ‘middle classes.’ 
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sufficient but still important for the following reasons: the amended articles were more 
democratic than the existing versions; the amendment had a symbolical importance for 
enabling the trial of the 1980 coup practitioners; and it had the potential to lead to a process of 
fundamental change.184  
This event occurred against the background of a highly polarized environment in the country 
(see Ch. 3). The pro-Kurdish party BDP had been calling for boycotting of the referendum on 
the grounds that the amendment did not take into account Kurdish demands for a democratic 
solution to the issue via a new constitution (see Ch. 2). The AKP government, on the other 
hand, had been pressuring social actors including interest associations to publicly express 
their choice (see Ch. 4). In this vein, the Minister of Internal Affairs also paid a visit to 
Diyarbakır and had meetings with certain associational leaders to campaign for the 
referendum (Firat News, 06/08/2010). In such an environment, the joint statement became the 
most significant event in which the Chamber took a stance openly in support of the 
government and in opposition to the Kurdish movement in such a striking manner. 
Actors from the Kurdish movement responded negatively to this initiative by business 
representatives. The co-chair of the pro-Kurdish party Selahattin Demirtaş stated that business 
representatives did not represent all of Diyarbakır and that to act as if it was so was 
‘immoral.’ Demirtaş interpreted the initiative as a political move in that representatives were, 
he argued, in contact with the AKP while some were expecting to become a member of the 
parliament. He added that they declared their preference urgently because of the AKP’s 
pressures on business groups to do so (Milliyet, 23/08/2010; Birgün, 24/08/2010). The PKK’s 
leader Abdullah Öcalan interpreted the event similarly: he argued that the associational 
leaders had an agreement with the state, with the hope of gaining a role in case the PKK was 
eliminated.185 
Selahattin Demirtaş also argued that members of the associations in question would boycott 
the referendum. However, among the Kurdish business community, it was mainly Celalettin 
Birtane, who opposed the joint press statement by a counter press statement. Birtane was at 
                                                          
184 See Bianet, 19/08/2010. Associations include, inter alia, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Stock 
Exchanges, the Chamber of Tradesmen and Craftsmen, the Chamber of Pharmacists, the Chamber of 
Agriculture, GÜNSİAD, DİSİAD, DİGİAD, and MÜSİAD. Some are compulsory associations and others are 
voluntary. 
185 ‘Öcalan demokratik özerkliğin esaslarını açıkladı,’ 20/08/2010 dated meeting notes taken by Öcalan’s 
lawyers. Available online at http://www.rojaciwan.com Access date is 15/12/2012.  
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the time the leader of DİYAD186 as well as a member of the Chamber. He also has a 
background in the Kurdish movement: he used to be the leader of the pro-Kurdish party 
DEHAP’s headquarters in Diyarbakır as well as an executive of an affiliate union of the 
KESK.187 By his press statement, Birtane criticized the business representatives for not 
consulting their members before making such a statement and for publicly declaring 
preferences about the referendum, while he did not declare his own preference (Evrensel, 
26/08/2010). 
The media’s take on this emerging conflict was revealing. Firat News, a major pro-PKK news 
website, claimed that Galip Ensarioğlu had economic interests in supporting the referendum. 
The given example was a construction contract signed between Ensarioğlu and Diyarbakır’s 
Dicle University through public procurement by the Special Provincial Administration. Its 
value was stated as almost four million Turkish Liras (Firat News, 11/09/2010). Ensarioğlu 
rejected this interpretation, adding that he got the contract despite the efforts by the 
governorship to cancel it (Sabah, 04/10/2010). 
The mainstream media, on the other hand, pointed at the ‘emerging bourgeois’ in the Kurdish 
region as a political alternative to the pro-Kurdish party BDP. This depiction was made with a 
supportive tone, based on interviews with business representatives. In one of them, Şah İsmail 
Bedirhanoğlu stated that ‘feudal relations of production are turning into a capitalist mode of 
production in the region’ and that ‘a new bourgeois class is in the making’ (quoted in Milliyet, 
25/08/2010). He also expressed his opposition to violence as a means of rights struggle, 
adding that democratic channels should be used instead. In an interview right after the 
referendum, Bedirhanoğlu stated that ‘the Kurdish society is not homogenous. The political 
movement in the region should show tolerance to this’ (quoted in Milliyet, 13/09/2010). 
Bedirhanoğlu has been the leader of GÜNSİAD and become one of the most visible public 
figures (or ‘opinion leaders,’ as called in the associational site) in the recent process. 
The Chamber’s leader at the time, Galip Ensarioğlu, also emphasized the importance of peace 
for development, noting that the fourteen associations, which made the joint statement, 
represented the business community of Diyarbakır, which provided employment to some two 
hundred thousands of people. Moreover, he countered the BDP’s criticism of their joint 
                                                          
186 Diyarbakır İşadamları Yapı Derneği – Construction Association of Diyarbakır Businessmen. It is a small 
business association founded in 2008 for entrepreneurs working in the construction sector.  
187 My interview with Celalettin Birtane, Diyarbakır, 04/05/2011. For information on DEHAP and KESK, see 
respectively Chapters 2 and 4.  
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statement by questioning that they were recognized as representatives of Diyarbakır when it 
was in accordance with the BDP’s interests, but not recognized so when it was not in 
accordance (Yeni Şafak, 24/08/2010; Milliyet, 25/08/2010). While this questioning points at 
the fluid character of both coalitions and claims, the events contributed to the depiction of a 
Kurdish ‘civil society’188 in favor of peace and using democratic political channels. This was 
juxtaposed with the Kurdish movement, some components of which have been involved in 
armed struggle. The vulgar version of this depiction has been the binary of ‘good Kurds’ 
versus ‘bad Kurds’ outlined in Chapter 3. The mainstream media and the AKP government 
had a role in producing this outcome; but the Kurdish business representatives also 
volunteered in asserting themselves as a third actor in such guise. 
In the end, the participation rate for the referendum in Diyarbakır was 34 per cent, and the 93 
per cent of the participants voted in favor of the referendum. Note that the participation rate 
was 73 per cent nationwide whereas it was only about 1 per cent in Hakkari, a stronghold of 
the Kurdish movement (see Table 3. 5). 
Decentralization via ‘democratic autonomy’ or state rescaling? 
Again in 2010, on the 18th and 19th of December, the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) 
organized a workshop in Diyarbakır to discuss the proposal of ‘democratic autonomy.’ 
Participants included diverse actors such as, inter alia, pro-Kurdish politicians, associational 
leaders, academics, and journalists. The workshop resulted in harsh reactions and 
controversies. Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that he would not let a ‘surgery’ done on the 
country (Yeni Şafak, 27/12/2010). The National Security Council, gathered under the 
leadership of President Abdullah Gül, emphasized the principles of ‘one flag, one nation, one 
state,’ rejecting any challenges to them (Milliyet, 29/12/2010). While the state actors reacted 
to the political components of the proposal such as the advocacy for bilingualism, Kurdish 
business leaders reacted most vehemently to its economic dimension. In addition to the 2010 
constitutional referendum, this was the second major event in which Kurdish business leaders 
opposed a political proposal by the Kurdish movement. 
The proposal of democratic autonomy has been on the agenda of the Kurdish movement since 
2007. It reflects the influence of ideas Abdullah Öcalan developed in the post-1999 period, as 
regards the reconfiguration of territorial-administrative organization to enable a democratic 
                                                          
188 Associational leaders often spoke of themselves as ‘civil society organization’ while making press statements.  
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solution to the Kurdish issue (see Ch. 2). The pro-Kurdish parties DTP and BDP advocated 
the proposal as a part of their party programs (DTP 2007; BDP 2008). It was then a proposal 
for decentralization, through the creation of regional administrative units between the central 
government and provinces. There would be some twenty regional parliaments, each 
representing a number of neighboring cities and having powers in areas such as education, 
culture, healthcare, and the economy. Regional parliaments would be formed in a way similar 
to existing provincial councils on the basis of elections (Dicle 2009). However, the 2010 DTK 
workshop included a new proposal for debate, in addition to this old one. And it was this new 
proposal which caused the controversy. 
The contested proposal advocated an alternative model of economic development. This model 
encouraged an ‘egalitarian solidaristic economy, driven by not profit maximization but use 
value’ (DTK 2010). More specific ideas included the coordinating role of consumer and 
producer cooperatives, as well as a mixed economy, composed of both private and self-
managing public sectors.189 It was this approach critical of the market economy that triggered 
criticisms by business leaders. The Chamber’s leader Galip Ensarioğlu stated to the press that 
people who have never run a shop in their life were proposing an economic model for 
Kurdistan (Yeni Şafak, 28/12/2010). He said that he did not find it realistic to give up the 
competitive model while the world was a single market. He also argued that democratic 
autonomy was not a major demand for Kurds (Taraf, 25/12/2012). 
Ensarioğlu advocated instead another model for strengthening local governments. He 
described the AKP government’s initiatives in this regard (see Ch. 3), by pointing at the fact 
that special provincial administrations got stronger thanks to new powers to manage public 
procurements and investments based on resources allocated by the center. He also mentioned 
the establishment of development agencies and the AKP government’s reform proposal for 
local governments, a proposal which he claimed was postponed because the Kurdish 
movement started advocating a similar model. This was the model of democratic autonomy 
which was developed in 2007 by the pro-Kurdish politician Hatip Dicle and adopted by pro-
Kurdish parties as described above. Ensarioğlu spoke positive about this model.190  
                                                          
189 These ideas are not seen in the DTK’s (2010) written proposal, but were discussed in the workshop according 
to the account of Galip Ensarioğlu. See ‘Kürtlerin asıl talebi özerklik değil,’ Taraf, 25/12/2010. The ideas are 
also developed in a variety of pro-Kurdish movement publications (Haber-Merkezi 2011; AÖSBA N/A; Sönmez 
2011; Çelik 2011).  
190 See ‘Kürtlerin asıl talebi özerklik değil,’ Taraf, 25/12/2010 and my interview with Galip Ensarioğlu, Ankara, 
23/09/2011. 
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The GÜNSİAD’s leader Şah İsmail Bedirhaoğlu also was invited to the workshop and he 
expressed similar concerns in my interview with him: he described the 2010 DTK’s proposal 
as aiming a ‘classless society’ and proposing ‘self-defense forces’ which disturbed some local 
groups. As mentioned in Chapter 2, self-defense forces, for the decentralization of public 
security, are seen by some Kurds as a threat to the opponents of the Kurdish movement. 
Bedirhaoğlu, on the other hand, supported the liberal model of decentralization. He specified 
that it was special provincial administrations not municipalities which were to be 
strengthened.191  
The model advocated by business leaders relates to the ongoing process of ‘state rescaling’ in 
Turkey (see Bayırbağ 2010; cf. Brenner 1999). This process was somewhat triggered by the 
AKP government’s reform process for EU candidacy, as it included in its 2003 Accession 
Partnership document the objective to set up regional branches at NUTS 2 level (EC, 
(European Council) 2003). However, the reform process was impeded in certain respects by 
the bureaucratic elites and the then President Sezer due to concerns about the unitary structure 
of the country. The process witnessed the devolution of powers from the national government 
to special provincial administrations and its units at the local level. Special provincial 
administrations have provincial councils as decision-making bodies, constituted by local 
elections. Furthermore, development agencies were founded as mentioned above. They reflect 
better the new governance model, including, inter alia, leaders of chambers of commerce and 
industry in their executive board, in addition to the involvement of the leaders of voluntary 
business associations in advisory councils. Therefore, the model has the potential to increase 
the power of businesspeople at the local level, in contrast to the DTK’s model.  
In late December, however, after the responses by the state actors and businesspeople, a 
demonstration took place in Diyarbakır in support of the proposal of democratic autonomy. 
National newspapers highlighted a big placard from this demonstration: it said that ‘Kurdish 
people wants democratic autonomy, rather than becoming collaborators of the AKP, like 
Galip Ensarioğlu and Emin Aktar are’ (Milliyet, 29/12/2010). There was a signature of the 
People’s Initiative of Amed (the antique name of Diyarbakır), and behind the placard were the 
PKK flags held by other demonstrators, as commonly seen in pro-Kurdish protests. As to why 
                                                          
191 My interview with Şah İsmail Bedirhanoğlu, Diyarbakır, 24/03/2011. It seems that these two businessmen 
reflect the general approach of Kurdish organized business. However, there is an exception. Similar to the 
divergence in the referendum debate, the DIYAD’s leader Celalettin Birtane expressed different views, in 
support of the contested model, by emphasizing social justice and participatory mechanisms for the workplace 
and politics. My interview with Celalettin Birtane, Diyarbakir, 04/05/2011.  
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these two names were targeted, Ensarioğlu and the then Bar’s leader Aktar (see Ch. 6) were 
the major associational leaders who appeared a lot in the national media gradually under a 
pro-AKP guise thanks to their oppositional approach to some political proposals by the 
Kurdish movement: this approach concerned the boycott call against the 2010 referendum, in 
addition to the model of democratic autonomy. 
Against the background of different proposals and diverse responses, the pro-Kurdish party 
BDP maintained the proposal as it was prepared in 2007. Hence, the party has kept some 
ambiguity with regard to the economic dimension of the proposed model. Ambiguity helps 
form a coalition of actors with different ideas and interests. There might have been some 
opposition to the DTK’s model, but the ambiguous model as still held by the BDP provides a 
major model of decentralization to date, a model which accommodates other common 
demands such as linguistic rights. Thereby, Kurdish actors can be still a part of this somewhat 
flexible coalition under the demand for strengthening of local governments, while ambiguity 
leaves the proposal open to future contests (cf. Streeck/Thelen 2005: 26-27). 
Conclusions  
Despite being a latecomer in terms of politicization, the Chamber, accompanied with the 
voluntary business associations, played a leading role in Kurdish associational activism. It 
regularly took part in encompassing coalitions formed by the associations on an ad hoc basis 
since 2005. The concern about the conflict situation – efforts to moderate the dual power 
contestation and press for peace – provided the common ground. In this respect, the attention 
paid by the AKP, top state figures and the mainstream media helped achieve this third actor 
status, opening up the space for associational activism and favoring business associations in 
particular as the representatives from civil society. However, the associations also gradually 
acted in harmony to make pro-Kurdish rights claims. The minimum common demands – such 
as the right to education in mother language, constitutional safeguards for recognition, and 
strengthening of local governments – provided the basis for this coalition. The Kurdish 
movement played a role in articulating these common demands, by highlighting the shared 
collective identity and keeping some ambiguity about the demands to downplay the 
differences of interests and ideas among groups (cf. McAdam/Tarrow/Tilly 2008).  
However, the Chamber, coupled with the business leaders, also formed narrow coalitions at 
times of significant political events in the country. These led to conflicts both among 
associations and between the business leaders and the Kurdish movement. The major example 
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is the 2010 Constitutional Referendum for which the business leaders (as well as the Bar 
Association) supported the referendum in favor of the AKP government and against the 
boycott calls by the Kurdish movement. This appears to be a significant strategic decision 
which increased the power of the business leaders. With their discourses and activism, 
business leaders played a role in the categorical division of Kurds: first, they voiced it as the 
‘supporters of violent methods’ versus the ‘supporters of a peaceful solution.’ Second, 
especially following the referendum debates, the division took also an economic basis: they 
depicted themselves as the ‘emerging bourgeois,’ who favored ‘democratic channels’ over 
‘violence.’ The vulgar version of this was the category of ‘white Kurds’ used in the 
mainstream media (also see Ch. 3). 
Indeed, the business alignment with the government appears to have an economic dimension: 
the period under the AKP rule provided new opportunities for capital accumulation. The 
Chamber gained access to new resources for itself as well as for its members, in addition to 
opportunities for its leaders for political career advancement. Political normalization in the 
Kurdish region, compared to the 1990s, contributed to the economic improvement of 
Diyarbakır, helping its integration with the national and, to a degree, international markets. 
The emerging market in Kurdish northern Iraq provided an opportunity and increased hopes 
for Kurdish economic actors to use their ethnic-linguistic capital in their relations with both 
Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish economic actors. 
On the other hand, as the debates on the democratic economy proposal show, Kurdish 
business actors’ views conflict with the Kurdish movement with regard to the model of 
economic development and decentralization each one advocates. Moreover, the pro-market 
model supported by business actors is akin to the initiatives by the AKP government. 
Although the pro-Kurdish parties kept ambiguity in party programs with regard to the 
economic dimension of the proposal to obscure the differences of ideas and interests (as the 
radical not-pro-market version comes from the PKK circles), they could not avoid the clashes. 
And there is the more general trend that the moral economy becomes more contested, as seen 
in the resistance to shop closure protests.  
One could suggest that the conflict of interests push business leaders toward the AKP 
government. However, business leaders usually pursued a balanced approach, strategically 
manipulating the dual power situation despite the constraints it presented: they took part in 
shifting flexible coalitions and cooperated with each power in political and/or local projects 
(cf. Scott 2009: 60). In this respect, there has been a compromise between business leaders 
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and the Kurdish movement: the former started publicly voicing pro-Kurdish demands and 
occasionally collaborated with the movement (e.g. Sarmaşık), while the latter, especially at 
the municipal level, started loosening the moral-economy obligations for business actors 
(‘capital has no patriotism,’ or the business members who do not donate to Sarmaşık). 
Overall, the Chamber and the business leaders enjoyed high public visibility and legitimacy, 
increasing their bargaining power in the process. 
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Chapter 6: Professional associations  
The Bar and Medical Associations had been active already in the 1990s, with efforts to draw 
attention and to find solutions to severe problems relevant to their associational focus under 
the Emergency Rule. Thanks to the changing political environment, these associations became 
more politicized in the 2000s, making claims in a scope broader than their professional field. 
However, the nature of this politicization as well as its consequences has showed a significant 
variety between the two associations. This chapter examines the activities by these 
compulsory professional associations in the transitional period. It aims to explore the roles 
associational leaders played in coalition formation and understand the divergence by looking 
at their interactions with memberships and political interlocutors. The cross-pressures of 
economic-professional interests and collective identity politics provide the trajectory to trace 
these interactions.  
First, I give an overview of associational leadership and properties. I start with a brief 
historical background of the 1990s and then go on with the AKP period. I also underline 
differences in the access to resources and changes in some associational properties such as the 
size of memberships. Second, I highlight some major dynamics in the membership 
environments of the two associations. This section gives an idea about the major opportunities 
and constraints facing professionals as a result of political and economic processes, also 
giving examples of the interplay between professional interests and political-moral 
commitments. Third, I examine the patterns of interaction between each association and the 
political actors. I first focus on the Bar’s leading yet somewhat unstable position in 
associational activism. Then I point at the activities by the Medical Association, which 
appeared more consistent but also more oppositional. The chapter concludes with major 
points. 
6.1 Associational leadership and properties 
This section first gives a glimpse of the Bar and Medical Associations in the 1990s with a 
focus on the leadership level to better understand the associations’ changing role and 
significance. It then gives an overview of the AKP period. It points at diverse trends seen in 
the associational site, as the Bar became more significant and contested since 2005 while the 
Medical Association kept a lower profile in political activism as mediated by the mainstream 
media. These trends also give a general view of political alignment of leaders. Finally, the 
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section mentions some associational properties such as the size of memberships, access to 
new resources, as well as the nature of relations with respective peak associations in the 
recent period, as they link leadership to both its membership and political interlocutors that 
the other two sections elaborate on. 
A brief historical background 
As mentioned before, the armed conflict made associations of Diyarbakır more vocal in the 
1990s. This was especially the case for the Bar and Medical Associations, as they were 
influenced in diverse ways from human rights violations common under the Emergency Rule 
(see Ch. 2). Many civilian Kurds were subjected to arbitrary arrests, torture in police 
detention, forced disappearances, village evacuations, and murders by unknown perpetrators. 
Associational members also were influenced in the work environment: defense lawyers were 
put under pressure, when they undertook political cases, through detention and investigations 
on the grounds of alleged membership to illegal organizations. And physicians were required 
to prepare reports on torture claims as desired by the police, or would be faced with pressures 
through, inter alia, exile if they were employed in the public sector. Several professionals also 
were murdered by unknown perpetrators.192 In such an environment, it was inevitable for 
associational leaders not to engage in some sort of activism. 
Diyarbakır was a special place for Kurdish rights struggle in the legal arena thanks to the fact 
that the Bar Association was then a regional association and there were the branches of major 
human rights associations in the city.193 The Bar’s leaders engaged in various activities 
against human rights violations and pressures on their members: they made press statements, 
tried to mobilize the peak association TBB (mostly unsuccessful), prepared reports, and had 
meetings with foreign delegates and the state officials.194 Yet, the Bar’s executives were also 
faced with difficulties, at times threatened by the officials, taken into custody, put on trial and 
                                                          
192 See the speeches by the Diyarbakır Bar’s delegates for the general assemblies of TBB (TBB 1995b: 91-97; 
TBB 1996b: 50-53; TBB 1999c: 80-85) and a petition by the TBB (1999c: 248). Also see (Bora 2002; İnanıcı 
2008: 182-183; Muller 1996: 187-191; Çelik, Abdullah 2010; van Bruinessen 1996). 
193 These included mainly the Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği – İHD) and the Human Rights 
Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı – TİHV). The Diyarbakır branch of İHD was founded in 
1988 and chaired in the 1990s by Osman Baydemir, the current Mayor of Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality 
and in the 2000s by Selahattin Demirtaş, the current co-chairperson for the pro-Kurdish party BDP. İHD was one 
of the major targets of political pressure. The Diyarbakır branch of TİHV was founded in 1998 and chaired by 
Sezgin Tanrıkulu, later leader of the Bar Association. See Diken (2001: 143-160). 
194 See the speeches by Diyarbakır delegates in the assembly meetings of the TBB mentioned above. Also my 
interviews with past leaders, Mustafa Özer, Diyarbakır, 24/06/2011 and Fethi Gümüş, Diyarbakır, 01/10/2011.  
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even experienced assassination attempts because of such activities.195 Nevertheless, the Bar 
and legal professionals appeared as increasingly important actors. Leading lawyers occupied 
multiple positions in associations and started taking cases to the European Court of Human 
Rights, where they were often ruled against Turkey. Considering the centrality of legal 
problems to the Kurdish issue, lawyers appeared to be important candidates for party politics. 
The Medical Association was too a regional association at the time, while Diyarbakır has been 
a center for healthcare in the region. The association was making efforts to fight human rights 
violations, although it was not an actor as central as the Bar was. Similarly, the association’s 
leaders made press statements, prepared reports, held meetings with the state officials and 
foreign delegates, while having cooperative relations with the peak association TTB as well as 
other associations in the province such as labor unions. Leaders raised concerns about the 
officials’ interference to forensic medicine reports, torture, hunger strikes in prisons, and 
forced migration. They also pointed at difficulties in conducting professional duty, such as 
linguistic barriers between physicians and patients.196 However, the executives of the Medical 
Association, as well as unionists in the healthcare sector, also were subjected to political 
repression at times through exiles, investigations, plots, and murder by unknown perpetrators 
(Çelik, Abdullah 2010). 
In such an environment, lawyers appeared to be in a less unsafe position as they worked 
mostly in the private sector and had the guard of legal knowledge, as opposed to physicians, 
who worked mostly in the public sector then. The changing political and economic 
environment from the late 1990s onwards, however, was to have important impact on 
professional environments and associations. 
Associational leadership in the AKP period 
In the AKP period, the professional associations have become more active in the political 
arena, making claims with a broader scope than that of professional fields. They also turned 
into contested sites; this has been particularly the case with the Bar. The Bar had two different 
leaders in this period up to 2012: Sezgin Tanrıkulu and Mehmet Emin Aktar. Political 
activism by these figures is detailed below in the third section, but some general notes on 
                                                          
195 My interview with Mustafa Özer, Diyarbakır, 24/06/2011. See also the interviews by Neşe Düzel (Radikal, 
19/02/2001) and Ertuğrul Mavioğlu (2006: 117-127).  
196 See Soyer (1996); Bora (2002); my interviews with past leaders, Mahmut Ortakaya, Diyarbakır, 23/06/2011; 
Seyfettin Kızılkan, Diyarbakır, 22/06/2011; and Necdet İpekyüz, Diyarbakır, 28/06/2011.  
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associational leadership and electoral processes197 will help understanding this activism, as 
well as coalitions that come out of it. 
Since the late 1980s, Sezgin Tanrıkulu occupied various positions in the Bar’s executive 
boards and administration, as well as the chair of the local branches of human rights 
organizations. He was a publicly known person, undertaking the cases of important Kurdish 
political figures, and having meetings with foreign politicians including the US then-President 
Bill Clinton in his visit to Turkey in 1999. However, he too was taken into custody a few 
times on political grounds. Tanrıkulu served as the leader of the Bar for three terms between 
2002 and 2008. Under his leadership, the Bar continued to draw attention to human rights 
violations and became more active in politics. As Tanrıkulu kept the Bar’s political tradition, 
clashes occurred between him and the Prime Minister as detailed below. However, these 
experiences paved the way for his political career: he became a member of the parliament on 
the tickets of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in the 2011 elections. At a time Kurdish 
politics were divided into two poles represented by the AKP and the Kurdish movement, 
Tanrıkulu’s choice pointed out an alternative option, as well as efforts within the CHP to 
revise its approach to the Kurdish issue. 
Tanrıkulu was succeeded by Mehmet Emin Aktar, who served two terms until 2012. Before 
this, Aktar too occupied various positions in the Bar throughout the 1990s in executive boards 
and administration. Aktar pursued a strategy somewhat different than that of Tanrıkulu and 
similar to that of Ensarioğlu from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (see Ch. 5): he 
usually pursued a balanced approach towards the dual power. Yet, there were also some 
oscillations in the political positions he took, as detailed below. According to rumors, Aktar 
wanted to run as a candidate on the tickets of the AKP in the 2011 general elections, after his 
support for the 2010 referendum, however, he was not accepted.198 He did not run as a 
candidate for the Bar leadership again. 
                                                          
197 Elections take place once in two years to assign leaders and the members of executive boards as well as 
delegates for peak associations. Members gather in general assemblies and vote for or against candidates. In bar 
associations, both leaders and members of the executive board are elected directly by general assembly. In 
medical associations, general assembly elects the members of the executive board, which elects the leader. The 
number of seats of the board varies among associations as well as according to the size of respective 
membership. Currently, the Bar’s executive board has ten members, whereas it is seven for the Medical 
Association. The election of the board also varies in practice. In Diyarbakır, members vote for individual 
candidates, hence proportional representation, as demanded by the law, whereas the de facto practice in, say, the 
Istanbul Bar is that members mostly vote for bloc-lists of candidates, hence, majoritarian representation. As to 
the Diyarbakır Medical Association, there is mostly a single list. 
198 Rumors are, of course, not reliable, as they may emerge to de-legitimize actors. Yet I should note that I heard 
this rumor within both the AKP (including a local official) and the pro-Kurdish circles. 
148 
 
According to some of my interviewees, Aktar was supported by Sezgin Tanrıkulu in 
associational elections against his rivals. Candidates rely on intra-associational networks on 
the basis of personal and political ties. However, these networks are loose and re-made in 
each term. There can also be interference by external actors. For instance, I was told by a past 
leader, who is close to the Kurdish movement, that the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
as well as leading businesspeople, tried to influence the 2010 elections by convincing some 
lawyers to vote for Aktar against his rival who was told to be supported by the pro-Kurdish 
party BDP.199 His rival was Tahir Elçi, who apparently received votes mostly from the 
supporters of the BDP,200 whereas Aktar received votes mainly from two other groups: one is 
the so-called liberals (read as those who are critical of the Kurdish movement) and the other is 
the pious (also known as Islamists, some of whom support the AKP).201 Halit Advan is a 
lawyer from the latter group; he occupied seats in executive boards under Aktar’s leadership 
until he became the chairperson of the AKP’s Diyarbakır headquarters. In my interview with 
him, Advan told me that pious lawyers became influential in the Bar’s elections since the 
mid-2000s, but they supported Tanrıkulu and Aktar, rather than running their own candidate, 
and occupied a few seats in executive boards. Such diversity within the boards should be 
affecting the decision-making process, making it relatively difficult for leaders.202 
Hence, the 2000s witnessed increasing competition within the Bar Association. In the 1990s, 
there used to be mostly a single candidate for leadership or, in a few cases, two candidates. 
However, the number increased in the following decade, alternating between two and four. 
This was followed by the formation of a group by pious lawyers in the 2012 elections. This 
group proposed a candidate for leadership and a list of candidates for the executive board203 in 
a fashion similar to the bars in big provinces such as Istanbul and Ankara. This appears to be 
an outcome of both increasing diversity within membership, as it enlarged in numbers, and 
                                                          
199 In this vein, I was told by the Chamber’s past leader Kutbettin Arzu that they had supported pro-democratic 
forces in the Bar, implying an effort against the Kurdish movement. 
200 A few lawyers of different political commitments told me that some lawyers who describe themselves as 
‘patriot’ and support the BDP would be reluctant about the control of the Bar management by the BDP; hence, 
electoral behavior might be different within the association than party politics. 
201 A member of the executive board told me that pious lawyers comprises one third of votes, while the rest is 
equally divided between liberals and supporters of the BDP (also known as patriots). 
202 My interview with Halit Advan, Diyarbakır, 23/06/2011.  
203 Hence, the coalition of the pious and the liberals was divided into two candidates, while Tahir Elçi won the 
race thanks to the support of the BDP circles (Haber Diyarbakır, 03/11/2012 and Bianet, 05/11/2012). 
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the Bar’s increasing political significance. The high rates of participation in associational 
elections also support this.204 
The Medical Association portrays quite a different picture. In the 1990s there used to be 
mostly a single candidate for leadership and this continued in the 2000s, remaining to be a 
less contested area, also characterized with low participation by members in elections.205 On 
the other hand, while the Bar was led by two leaders in the AKP period up to 2012, it was five 
for the Medical Association.206 The reason is probably because leadership offers lower returns 
for physicians: physicians usually work in hospitals in the public and private sectors, unlike 
lawyers, who are usually self-employed and, hence, more flexible time wise. For physicians 
working in the public sector, there is also the risk of exile, as a punishment by political 
authorities. 
The Medical Association also has been less visible in the national media than the Bar and the 
Chamber. Its leaders made press statements, individually or in joint action with other 
associations. Statements touched upon sometimes political issues, sometimes professional 
issues. Yet, the association appeared usually as a secondary element in joint actions seen in 
the post-2005 associational activism, which was led more by business leaders and the Bar. 
The leaders of the Medical Association read out joint press statements once in a while, in 
addition to less appearance in TV programs or interviews for mainstream newspapers. Hence, 
there is also less focus on its individual leaders in this overview. 
One reason for the lower visibility is the fact that the association does not occupy a strategic 
position as it does not appear central to the definition of the Kurdish issue in professional 
terms, i.e. healthcare concerns have received less attention than, say, human rights violations 
or regional underdevelopment about which the Bar and the Chamber are concerned by 
definition. This has been the case despite the fact that the Medical Association was involved 
in activities concerning healthcare services in Kurdish language. Another reason seems to be 
the political stance of recent leaders of the Medical Association vis-à-vis the dual power 
contestation. The Medical Association too became politically more active in the 2000s, thanks 
                                                          
204 The participation rate varies between 80 and 90 per cent (see DDK 2009: 708; also my calculations based on 
the media coverage).  
205 One past leader of the Diyarbakır Medical Association told me that the participation rate was only about 10 
per cent.  
206 Leaders in the AKP period up to 2012 included Necdet İpekyüz, İlhan Diken, Adem Avcıkıran, Selçuk 
Mızraklı, and Şemsettin Koç. I had interviews with İpekyüz (Diyarbakır, 28/06/2011) and Koç (Diyarbakır, 
24/03/2011). 
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to the changing environment; however, this politicization evolved in a direction that recently 
came to be openly supportive of the pro-Kurdish party and in opposition to the AKP 
government. Associational properties and dynamics in the membership environment 
contributed to such a political alignment. 
Increasing membership, varying effects  
Over the last two decades, university enrollment has increased across the country helped by 
the processes of urbanization and the rising number of universities. The faculties of law and 
medicine became more accessible, as they also were established at Diyarbakır’s Dicle 
University. Thereby, the memberships of the associations have grown. In the 1990s, the two 
associations were organized at a regional level; the 2000s witnessed the establishment of 
separate provincial associations. Yet, even after the fragmentation, Diyarbakır’s Bar and 
Medical Associations came to possess much larger memberships (see Table 4.2, as well as 
Muller 1996; Diken 2001; DDK 2009). 
The growth of membership increased the diversity within the associations. This has been 
more visible and influential in the Bar, as described above with regard to the increasing 
competition in electoral processes. The Medical Association, on the other hand, found itself in 
a different situation. One past leader told me that physicians got interested in the association 
in the 1990s as they benefited from its support for the hard conditions they were working 
under. However, as the situation improved in the 2000s, physicians lost their interest in the 
association, as manifested in low electoral-participation rates. Also, it is not only the number 
of physicians that has increased, but also the number of private hospitals, a fact which 
contributed to the improvement of work conditions and income levels for physicians (see next 
section). Hence, the changes have not contributed much to the internal competition.  
Material sources enjoyed by the associations also improved in the 2000s, especially for the 
Bar. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the legal changes in the beginning of the decade increased 
income sources of the bars. In the case of Diyarbakır Bar, there have been also projects as 
sources of income. Projects rely mostly on European Union funds, which have improved 
mainly in the 2000s.207 The Diyarbakır Medical Association, on the other hand, seems to have 
not enjoyed an increase in its already limited sources of income. Also, the access of both 
                                                          
207 Based on my interviews with past leaders.  
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associations to sources appear to be much poorer than, for instance, that of the Chamber for 
Commerce and Industry.208  
Before proceeding to the next section, let’s also note the variation in relations between the 
associations and their respective peak associations. The Diyarbakır Bar has had difficult 
relations with the TBB from the 1990s until the 2010 changes in the leadership. The Bar’s 
delegates and leaders had difficulty in having the TBB cooperating with them against 
problems related to the Kurdish issue. For instance, Sezgin Tanrıkulu complained about the 
non-cooperative behavior of the TBB with regard to human rights violations targeting Kurds. 
Tanrıkulu sometimes received in turn very negative reactions from Turkish nationalists in 
general assemblies (TBB 2005: 75; TBB 2007-96, 145-146). These problems with the TBB 
management have to do with the political tradition that prevailed in the latter, until the current 
leader Coşar who has proved to be pro-Kurdish and collaborative (see Ch. 4).209 For instance, 
he engaged in supportive activities against the judicially problematic aspects of the KCK 
operations with regard to the right to fair trial (e.g. long-lasting pre-trial detentions and trials 
functioning like de facto punishment). He also supported the demand for defense in Kurdish 
language (Milliyet, 23/02/2011) and attended a commemorative event organized by the 
Diyarbakır Bar about the old infamous Diyarbakır Prison (see Ch. 2), naming the prison as a 
shame on the state (TBB 2010b). 
The Medical Association, on the other hand, has had good relations with the peak association 
TTB from the 1990s up to now. As detailed in Chapter 4, the TTB management has been led 
by a group which is pro-Kurdish and left-leaning. It has had some delegates from Diyarbakır 
in its executive boards and cooperated with the Diyarbakır Medical Association, with regard 
to issues ranging from above-mentioned problems facing associational leaders in the 1990s to 
the demand for healthcare services in Kurdish language in the 2000s (see TTB 2000b: 49-53; 
TTB 2010-128; TTB 2012c: 31-52). Add to this the discontent common among physicians 
across the country concerning some policy initiatives of the AKP government in the 
healthcare sector (see below next sections and Ch. 3).  
                                                          
208 In 2007, the Bar’s income was 531 thousand Turkish liras and its expenditure less than the half. The Medical 
Association had 87 thousands as income and almost the same as expenditure (DDK 2009: 508, 738).  
209 With the so-called democratic opening in 2009, on the other hand, the then leader of TBB Özdemir Özok was 
to express support in a meeting with the Minister of Internal Affairs, while a group of bar associations expressed 
support by a joint press statement in Diyarbakır (Bianet, 14/08/2009 and 18/01/2010). Note that the Kurdish 
issue has been very divisive among provincial bar associations, as associations dominated by Turkish nationalists 
maintained a negative approach to the issue. For instance, the Istanbul Bar legally warned member lawyers who 
worked with Abdullah Öcalan, as detailed in next section. 
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6.2 Dynamics in the membership environment 
Membership environment is important to understand associational politics. Properties of this 
environment influence electoral processes with regard to how competitive the elections will 
be and who will be elected as a leader. Its dynamics are also taken into account by leaders in 
their articulation of demands, as well as in their interaction with political interlocutors. In this 
section, I describe the membership environments of the associations. First, I illustrate how 
lawyers have been faced with state-induced constraints, as well as political-moral 
commitments linked to the Kurdish issue. Second, I point at the liberalization process in the 
healthcare sector with regard to its effects on physicians; yet, the Kurdish issue has an impact 
on this sector as well, making some experiences peculiar. 
Legal advocacy between profession and activism 
Lawyers have been working in the Kurdish region under conditions that are pretty much 
different than those in the rest of the country. They were faced with serious difficulties 
especially in the 1990s, as mentioned in the beginning. Yet, lawyers emerged as important 
actors in Kurdish politics. This is partly because the legal dimension of the Kurdish issue has 
been important. There is also the fact that they had a relatively protective shield of legal 
knowledge against political repression made them stronger. Thanks to this, lawyers have had 
an important place in oppositional politics in general.210 These also motivated some of the 
young generation to study law. A Kurdish lawyer who studied law in the early 2000s told me 
that every family in the region needed one lawyer since every family would have one member 
taken into custody and have problems with land property, etc. 
In the 2000s, the situation for lawyers got better; yet, constraints have not completely 
disappeared, especially for lawyers who were involved in cases that had political aspects. For 
instance, a court case was launched in 2003 against four lawyers in Diyarbakır, including 
Sezgin Tanrıkulu, the then leader of the Bar, for allegedly abusing their legal responsibility in 
compensation cases of villagers. Compensation was sought for losses suffered by villagers 
because of forced evacuation and burning of their villages in the 1990s. The lawyers were not 
convicted in the end (Bianet, 24/12/2003). Kurdish lawyers would take such cases for 
compensation of losses as well as human rights violations by going first to national courts and 
then to the European Court of Human Rights, which mostly ruled against Turkey by 
                                                          
210 I was told about this also by a left-leaning lawyer concerning left-wing parties, in addition to pro-Kurdish 
ones. 
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sentencing it to pay fines. This is how the AKP government enacted a law in 2004 for the 
compensation for material damages suffered by individuals under the Emergency Rule in the 
Kurdish region. I will come back to this law below (see also Ch. 3); but, here let’s underline 
that pressures faced by lawyers had to do with the challenges they posed to the political 
regime. 
Another significant role played by some Kurdish lawyers was in relation with the defense of 
imprisoned guerilla leader Öcalan. For instance, Öcalan’s lawyers were legally warned by the 
peak association TBB in 2003 for making press statements that allegedly aimed to mobilize 
the PKK (Radikal, 07/09/2003). The TBB under Özok’s leadership then embraced the 
security approach to the Kurdish issue, i.e. taking it as a problem of ‘terrorism’ (see Ch. 4). 
Lawyers were playing important roles, as they mediated Öcalan’s views of contemporary 
politics to the public since he was put into prison in 1999.211 Some lawyers also took part in 
protests. For instance, a group of lawyers referred to Öcalan as ‘Mister Öcalan’ in their 
official petitions to have a meeting with him and thereby got themselves investigated for 
‘praising the terrorist organization’ (Firat News, 15/07/2008). The use of this specific word 
‘Mister’ had been a reason for the trial and conviction of many Kurdish activists until a high 
court recently ruled against one conviction on the grounds of the right to freedom of speech 
(Radikal, 21/05/2012). 
Another source of confrontation between Kurdish lawyers and the political regime emerged as 
a result of KCK operations. As mentioned in Part I, the operations started in 2009, targeting 
first the elected local representatives of the pro-Kurdish party and then activists, unionists, 
journalists, etc., leading to the gradual detention of some thousands of people. Operations and 
trials took place across the country, the major one concerning Diyarbakır. They have been 
highly controversial though: their goal appeared to be suppressing the Kurdish movement, 
rather than judicial grounds: for instance, targets were often held in pre-trial detention more 
than a year. Trials were carried out by specially-authorized heavy criminal courts which are 
pretty problematical in legal terms (see Ch. 3, §2). Long-due indictments turned out to be 
highly dubious concerning accusations and evidence (see İnanıcı 2011c; Aktar 2012; 
Kozağaçlı 2012). The request by defendants for defending themselves in Kurdish language 
                                                          
211 These included lawyers from Diyarbakır as well as other parts of the country. Also note that some lawyers, 
who were registered at the Istanbul Bar Association and among the lawyers of Öcalan, were faced with 
constraints posed by both the courts and the Bar. They were put on trial following accusations by the Chief of the 
General Staff because of their press statements on Öcalan and hence allegedly making propaganda for the PKK. 
The Istanbul Bar also made a legal warning for the lawyers for the same reason. Note that repeated warnings 
may lead to banning of members from practicing the profession (Bianet, 05/07/2011).  
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was rejected and defendants were taken to trials in groups, making individualized defense 
difficult. Defendants did not attend some trials as a protest, and so on, so forth. 
While some three hundreds of lawyers undertook the defense role for the major case in 
Diyarbakır because of its symbolical importance for including elected representatives, lawyers 
boycotted some trials of this case as a protest to above mentioned problems. The Diyarbakır 
Bar joined the protest by resisting sending new lawyers to the trials. As a result, both actors 
were to be faced with judicial complaints. Repeated problems, on the other hand, led the to 
increase of professional solidarity, as the peak association TBB, some other bar associations 
and lawyers from the rest of the country expressed support for Kurdish lawyers and the 
Diyarbakır Bar. Leaders of some bar associations and the TBB also attended trials in 
Diyarbakır (Bianet, 10/08/2011). However, difficulties facing Kurdish lawyers reached a peak 
level when lawyers of Abdullah Öcalan were included among targets of the KCK operations: 
more than 30 lawyers have been detained since late 2011 and put on trial on the grounds of 
roles they allegedly played to enable communication between Öcalan and the PKK (see the 
indictment TC 2012). This serves not only to deprive defendants from the right to have a 
lawyer, but also to intimidate lawyers so that they will not take political cases. The latter 
effect has already been felt, according to the Bar’s leader (Radikal, 13/06/2012). 
In addition to the constraints induced by the state, political-moral commitments also seem 
significant. Political cases have had a significant share in overall cases in Diyarbakır and 
targeted mostly members or supporters of the Kurdish movement. But the concept of 
supporter is in its loosest sense here: for instance, there was a period thousands of children 
who participated in urban demonstrations were taken into custody en masse and put on trial 
according to the Anti-Terror Law.212 Considering also the compensation cases for losses 
under the Emergency Rule, majority of lawyers in Diyarbakır have dealt with cases that have 
a political aspect.  
In such a politicized and insecure environment, political-moral commitments may have an 
important influence on conducting professional duty. In this regard, a common practice has 
emerged in the legal market not to take the cases of PKK defectors (also known as confessors 
– itirafçı), who provide Turkish security forces with insider information about the 
organization. Yet, lawyers might fail sometimes in reconciling their professional interests 
                                                          
212 Detentions were concentrated between approximately 2008 and 2010 and public reaction led the government 
to amend the Anti-Terror Law in 2010 (see Chapters 2 and 3).  
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with social expectations. I heard a few statements, while doing my fieldwork, about how it 
was difficult to mobilize lawyers for political causes apart from highly symbolical cases such 
as KCK trials. For instance, I once met a few children, who just came out of prison where 
they were held in detention because of their participation in pro-Kurdish demonstrations – 
they are the once so-called stone-throwing children (see Ch. 2). One of them told that they 
had wanted to get out of the cell and throw stones also at their lawyers. This was because of 
the lack of attention. When I asked some of my informants, I was told that the attention could 
be lacking because lawyers had either too many cases to properly take care of or not enough 
motivation when they performed it voluntarily, mobilized by the pro-Kurdish party or NGOs. 
Such clashes of professional interest and political commitment lead to legitimacy problem for 
lawyers, which may in turn appear as a constraint. I heard from a few of my informants, 
including young lawyers, arguing that lawyers got ‘rich from the war’ (savaş zenginleri). 
Examples were mostly about the compensation cases. As mentioned before, these cases seek 
compensation for losses suffered by Kurdish villagers because of forced evacuation and 
burning of villages in the 1990s. Lawyers used to take these cases first to national courts, 
which would usually rule against plaintiffs, and then to the European Court of Human Rights, 
which would usually rule against Turkey by sentencing it to pay fines. The AKP government 
enacted the 2004 law213 to manage such complaints by its own rules, allowing compensation 
for material damages suffered by individuals under the Emergency Rule in the Kurdish 
region.  
Applications have been made in the following years, with highest numbers coming from 
Diyarbakır (Yükseker 2008a). Applicants as well as their lawyers had various problems in the 
process of application to the damage assessment commissions, which consisted of state 
officials trying to avoid recognizing losses or to undervalue them.214 However, another 
problem relevant for our discussion concerned relations between lawyers and applicants. I 
was told a few times about this lawyer from Diyarbakır who gave his customer fake money, 
instead of the compensation money given by the state (also see Hürriyet, 01/05/2010). This 
appears to be an exceptional case; yet, less severe forms of abusive behavior and conflict of 
                                                          
213 Law No: 5233, dated 17/07/2004. The official title uses ‘compensation of losses due to terrorism and the fight 
against terrorism.’ 
214 See the evaluation byYükseker (2008a) focusing on Diyarbakır, as well as my interview with Mehmet Emin 
Aktar (Diyarbakır, 25/03/2011).  
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interests were seen at times.215 Furthermore, a number of lawyers are told to have made 
‘fortunes,’ and many others made some good money thanks to these cases; hence, the 
expression of ‘rich from the war’ above.216 On the other hand, lawyers too suffer from uneven 
regional development in that they can be charging lower fees for mundane cases like divorce 
than in western parts of the country.217 
Politics and liberalization in the healthcare sector  
Kurdish physicians also have been working under conditions that are pretty much different 
than those in the rest of the country, being subjected to most serious politically-induced 
constraints in the 1990s. Yet, these also meant that physicians mattered as professional actors. 
In the 2000s, the situation for physicians also got better. Still, constraints have not completely 
disappeared, as political instruments can still be used for those working in the public sector. 
For instance, the city’s Dicle University and its Faculty of Medicine witnessed important 
changes in the AKP period, especially since 2008 when the President Abdullah Gül appointed 
as the new rector Prof. Ayşegül Jale Saraç, who had run as a candidate in the 2007 general 
elections on the tickets of the AKP. Since then, it is argued that pious groups218 became more 
influential at the university, including the Faculty of Medicine, while some employees were 
subjected to increasing pressures concerning, inter alia, tenure, project supports, and 
administrative positions. In this vein, at least 40 academics and a number of physicians 
resigned from the university hospital, starting to work at the public hospital. The situation led 
                                                          
215 These may include higher-than-usual rates of commissions taken by lawyers from plaintiffs; lawyers’ 
preference for quick results through the commission over filing cases in courts for an indefinite process in case 
the commission undervalues the losses; lack of attention to the specificities of individual cases if a lawyer deals 
with too many applications ; and searches by lawyers to find potential applicants (based on my fieldwork as well 
as Yükseker 2008a; Kurban 2008).  
216 Fortunes were possible thanks to the concentration of applications in the hands of some lawyers (Kurban 
2008). Note that some lawyers from Diyarbakır took cases also from other Kurdish provinces. NGOs, as well as 
personal and familial networks, appear to be important in the distribution of applications. According to an EU 
progress report, a total of 2 billion Turkish liras was paid to applicants by 2010 (EC 2010). This appears to be a 
significant source of revenue for lawyers considering that the rate of commission charged by lawyers may vary 
between 10 and 25 per cent, in addition to the uneven distribution of applications. Accordingly, I was told by an 
outsider lawyer in Ankara that the profitable situation led to conflicts also among some competing lawyers in 
Diyarbakır. 
217 My interviews with Mehmet Emin Aktar (Diyarbakır, 25/03/2011) and Meral Danış Beştaş (Diyarbakır, 
28/04/2011).  
218 I was told by a few informants that different pious communities existed at the university: e.g. Gülen, Menzil 
and Yeni Asya communities (the second linked to the Nur order and the third to the Naqshbandi order; for brief 
background information on pious orders, the AKP and Kurdish electorate, see Ch. 3). 
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to associational efforts for involvement in the university’s affairs as an external democratic 
pressure, as elaborated in third section below.219 
The AKP government’s reform initiatives for healthcare also raised concerns among 
physicians. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the initiatives included the re-introduction of 
compulsory service for physicians, which in practice require employment mostly in the 
Kurdish region for its lack of medical staff; the introduction of performance criteria for 
physicians; and a law that aimed to prevent physicians’ concurrent employment in public and 
private sectors, which was recently annulled by the Constitutional Court. Especially the latter 
initiative has been a huge concern for physicians across the country. A concern more specific 
to Diyarbakır, on the other hand, has been the closure of several public hospitals in the city in 
the recent years.220 My interviewees from different political positions in the healthcare sector 
– including members of the government-friendly union for the healthcare sector, Sağlık-Sen 
(Memur-Sen affiliate) – expressed discontent with these policies. The discontent appears to 
contribute, even if partly, to the fact that the Medical Association has been run by a leadership 
which opposes the AKP government’s relevant policies, in addition to a supportive approach 
to the Kurdish movement. 
As mentioned before, liberalization in the healthcare sector also improved the situation for 
physicians. The number of private hospitals has been on the rise in Diyarbakır over the last 
decade, similar to the rest of the country. However, the shortage of physician supply in 
Diyarbakır, as well as the reluctance of physicians to work in the region, leads to higher 
salaries, even higher than those in the western parts of the country.221 The improvement of 
work conditions was interpreted by a previous associational leader as one reason behind the 
indifference of the membership to the electoral processes within the Medical Association.  
                                                          
219 See Dicle Üniversitesi İzleme Komisyonu, ‘Dicle Üniversitesi'nde neler oluyor?’ Radikal, 13/06/2010; ‘Dicle 
Üniversitesi Rektörü Saraç’a Tepki,’ Milliyet, 30/06/2009 and ‘YÖK Dekanı Görevden Aldı,’ Radikal, 
25/02/2010. It is told that healthcare personnel can be subjected to pressures also to transfer their membership to 
the Memur-Sen affiliate union in the sector. In some cases, the transfer of membership can be voluntary for the 
purpose of career advancement. Yet, note that physicians are not very active in the union scene; hence, the 
situation seems to concern other employees in the healthcare sector. 
220 The hospital for chest diseases and the SSK hospital were closed down (SSK hospitals – previously a part of 
the social insurance scheme for workers - were integrated to the Ministry of Health all around the country as a 
result of the 2006 Social Security Reform; however, while they were usually turned into public hospitals 
elsewhere, Diyarbakır’s hospital was closed down). The state hospital was first planned for moving out of the 
city, but this was canceled because of local opposition; it was then integrated to the research-and-education 
hospital. 
221 I heard salaries can go up to 60,000 Turkish liras a month and even more in case of surgeons of shortage 
branches. 
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Yet, private hospitals are not politics-free. Some hospitals have a local reputation as being 
close to political parties. This happens especially in relation with the owners of hospitals 
whereas employed physicians can be diverse in terms of political identity. For instance, the 
owner of a hospital which was told to be supportive of the AKP wanted to run as a candidate 
in the 2011 general elections on its tickets. Another hospital was told to be close to the pro-
Kurdish party: ‘patriotic’ physicians were told to be plenty among its employees while the 
party and the local municipalities could send some of the supporters to this hospital for 
medical treatment if deemed necessary. Here, events that took place at the hospital in summer 
2011 while I was in the city appear interesting for observing the ambiguous interplays of 
professional interest and collective identity politics. 
Firat News, a major online news portal supportive of the Kurdish movement, covered the 
layoff of a number of employees of this hospital, including physicians, right after the 2011 
general elections. With a reference to one of the Medical Association’s executives, the layoff 
was depicted as a political event: the employees in question were Kurdish ‘patriots,’ speaking 
Kurdish with patients, and the layoff was triggered by the discontent of the hospital 
management concerning this situation, as well as the discontent of AKP circles concerning the 
election results in Diyarbakır. It was further claimed that the hospital was linked to Galip 
Ensarioğlu, the previous leader of the Chamber and a new MP from the AKP (see Ch. 5; Firat 
News, 18/06/2011). However, soon the referred executive of the Association denied having 
made a comment about the political link, while the Association made a press statement in 
front of the hospital criticizing the layoff in terms of labor standards.222 Following this, I ran 
into a manager of the hospital by chance: he too rejected the political comments and instead 
depicted the layoff in managerial terms, adding the ongoing presence of ‘patriotic’ physicians 
as a supportive argument. Hence, what at first seemed to me like an intersection of 
professional and ethno-political disadvantages turned out to be a case in which there might be 
an appeal to identity politics to mobilize support for labor struggle. However, there is too 
much ambiguity about the event, as some physicians later I talked to support the claim that the 
layoff was somewhat politically motivated against some patriotic employees. The case 
indicates the complexity of local politics and the professional life embedded in it. 
Associational leaders need to take into account these dynamics, in addition to national 
politics. 
                                                          
222 I was present at the press statement (Diyarbakır, 20/06/2011). See also ‘Amed’de işten atılanlara destek’ 
Özgür Gündem, 21/06/2011, ‘Hastanedeki İşten Çıkarmalar Protesto Edildi’ Bianet, 21/06/2011, and ‘Alman 
Hastanesi İddasına Tekzip.’ Available online at http://www.diyarbakirhaber.gen.tr/haber-1809-Alman-
Hastanesi-Iddasina-Tekzip.html  
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6.3 Contemporary political activism 
The Bar and Medical Associations have become gradually more politicized in the new 
political environment of the 2000s. Both associations took part in joint activities that have 
intensified since 2005 to make pro-Kurdish rights claims and moderate the dual power 
contestation. The Bar has occupied a strategic location in this new environment, since laws 
and the judiciary system are important for the Kurdish issue. Hence, it appeared as a leading 
actor, in addition to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and business leaders. The 
Medical Association, on the other hand, appeared less in the mainstream media although it 
sometimes took a leading role too, albeit from an alternative perspective. This section focuses 
on political activism by these associations. First, I give major examples of the Bar’s shifting 
alignments, which depict it sometimes in harmony and sometimes in conflict with each 
political actor – the AKP government and the Kurdish movement. Second, I give major 
examples of activism by the Medical Association, which depicts it gradually siding with one 
of these political actors, that is, the Kurdish movement. 
The bar association between confrontation and cooperation 
In the AKP period, the Bar Association has been increasingly vocal concerning problems 
within and outside the legal arena. Sezgin Tanrıkulu, the Bar’s leader between 2002 and 2008, 
was a strong leader figure and took action either as an individual leader or in cooperation with 
other associations. Under his leadership the Bar made press statements and publicized reports 
concerning issues such as the following: proposals for general amnesty; problems seen in 
fight against torture and trials of accused officials; limits of the government’s legislative 
arrangements for enabling broadcasting in Kurdish language; politicization of the judiciary 
and its failure to bring justice to cases of organized crime targeting Kurds as well as negative 
effects of new legislations in criminal law on the right to free speech. Tanrıkulu himself also 
was faced with judicial investigations because he had calendars published for the Bar in both 
Turkish and Kurdish languages.223 Hence, the Bar either pointed at problems under the AKP 
rule or called the government for taking action. 
                                                          
223 See Chapter 3 for a broad of overview of mentioned events and the following for the press statements: ‘Baro 
başkanlarından genel af tasarısı,’ Bianet, 30/06/2003; ‘Diyarbakır Barosu’ndan “işkence raporu”’ Hürriyet, 
13/09/2004; ‘Baro dil yönetmeliğini yargıya taşıyor,’ Bianet, 26/01/2004; ‘Tanrıkulu yargı bağımsızlığı 
darmadağın,’ Bianet, 20/08/2004; ’Tanrıkulu: Sorun ideolojik bağımsızlık,’ Bianet, 07/09/2005; ‘Erdoğan’ın 
mesajı siyasi iaredeye dönüşmeli,’ Bianet, 10/08/2005. 
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Tanrıkulu was not totally critical of the AKP government. The Bar was included among 
Diyarbakır’s associations which made press statements supporting Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
2005 visit to Diyarbakır. Erdoğan gave a public speech there, acknowledging the mistakes 
historically done by the state with regard to the Kurdish issue and promising a solution 
through democratization. In this respect, Tanrıkulu admitted the accomplishments of the 
government on some reforms, while also emphasizing their limits and existing problems. He 
also supported the trial of Ergenekon – the organized crime network connected to the state 
and responsible for, inter alia, extrajudicial killings carried out in the Kurdish region under 
the Emergency Rule.224 
Tanrıkulu’s assertive leadership, however, was to bring him in open confrontation with Prime 
Minister Erdoğan. In April 2008, representatives from 15 associations of Diyarbakır visited 
Erdoğan in Ankara. The group included the leader of the Bar, in addition to those of the 
Chamber, the Medical Association, and voluntary business associations. They presented a 
report to the Prime Minister concerning political and economic measures for the Kurdish 
issue. In the meeting, Tanrıkulu emphasized that governments mostly prioritized economic 
measures over political measures. He also underlined the joint demands for education and 
public services in Kurdish language. As Erdoğan reacted negatively accusing him of making 
propaganda and lying, Tanrıkulu left the meeting.225 
Same year, Erdoğan made another visit to Diyarbakır where he had a meeting with 
associational representatives. However, the Bar Association, as well as the Medical 
Association and the Human Rights Association, did not participate in the meeting despite the 
official invitation, while business associations were present. This signaled the emerging 
cleavage among associations as well as different treatment by the political authorities. Hence, 
the associations which boycotted Erdoğan and were more assertive in making pro-Kurdish 
claims were not invited to the meeting then-Chief of the General Staff Başbuğ had with local 
representatives in his visit to Diyarbakır in the same year. Business associations, on the other 
hand, were again present. In the meeting, Başbuğ underlined economic measures against 
poverty and recruitment by the PKK. He also pointed at the ‘duties’ of associations in the 
fight against terror in relation with their organizational field, as well as the need for 
                                                          
224 See ‘Diyarbakır Barosu Başkanı Tarnıkulu’nun PKK’ye silah bıraktırma formülü,’ Rizgari, 04/05/2006 and 
‘Sezgin Tanrıkulu: “Kürtler Ergenekon’a tarafsız kalamaz,”’ Taraf, 21/07/2008.  
225 See ‘Diyarbakır Anlattı, Ankara Dinledi, Erdoğan Yine Duymak İstemedi,’ Bianet, 09/04/2008 and 
‘Diyarbakır Barosu’ndan Erdoğan’a cevap,’ Hürriyet, 12/04/2008.  
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coordination between the army and associations. Some other meetings held by Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and President Gül also prioritized business representatives.226 
Mehmet Emin Aktar, the successor of Tanrıkulu, pursued a somewhat different political 
approach during his leadership between 2008 and 2012. This period witnessed the change in 
the balance of power at the national level more evidently, as it evolved to the advantage of the 
AKP against secularist-nationalist bureaucratic elites (see Ch. 3). The AKP government, on 
the other hand, pursued ambiguous policies concerning the Kurdish issue: it continued with 
initiatives with a claim to solve the issue but also strengthened its Turkish nationalist rhetoric, 
summarized in Prime Minister Erdoğan’s variable motto of ‘one nation, one state, one flag 
(and one language).’ Add the fact that the Kurdish movement came under increasing 
repression in this period through judiciary means. While the Bar under Aktar’s leadership 
kept its historical mission of addressing problems in the legal arena, it took different positions 
vis-à-vis the AKP government and the Kurdish movement within this changing political 
context. Its interactions with the two political actors depicted shifting coalitions. Let’s 
consider examples for two trends. 
Aktar expressed support for the AKP government’s 2009 ‘democratic opening,’ as many 
organized actors within the Kurdish region and across the country did (see Ch. 3 and 4). By 
the opening, the government promised to take further initiatives as regards democratization, 
recognition of the Kurdish identity and regional economic problems, as a solution to the 
Kurdish issue. The government members also engaged in negotiations with organized actors 
in the country to generate public support. In this respect, Aktar pointed at what could be done 
in the short run for an improved use of Kurdish language in daily life and broadcasting, as 
well as the need to pause military operations by each side. He emphasized the demand for 
education in Kurdish language but as a goal for the mid/long run. He also took part in several 
joint press statements with associations from Diyarbakır, as well as bar associations from 
across the country, to promote a process of reform and negotiations as a part of the 
government’s opening claim (Bianet, 30/07/2009 and 18/01/2010). The Diyarbakır Bar under 
Aktar’s leadership also arranged several workshops and publicized proposals for legal and 
constitutional reforms (see Diyarbakır-Barosu-Başkanlığı 2009; Diyarbakır-Barosu-
Başkanlığı 2012; Diyarınsesi, 19/11/2011). 
                                                          
226 See ‘Başbuğ Diyarbakır'da konuştu; seçtiği STK'lerden destek istedi,’ Bianet, 05/09/2008 and ‘"Başbuğ 
Siyasetin Her Alanına Müdahale Etmek Niyetinde,’ Bianet, 05/09/2008. 
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In the last years, the constitution has been one of the major sources of controversy in Turkey. 
The 2010 Constitutional Referendum led to serious polarization and disagreements across the 
country as well as among Kurdish organized actors. The AKP government depicted the 
amendments as a step to further democratization and against the military guardianship. It was 
actually a package of quite diverse articles; yet, the government emphasized those such as the 
removal of immunity previously recognized to the generals of the 1980 coup, which had 
prepared the constitution in question (see Ch. 3). As described in previous chapter, Kurdish 
business actors called for voting in favor of the referendum, as opposed to the boycott call by 
the Kurdish movement for its neglect of pro-Kurdish demands. Aktar too joined the former 
coalition by publicly stating his support for the amendments. He argued that the 1982 
Constitution should change completely and even if the amendments were not enough they still 
targeted an important part of the constitution (Sabah, 11/07/2010; see also Ch. 3 on the 
amendments). 
Aktar’s increasingly pro-AKP appearance, however, led to reactions from the Kurdish 
movement. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Aktar was targeted in a mass demonstration 
that took place in Diyarbakır in 2010 in support of the proposal of democratic autonomy. 
National newspapers highlighted a big placard from this demonstration: it said that ‘Kurdish 
people wants democratic autonomy, rather than becoming collaborators of the AKP, like 
Galip Ensarioğlu and Emin Aktar are’ (Milliyet, 29/12/2010).227 As mentioned above, there 
were also rumors that he wanted to run as a candidate for the 2011 general elections on the 
tickets of the AKP. In the end, he did not. And he got increasingly engaged in activities 
critical of the AKP government and supportive of the Kurdish movement. 
Aktar was already raising some concerns about political and judiciary events throughout his 
leadership. He criticized the closure of the pro-Kurdish party DTP, as well as the detention of 
Kurdish local politicians and activists in KCK operations, for closing legal political channels 
and risking opening up the space for violent methods. He also argued that there was a 
violation of human rights and laws in the way detentions occurred. Accordingly, he was 
involved in joint press statements by Diyarbakır’s associations, including all the other local 
interest associations examined here, to call for the release of Kurdish politicians and human 
rights activists.228 
                                                          
227 The indictment concerning the lawyers detained in the KCK operations also claims that the PKK’s leader 
Öcalan threatened Mehmet Emin Aktar (see TC 2012).  
228 See Bianet, 15/04/2009, 12/12/2009, 24/12/2009, 28/12/2009 and 11/01/2010. 
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However, Aktar’s critical tone got stronger from 2011 onwards. Two interconnected factors 
seem influential in this: first, the government has not done much in the legal arena as regards 
its democratic opening but rather increased its nationalist rhetoric, as also argued by Aktar in 
an interview (Taraf, 06/06/2011; also see Ch. 3). Second, the repression of the Kurdish 
movement increased. KCK operations have been going on, as several police raids took place 
in different cities, leading to the detention of thousands at total. As mentioned before, serious 
problems followed: long pre-trial detentions, problematical indictments and courts’ rejection 
of the demand to make defense in Kurdish language, something that further postponed 
defenses. Furthermore, right before the 2011 general elections, the Supreme Board of 
Elections attempted to prevent some pro-Kurdish candidates from running in elections, 
contributing to tensions, while the Kurdish movement had been engaging in civil 
disobedience in Diyarbakır to protest the KCK operations and to press for pro-Kurdish 
demands (Bianet, 23/03/2011). 
In political terms, Aktar interpreted the events in the judiciary-police realm as an intervention 
to Kurds’ right to engage in legal politics, describing the KCK as an effort of the PKK for 
legalization. In professional terms, he pointed at unlawful measures and the violation of the 
right to fair trial. The Bar also joined the protests concerning the KCK trials in Diyarbakır: as 
mentioned in previous section, defendants did not attend some trials in 2011 as a protest since 
their request for defending themselves in Kurdish language was rejected and they were taken 
to trials in groups, making individualized defense difficult. This was followed by lawyers’ 
boycotting of trials. As the court asked the Bar to appoint new lawyers instead, the Bar 
resisted this request as a protest to the violation of defendants’ right to fair trial, as well as 
violation of the law. As a result, the Bar was faced with judicial complaints. However, 
problems facing Kurdish lawyers reached a peak level when lawyers of Abdullah Öcalan were 
included among the targets of KCK operations in late 2011: more than 30 lawyers have been 
detained since then and put on trial on the grounds of roles they allegedly played to enable 
communication between Öcalan and the PKK. The Diyarbakır Bar’s leader Aktar and 
lawyers, as well as leaders from the peak association and other provincial bar associations, 
protested the detention of lawyers.229 
The most severe hit came with the Uludere-Roboskî incident in December 2011: Turkish jets 
fired at a group of smugglers near the Turkish-Iraqi border, leading to the killing of 34 
                                                          
229 See, for instance, Taraf, 27/12/2010 and 06/06/2011; Bianet, 12/07/2011 and 10/08/2011; Radikal, 
04/08/2011, 25/11/2011, 07/12/2011; Firat News, 23/11/2011.  
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civilians, some under age, and the government accepted no responsibility arguing that the 
strike was based on information that they could be PKK guerillas (see Ch. 3). Bar associations 
from the Kurdish region, including the Diyarbakır Bar, prepared reports and argued that there 
was strong evidence that the bombing was intentional (see Diyarbakır-Barosu-Başkanlığı 
2012: 666-674). 
Against the background of a history of extrajudicial killings and bombing of villages by 
Turkish security forces and the resistance of the AKP government to accept responsibility, the 
Roboskî incident marked an important point in the process in that even Kurds supporting the 
AKP started to get critical.230 Halit Advan, a previous executive member of the Diyarbakır 
Bar and then-chairperson of the AKP’s headquarters for Diyarbakır, stated to a national daily 
that pious Kurds voted more for the pro-Kurdish party rather than the AKP because of the 
history of the state violence against Kurds. Note that Prime Minister Erdoğan often accused 
the Kurdish movement’s members of being religiously ‘perverse,’ while trying to articulate 
Kurds to its constituency under a theme of religious fraternity. In his statement, Advan also 
referred to the Roboskî incident emphasizing the need to find who is responsible for the 
massacre, while criticizing judicial bureaucrats’ approach to Kurdish language in their 
handling of KCK trials. As these drew the reaction of Prime Minister Erdoğan, Advan 
resigned.231 
Finally, note that the leaders of the Diyarbakır Bar supported common pro-Kurdish demands 
such as the right to education in Kurdish language and devolution of power to local 
governments. The Bar also took part in the founding platform for Sarmaşık, in addition to 
giving away some donation. Although both leaders in the recent period appear to be 
somewhat distanced to the Kurdish movement, they gave support to the movement in case of 
unlawful and unfair treatment of its members. 
Professional and political discontent of the medical association 
                                                          
230 The KCK operations were a previous trigger for this, see Neşe Düzel’s interview with Mehmet Emin Aktar, 
‘Emin Aktar: Kürtler ilk kez Öcalan’ı tartışıyor,’ Taraf, 27/12/2010.  
231 See Taraf, 30/11/2012; Radikal, 06/12/2012; Birgün, 16/12/2012. There are other indicators for the loss of 
trust for the AKP government among pious Kurds. A Kurdish journalist, who wrote for the pro-government daily 
Yeni Şafak, also lost his job since he criticized the AKP goverment because of its resistance to apologize for the 
incident. In an interview done by Ruşen Çakır, Akel points at a rising cleavage between pious Kurds and pious 
Turks (see ‘Söyleşi: Türk ve Kürt İslamcıların yolları hızla ayrılıyor - Ali Akel,’ Vatan, 30/11/2012). In this 
regard, the Mazlum-Der, a human rights association led by the pious, also increasingly criticized the government 
with regard to its Kurdish policy as well as other anti-democratic policies. See, for instance, Neşe Düzel’s 
interview with the Mazlum-Der leader, ‘Faruk Ünsal: KCK’lıları Karadeniz’e gönderiyorlar,’ Taraf, 23/01/2012.  
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In the AKP period, the Medical Association too has been increasingly vocal concerning 
problems within and outside the professional field. As mentioned before, the leader turnover 
at the association has been higher while its leaders were not as visible as the leaders of the Bar 
and business associations in the national media. This does not mean that the Medical 
Association was less active than them but it has not occupied a strategic location. This 
appears to do with, on the one hand, the less significance the medical field has in the 
definition of the Kurdish issue, as opposed to the legal and the economic fields the other 
associations are concerned with. There is, on the other hand, the Medical Association’s 
approach to the government, which came to be more openly critical by the time. 
The association was involved in numerous joint initiatives taken in cooperation with the other 
associations for pro-Kurdish common demands and concerns, as described before. In addition 
to this, we see two axes of activism by the association. One, the Medical Association raised 
concerns about professional issues facing its membership and patients. This happened to a 
degree more than, say, the engagement of the Bar Association for its own membership. Two, 
the Medical Association took steps concerning major political events such as elections and the 
2010 referendum in a way supportive of the Kurdish movement and in opposition to the AKP 
government.  
Professional concerns related to dynamics at both national and local levels. As outlined 
before, the AKP government’s policies concerning the healthcare sector received opposition 
from physicians as well as the peak association TTB (see §2 above, Ch. 3 and 4). Diyarbakır’s 
Medical Association also expressed discontent and organized several protests against, inter 
alia, the reform of social security system; the legislation attempt to prevent physicians’ 
concurrent employment in public and private sectors; the introduction of performance criteria 
for physicians; and some other legal arrangements concerning re-appointments in the public 
sector.232 
As to local topics which caused discontent, the closure of several public hospitals in the last 
decade was mentioned in previous section. In addition, the association led a platform which 
was founded in 2009 to observe changing political dynamics at Diyarbakır’s Dicle University 
and its consequences for employees including those in the Faculty of Medicine as well as the 
university hospital. In 2008, President Abdullah Gül appointed as rector Prof. Ayşe Jale 
                                                          
232 See, for instance, ‘Doktorlar: başımıza çuval geçirmeyin,’ Radikal, 31/01/2007; ‘Diyarbakır Tabipler Odası 
yürüyüşü,’ Diyarınsesi, 15/03/2009; ‘Sağlıkçılar Diyarbakır’da mitinge hazırlanıyor,’ Diyarbakır Haber, 
22/02/2011. The last legal arrangement about the public sector re-appointments is the so-called torba yasa.  
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Saraç, who had run as a candidate for the 2007 national elections on the tickets of the AKP. 
What seemed problematic to some locals was not only her appointment despite the lower 
votes she got in the nomination elections within the university but also the events that took 
place in the university under her rule. Several employees of the university experienced 
difficulties concerning, inter alia, tenure and administrative issues, and at least 40 academics 
and physicians resigned from their jobs. Pious groups, on the other hand, are told to have 
become stronger in the university (see §2 above). 
The platform argued that the new university management tried to send some of the existing 
academics away from the university and hired new academics on the basis of ‘ideological 
criteria.’ A press release by the platform interpreted the situation as the following: ‘in the 
previous period, it was enough to be committed to Kemalist principles as a criterion; in the 
new period, the only criterion is to have organic links to certain (pious) communities.’ This 
criticism, hence, also concerned the democratization problem as regard the AKP rule and its 
recent grip of the Board of Higher Education: ‘the problem is that this anti-democratic 
institution (the Board) shaped by the September 12 (coup d’état) mentality is preserved as it 
is. However, it seems like what the AKP government saw as a problem was not this institution 
itself, but rather with which ideology it was controlled.’233 
In addition to the Medical Association, the platform included local associations such as the 
Bar and the KESK-affiliate unions for healthcare and education sectors. The Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry also was involved in the very beginning but its leader later avoided 
attendance in activities such as attempts to meet the rector. According to a former executive 
of the Medical Association I talked to, the Chamber’s leader acted so because of the 
platform’s anti-government appearance, whereas the then leader Ensarioğlu was increasingly 
aligning with the government to become an MP on its tickets later (see Ch. 5). However, such 
an appearance and potential conflicts that would come with it did not scare the Medical 
Association away from taking a leading role in the platform. 
The Medical Association also engaged in activities concerning patients and the general 
population. From the earlier times, it made efforts to find solutions against the language 
barrier between physicians and patients and demanded healthcare services in Kurdish 
                                                          
233 My translation. For the release, see Dicle Üniversitesi İzleme Komisyonu, ‘Dicle Üniversitesi'nde neler 
oluyor?’ Radikal, 13/06/2010. Also see ‘Dicle Üniversitesi Rektörü Saraç’a Tepki,’ Milliyet, 30/06/2009. An 
elaboration on the Board of Higher Education is beyond the scope this discussion; as it is referred in this this 
example, it is just an example of the growing power of the AKP government and the aligned religious 
communities to replace Kemalist elites, as described in Chapter 3. 
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language. As the political environment became more conducive to debates about the Kurdish 
issue, the association organized medical conferences and published a guide for learning the 
medical history of patients in Kurdish language by 2009, with a support from the peak 
association TTB.234 In a similar vein, the Medical Association also was involved in 
committees with the Bar and human rights organizations to prepare expert reports on 
politically significant incidents that victimized Kurdish civilians.235 In other words, the 
Medical Association has kept its engagement in human rights activism. 
As to party politics and the Kurdish issue, the leader of the Medical Association welcomed 
the AKP government’s initiative in 2005, as the other associations did (Bianet, 09/08/2005 
and 19/08/2005). On other occasions as well, the leaders of the Medical Association made 
supportive statements for the AKP government’s initiatives such as the 2009 democratic 
opening as well as President Abdullah Gül’s visit to Diyarbakır in 2010, seeing them as 
potential steps to take action for a solution (Zaman, 07/11/2009; Radikal, 30/12/2010). They 
took part in joint press statements to decrease political tensions by, say, calling an end to 
armed conflicts and calling the MPs of the pro-Kurdish party DTP to give up on the idea of 
leaving the national parliament as a protest when the party was closed by the Constitutional 
Court in 2009 (Radikal, 10/10/2007, 16/12/2009, and 21/07/2010, see also Ch. 2).  
However, as the AKP government oscillated between initiatives for a solution to the Kurdish 
issue and repressive measures on the Kurdish movement (see Ch. 3), the Medical Association 
came to be more distanced to the government. As the Bar Association’s leader Tanrıkulu was 
responded aggressively by Prime Minister Erdoğan in a meeting in 2008 (see above), the then 
leader of Medical Association Selçuk Mızraklı followed Tanrıkulu and did not participate in 
Erdoğan’s next meeting with associational representatives in Diyarbakır in the same year 
although they were invited. This was interpreted in the media as a boycott (Taraf, 
22/10/2008). On the other hand, the same associational leaders were not invited to a meeting 
the Chief of General Staff had in Diyarbakır with local actors such as business leaders 
(Radikal, 06/09/2008).  
                                                          
234 The then Minister of Health Recep Akdağ also stated that they might find a mechanism to employ Kurdish-
speaking personnel in areas where Turkish is not widely spoken (Bianet, 22/05/2009) and the Diyarbakır 
Medical Association responded with an offer of help on this. For the Medical Association’s mentioned efforts , 
see Radikal, 07/12/2002 and 03/11/2003 for the earlier period and Radikal, 21/03/2009; Bianet, 23/10/2009; 
Hürriyet, 15/10/2010 for the recent period, as well as the Kurdish guide by Bülbül/Bülbül/Avcıkıran (2011).  
235 See, for instance, the press coverage ‘Ceylan keşke batıda, ağaçta kalan kedi olsaydı,’ Radikal, 04/10/2009; 
‘Taş atan çocuklar konusunda çarpıcı rapor,’ Radikal, 22/07/2011. 
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In an interview right after Erdoğan’s visit in 2008, Selçuk Mızraklı expressed his 
disappointment about the AKP government.236 He said that he did not find the government 
sincere in his approach to the Kurdish issue and interpreted its ‘maneuvers’ as aiming to 
increase its political prestige. He also explained the Kurdish electorate’s support for the AKP 
in the 2007 general elections as a reaction to the conflicts the AKP government had with 
Kemalist bureaucratic elites in which the AKP appeared as ‘dissident’ (see Ch. 3). He also 
added the strong Turkish-nationalist approaches of other political parties against the Kurdish 
issue. However, Mızraklı argued that the government came to reconcile with Kemalist elites 
following the trial process for the Şemdinli incident.237 Note that things turned out to be quite 
different though, as the AKP government and its allies waged a war against the bureaucratic 
elites. While the political instability pursued, the associational leaders kept raising their 
concerns and criticizing the government for events such as the persecution of children 
demonstrators according to the Anti-Terror Law, as well as KCK operations.238 
The Medical Association gave open support for the Kurdish movement on major political 
events. The leaders supported the electoral left-wing blocs, which included largely the 
candidates of the pro-Kurdish parties in the 2009 local elections and the 2011 general 
elections.239 The then leader of the Association Şemsettin Koç explained his support to the 
bloc in 2011 with the need for democratization. He stated that the process was denying the 
right to speak, to have a defense in courts (giving the example of KCK trials) and to give 
healthcare services in mother language. Koç also had supported the call of the Kurdish 
movement to boycott the 2010 referendum, advocating a completely new democratic 
constitution instead.240 
                                                          
236 See the interview by Şahin Artan and Yusuf Sami Solmaz, ‘Yanlış Hesap Diyarbakır'dan Döner,’ reproduced 
in Bianet, 11/11/2008.  
237 As described also in Chapter 3, a bookstore was bombed in Şemdinli (southeastern Turkey) in 2005, leading 
to one death. The local court found two gendarmerie officers and one PKK defector who now became an 
informer responsible for the bombing. The Land Forces Commander of the time publicly expressed his support 
for the accused and later the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors dismissed the prosecutor who had 
included accusations against high-ranking commanders in the indictment concerning the bombing (EC 2007). 
238 For the events, see Chapter 3 and for the press coverage of the Association’s take on the events, see 
‘Güneydoğu’da sivil toplum harekete geçti,’ Radikal, 16/12/2009; ‘Güneydoğulu doktorlar iktidarı ikiyüzlülükle 
suçladı,’ Radikal, 06/06/2010; ‘Diyarbakır’ın ihtiyacı propaganda değil, barış taahhüdü,’ Bianet, 02/09/2010; 
and ‘Diyarbakır’da KCK tutuklularının serbest bırakılması istendi,’ Fıratnews, 04/12/2011.  
239 See ‘Diyarbakır’da 32 kurumdan DTP’ye açık destek,’ Firatnews, 11/03/2009 and ‘Amed’de sendikalar 
Emek Bloğu’nu destekliyor,’ Diyarbakır Haber, 28/05/2011. Also see Chapter 2 on the elections.  
240 See ‘Referandumu Boykot Çağrısının Tam Metni ve İmzacılar,’ Bianet, 30/07/2010.  
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Indeed, these initiatives indicated a bloc alternative to the one led by the business associations 
and the Bar outlined previously: these were joint initiatives the Medical Association had with 
left-wing organizations at the local level including the labor union affiliates of the KESK and 
the DİSK. Note that respective peak associations also cooperate closely, as mentioned in 
Chapter 4. These efforts for campaigning in support of the Kurdish movement, however, 
received less attention from the mainstream media, in contrast to the efforts of the Bar and the 
business associations in favor of, say, the referendum. 
Overall, the Medical Association’s leaders in the recent period supported pro-Kurdish 
demands in common, such as the right to education in Kurdish language, constitutional 
reforms, and strengthening of local governments. The association also was involved in the 
founding platform for the Sarmaşık philanthropic association, supporting it with a 
contribution (see Ch. 2 and 4 on the association). However, such pro-Kurdish movement 
activities have been risky for associational leadership, as seen in the trial of a previous leader 
Selçuk Mızraklı. Mızraklı was involved in the organization committee for a demonstration 
that took place in Diyarbakır in 2009, with the slogan ‘Yes to Peace with Dignity.’ The 
committee included also other associational leaders such as business and union leaders (see 
Ch. 5 and 7). Because of slogans made by demonstrators, the committee members were put on 
trial under the Anti-Terror Law and convicted of making propaganda for the PKK.  
Conclusions 
As the Bar and Medical Associations increased their political activities in the post-2005, they 
cooperated with other interest associations, taking part in encompassing coalitions. These 
were grounded on the basis of common concerns about the conflict situation, as well as pro-
Kurdish common demands. The Bar Association occupied a strategic location thanks to the 
centrality of legal issues to the definition and practice of the Kurdish issue. Hence, its leaders 
became prominent public figures, frequently appearing in the media and usually pursuing a 
balanced approach vis-à-vis the dual power contestation, giving support to both the Kurdish 
movement and the AKP government on special occasions, while also having tensions with 
each from time to time. In this regard, the Bar’s strategy appeared somewhat similar to that of 
the Chamber. The Bar also joined the business leaders in a narrow coalition to support the 
government for the 2010 referendum. Yet, it was to get farther away from the government and 
closer to the Kurdish movement with the changing political context. As the Bar played an 
important role in the associational activism, it turned into a contested site in which the AKP 
and the Kurdish movement competed for influencing the associational electoral processes as 
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well as leaderships, hence, contributing to the shifts in alignment. On the other hand, activism 
by the Bar and lawyers played an important role in pressing for pro-Kurdish rights claims in 
the legal arena, such as the right to have defense in Kurdish language in courts, a demand 
articulated by the Kurdish movement.  
The Medical Association regularly took part in joint associational activities; however, it 
appeared as a relatively secondary actor. It also had less visibility in the mainstream media. 
This should be partly because healthcare issues are not as central to the Kurdish issue as legal 
issues are. Another reason, however, seems to be the association’s opposition to the 
government on two fronts: the first one concerns the government’s policy initiatives 
concerning the healthcare sector, especially with regard to the working conditions of 
physicians, whom were discontented as a result. The second concerns political issues: 
although associational leaders supported the government’s promises to bring a solution to the 
Kurdish issue, disappointments were increasingly expressed by the time, leading to the open 
support to the pro-Kurdish parties in last two elections as well as support for the boycott call 
on the 2010 referendum. In this vein, the association acted in cooperation with the labor 
unions from the municipal sector and other left-wing associations, forming a bloc alternative 
to the business-led coalition. This, however, did not receive much attention from the national 
media, unlike its counterpart. In the end, the Medical Association did not turn into a contested 
site unlike the Bar Association or the Chamber and took a more coherent political stance over 
the time.  
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Chapter 7: Labor unions 
Labor unions which are organized in the municipal sector were already active in political 
struggles in the 1990s. However, the following decade put them under completely different 
conditions. Their comrades from the 1990s became their employers, as the pro-Kurdish 
parties started ruling the municipal governments in the region. However, they were to rule 
under strict pressures by the AKP government, who tried hard to win Kurdish municipalities 
in Diyarbakır with appeals to, inter alia, ‘service’ politics (promising economic development 
and better municipal services), as opposed to the Kurdish movement’s ‘identity politics.’ 
Against this background, the unions took part in various political activities, playing roles in 
the formation of diverse coalitions vis-à-vis the contestation of the state. They also engaged in 
activities of interest representation, carrying out collective bargaining under extraordinary 
conditions. This chapter examines the activities by the labor unions, looking at how they dealt 
with the cross-pressures of economic interests and collective-identity politics. 
First, I give an overview of the associational environment. I start with a brief historical 
background of unionism in the city and then describe the changing environment of the 
municipal sector as a result of the repeated election of pro-Kurdish parties, as well as the AKP 
government’s counter-activities. I also specify the unions currently organized in the sector, 
outlining some organizational properties, as well as constraints they are faced with. Second, I 
elaborate on the major dynamics in the membership environment. Here, I remind the reader 
the consequences of liberalization processes and the armed conflict for the local labor force. 
In addition, I point at the political pressures that targeted municipal employees especially via 
KCK operations. Third, I examine the patterns of interaction between the unions and the 
political actors. I first take into account the processes of collective bargaining, which reflect 
the impact of dynamics mentioned in the first two sections, arriving at a compromise. I then 
elaborate on political activism by the unionists and their memberships, which oscillated 
between intragroup encompassing coalitions and alternative narrow coalitions in cooperation 
with the Kurdish movement. I conclude with a general analysis. 
7.1 Unionism in the municipality sector  
This section gives background information to understand contemporary unionism in 
Diyarbakır’s municipal sector. I first mention how unionists were faced with political 
repression in the post-1980 period and then give an overview of the 2000s, focusing on two 
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major dynamics relevant for union activities: the repeated election of pro-Kurdish political 
parties to municipal office in the Kurdish region since 1999 and the challenges posed by the 
AKP against these municipalities. Finally, I specify the unions under scrutiny, providing 
details about formal and informal rules underlining their structure and modus operandi. 
A brief historical background 
The armed conflict in the 1990s made labor unions in Diyarbakır more political as well. 
Unions formed the Democracy Platform, along with the Bar and Medical Associations, to 
raise concerns about human rights violations and make democratic claims. They would 
prepare reports on politically significant incidents and make press releases or participate in 
demonstrations (Diken 2001: 167-173). However, they were faced with various difficulties. 
For instance, when unionists, including those from the municipal sector, decided to participate 
in a demonstration for peace, alongside the pro-Kurdish party of the time HADEP, they were 
taken into custody by the police on the grounds that it was allegedly organized by the PKK 
(Milliyet, 01/09/1997). It seems like political repression targeted union representatives and 
members more often than, say, business and professional associations examined in the 
previous chapters, while repression took diverse forms such as detentions, judicial 
investigations, difficulties in promotion, exiles to other provinces, and extrajudicial killings.  
The 1990s also witnessed unionization efforts in the public sector. As detailed in Chapter 4, 
unions were being formed in the public sector since 1990 thanks to the legal void, although 
they were not officially recognized until 2001 (KESK 2010; Üzüm 2011). In Diyarbakır, it 
was the affiliate unions of the left-leaning confederation KESK that have been more active 
and successful in efforts for the organization of public employees, especially in the sectors of 
healthcare, education and municipal services. However, union representatives and members 
were subjected to severe political repression, while unions were faced with judicial 
difficulties, including closure threats (Diken 2001: 176-180; Çelik, Abdullah 2010).241  
The municipal governments in the city were run by the Islamist Welfare Party (see Ch. 3) 
between 1994 and 1999. The Workers’ Union for Municipalities and General Services in 
Turkey (Türkiye Belediyeler ve Genel Hizmetler İşçileri Sendikası – Belediye-İş) has been the 
leading actor among workers’ unions in the sector until it recently lost some of its 
membership to the Union for General Services Workers of Turkey (Türkiye Genel Hizmetler 
                                                          
241 Also based on my interviews with past and present local representatives of KESK-affiliated unions such as 
Tüm-Bel-Sen (municipality sector), SES (healthcare sector), and Eğitim-Sen (education sector) in Diyarbakır. 
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İşçileri Sendikası – Genel-İş).242 As for civil servants, the Union for Laborers of All 
Municipal and Local Administrative Services (Tüm Belediye ve Yerel Yönetim Hizmetleri 
Emekçileri Sendikası – Tüm-Bel-Sen) has been gradually central to their organization. I will 
come back to these unions below, but here let’s note that the 1990s witnessed occasional 
tensions between the unions and the municipal governments, especially concerning the 
payment of wages (Milliyet, 14/02/1996 and 31/12/1997). Union representatives, on the other 
hand, have had common political concerns and taken joint actions within the Democratic 
Platform mentioned above, despite their competition with each other and affiliation with 
confederations of diverse ideologies at the national level (that is, TÜRK-İŞ and DİSK/KESK, 
see the subsection after). Local conditions, namely, the Kurdish issue, have not only led 
competing union actors in Diyarbakır to converge to some degree, but also required peak 
associations to ‘tolerate’ divergences between the local and the central if they wanted to get 
organized in the region. On the other hand, the election of pro-Kurdish parties to municipal 
government would change the configuration of power and make the political alignment of 
local labor unions more complicated.  
Changing municipal environment in the 2000s 
In the 1999 municipal elections, the pro-Kurdish party HADEP won 37 offices in eastern and 
southeastern regions, including municipalities in Diyarbakır city. This event set the beginning 
of the Kurdish local rule, which was consolidated in the elections of 2004 and 2009 in spite of 
challenges by the AKP (see Table 2.5). Against the background of exclusion from 
parliamentary politics till 2007, municipal offices opened up a legal space for the Kurdish 
movement to reclaim Kurdish identity and to stand for Kurds. For instance, foreign 
representatives from the EU and Western countries visited Diyarbakır increasingly from 1999 
onward to meet, inter alia, municipal officials and to learn about the situation of the Kurdish 
region. Annual progress reports by the European Commission concerning Turkey’s candidacy 
process showed influences of these meetings (see Ch. 3 and Watts 2010). Furthermore, pro-
Kurdish mayors have engaged in some political activities and provided some municipal 
services in line with the political goals of the Kurdish movement. These aimed, inter alia, to 
enable the use of Kurdish language in the public sphere; highlight ethnic identity and local 
                                                          
242 Genel-İş’s branch in Diyarbakır was founded in 2010. The union also had been active in the city before, 
although it had to freeze its activities between 1980 and 1992 as a result of the 1980 coup (for more information, 
see the subsection after). Note that unions have to acquire a certain number of members in order to be eligible to 
open a branch in a city. Until they achieve the required size of membership, they may have a representative 
office instead. 
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history (Gambetti 2009; Watts 2010); promote different social norms, as well as intra-group 
solidarity (e.g. Sarmaşık philanthropy association, see §3 below and Ch. 2). 
In this regard, the local rule by pro-Kurdish political parties has contributed to the emerging 
situation of dual power, as outlined in Chapter 2. It played a role in the political representation 
of Kurds and paved the way for the proposal of ‘democratic autonomy’ in the 2000s, as pro-
Kurdish mayors claimed an alternative model of local government, which was more 
participatory and responsive to local needs (BDP N/A; also see Ch. 2). Furthermore, the 
repeated election to the local office indicated social support for the Kurdish movement. Note 
that local elections in Turkey are usually thought to follow a different logic than that of 
national elections, as factors such as popularity of individual candidates for mayorship and 
concerns about the quality of municipal services may override partisanship. However, it has 
been the opposite in the Kurdish context to date: political commitments appear to be more 
important than the quality of municipal services.243 This has been so against the background 
of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s repeated emphases on ‘service’ over ‘identity’ to win Diyarbakır 
in local elections. For instance, during his visit to Diyarbakır in 2008, Erdoğan stated that 
‘infrastructure does not improve by engaging in identity politics,’ drawing attention to 
uncollected garbage in streets, as he often did when he visited Kurdish provinces (Radikal, 
21/10/2008; see also Ch. 3). 
Erdoğan’s efforts were to fail in winning the local elections in Diyarbakır but contribute to the 
symbolical importance of Kurdish local rule. On the road to the 2009 local elections, Mayor 
of the Metropolitan Municipality, Osman Baydemir, defined Diyarbakır as ‘the fortress’ 
which was ‘not to fall down’ (Milliyet, 03/09/2007). On another occasion, the Mayor said: ‘if 
the municipality succeeds, it means the BDP can succeed politically. In order for the BDP to 
succeed politically, Osman Baydemir needs to succeed. On the day we lose municipalities 
they will say “the Kurdish issue is over”’ (Milliyet, 30/04/2012). Hence, occupying such an 
important position since 2004 and being a charismatic leader, Mayor Baydemir also came to 
                                                          
243 This is based on my observations in Diyarbakir. Many locals I talked to found the municipal services lacking; 
some said that they were better than in the past, but also noted that they could be better. In a similar vein, one 
local who is supportive of the AKP government even told me that the province would be in a better situation if 
the Kurdish movement was not acting ‘like that.’ I also heard some locals supportive of the Kurdish movement 
contrasting the situation of Diyarbakır with neighbor province Urfa which has given a larger electoral support to 
the AKP in national elections and quickly developed in the recent years according to locals. Note this is a 
perception of locals, not necessarily an actual causality.  
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be a significant figure in the national political arena.244 Yet, Baydemir, as well as other pro-
Kurdish mayors, was to be faced with various difficulties in running the municipalities. 
The municipal environment has been changing nationwide. Since the 1980s, municipalities 
have enjoyed an increasing autonomy, financial resources, and socio-economic powers 
(Erder/İncioğlu 2008; Bayraktar 2007; Buğra/Savaşkan 2010). Nevertheless, pro-Kurdish 
municipalities have encountered several obstacles to enjoy these new powers. Municipal 
officials complained about ‘negative discrimination’ by the government, concerning the 
allocation of resources (Milliyet, 03/09/2007, see also Watts 2006). The AKP government’s 
then Minister of Justice, Mehmet Ali Şahin, validated this claim before the 2009 local 
elections apparently to influence electoral behavior: Şahin said that municipalities who fight 
with or contradict the government cannot have all of their projects approved in Ankara 
(Milliyet, 23/02/2009). Official statistics also show that provinces under the AKP rule 
received more from the centrally-allocated EU funds for social projects, as elaborated in 
Chapter 3. 
Obstacles concern not only the access to resources, but also the creation and redistribution of 
resources. The poverty-alleviation projects of municipalities run by the pro-Kurdish party 
were faced with judicial obstacles, while other municipalities, especially those of the AKP, 
have been playing a significant role in this arena (see Ch. 2 and 3). For instance, the Sarmaşık 
Association had been founded by the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality to fight poverty. 
It appeared as an alternative to the relevant activities by the AKP circles, which seemed both 
demeaning and aiming to influence electoral behavior, whereas Sarmaşık emphasized a more 
respectful approach as well as intra-group solidarity.245 However, Sarmaşık was closed by a 
court decision and had to be re-founded later by a platform of local associational actors, 
including labor unions, again under the leadership of the municipality. In addition, the 
DİYAR A.Ş., a company founded by the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, had to be 
                                                          
244 Note that municipal rules tend to be centered on mayors. This is especially the case with Metropolitan 
Municipalities, which enjoy a hierarchical relationship with district municipalities, and the mayors of 
Metropolitan Municipalities occupy a dominant role in this relationship (see Erder/İncioğlu 2008). In Diyarbakır, 
as both the Metropolitan Municipality and the four municipalities in the city are ruled by the members of the pro-
Kurdish party, they appear to have harmonious relations and, as I was told, have regular frequent meetings for 
the coordination of municipal affairs. Back to Osman Baydemir, as he mentioned in Chapter 5 he is a lawyer by 
profession and used to be the president of the Human Rights Association before getting elected for mayorship. 
He has also a background of religuous education, occasionally using religious references in his speeches. 
245 Former poverty-alleaviation activities were found demeaning because they mostly focused on a limited range 
of in-kind aids on an irregular and badly-organized manner, sometimes leading to crowds throng to the allocation 
scene. Alternatively, Sarmaşık uses food-banks so that aid recipients go and pick up whatever they need using 
their stamps. As to the promotion of intra-group solidarity, it stems from both the rhetoric and the financing 
method based on donations from various segments of local society (see below and Ch. 2). 
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privatized although it has been recently common for municipalities across the country to 
establish enterprises for the provision of local services and, hence, to have additional sources 
of income.246 The company has been subjected to judicial investigation because of alleged 
links to the PKK in the process of KCK operations (see Ch. 3). 
Hence, there have been more direct pressures too. Since the 1999 local elections, mayors and 
staff of municipalities run by pro-Kurdish parties have been subjected to periodic judicial 
investigations and detentions. ‘Investigations and charges were largely based on three main 
types of alleged violation: misuse of office; . . . violations of the political party laws 
concerning Kurdish language use; and aiding, encouraging or belonging to the PKK’ (Watts 
2010: 115). These pressures increased following the 2009 local elections. Recurring mass 
arrests occurred under the label of KCK operations, which targeted the civilian wing of the 
Kurdish movement on the grounds of alleged membership to the PKK’s urban organization 
KCK and establishment of a ‘parallel state’ (see Ch. 2 and 3). Thousands of people were 
taken into custody, many ending up with long pre-trial detentions. These people included, 
inter alia, the members of the pro-Kurdish party, mayors, unionists, NGO activists, 
journalists, and lawyers. By 2012, the number of detained municipal personnel was 326, 
including at least 10 elected mayors (Radikal, 01/07/2012). In Diyarbakır city, the current 
Mayor of Kayapınar Municipality has been held in detention in this process, leading to regular 
protests by the municipality employees in support of him, as mentioned in §3 below. The 
Mayor of Sur Municipality was also initially detained but then released conditionally because 
of his health problems, while the Mayor of Metropolitan Municipality, Osman Baydemir, has 
been faced with investigations and trials but not taken into detention. 
Major allegations about the municipal staff concern acting under directions by and transfer of 
money to the PKK. Note that indictments, which appear highly speculative, are based on, 
inter alia, wiretap evidence of phone calls and conversations carried out in office spaces, as 
well as statements by secret witnesses (see, for instance, the indictment for the major trial in 
Diyarbakir, TC 2010). According to my informants and locals, arrests have been highly 
arbitrary, targeting also many people who were not actually linked to the KCK. 
Major constraints facing municipal administrators, hence, were caused by the Turkish 
political and judicial authorities. However, note that there might be also some constraints 
                                                          
246 Decisions such as the establishment of a company by a municipality require the approval of the Cabinet; 
hence, the AKP government. 
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stemming from the Kurdish movement itself. The pro-Kurdish party BDP lays out particular 
principles for its affiliate municipalities to follow, as other parties probably do, and has a 
‘commission on ecology and local administrations’ for this purpose (see, for instance, BDP 
N/A). This commission has also been targeted by KCK operations, with an allegation of 
ruling the municipalities as an extension of the PKK (see the indictment for Diyarbakır's 
major KCK trial, TC 2010). In this vein, for instance, KCK indictments claimed that Mayor 
Baydemir was being criticized by figures from the Kurdish movement for not acting in 
coordination and even for taking a leading position. The mainstream media also covered 
relevant events in a way as if there were cracks within the movement. While Baydemir kept 
ruling the municipality in spite of expectations that he would resign after being harshly 
criticized by Abdullah Öcalan (see Bianet, 23/11/2010), these events might have contributed 
to the view that the AKP government wanted to ‘divide’ Kurds, a view I heard also from 
union representatives in the municipal sector. These hard conditions were to influence union 
activities as well. 
Associational properties  
In the 2000s, three unions have been active in the five municipalities of Diyarbakır city:247 
Genel-İş and Belediye-İş for workers248 and Tüm-Bel-Sen for civil servants249 (see Table 4.2). 
Genel-İş and Tüm-Bel-Sen have been members of the left-leaning peak associations DİSK 
and KESK, respectively, and both peak associations have had pro-Kurdish approaches. 
Belediye-İş, on the other hand, has been a member of the peak association Türk-İş, which has 
had a historically somewhat ambiguous identity. Türk-İş has been located usually on the 
center-right of political spectrum and not very responsive to pro-Kurdish demands, embracing 
the state’s take on the issue framed in terms of concerns about the ‘division’ of the country in 
                                                          
247 Since the 1990s, Diyarbakır city has been composed of Metropolitan Municipality, Yenişehir, Sur, Bağlar and 
Kayapınar municipalities. 
248 Genel-İş, founded in 1962, was an affliate of the labor union confederation Türk-İş until 1976 and then 
transferred to DİSK (Sezgin 2006); as the then major union in the work branch, it played an important role in 
union activism in the country in the pre-1980 period (Bianchi 1984: 241-243), while it had to freeze its activities 
until 1992 following the 1980 coup. Belediye-İş, on the other hand, has its roots in a union which was 
established in 1975 and affliated to Türk-İş; it uses its current name since 1983 (see Sezgin 2006). In addition to 
Genel-İş and Belediye-İş, there is also Hizmet-İş as the third most important union in the work branch 
nationwide. Hizmet-İş is a member of the Hak-İş confederation, which uses religious references (see Ch. 4) and 
has had good relations with the AKP government. However, Hizmet-İş has not been an important actor in 
Diyarbakır city in the last decade because of the Kurdish movement’s hold of local office. Note that workers are 
employed usually for municipal services such as parks, road maintenance and collection of garbage, although 
one can also see white-collar employees employed in a worker status. 
249 Tüm-Bel-Sen is a relatively new union, mainly an outcome of rising public sector unionism in the 1990s, 
under the umbrella of civil servants’ confederation KESK. Note that affiliate unions of KESK enjoyed easiness 
in the Kurdish region with regard to unionization (see Üzüm 2011). 
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the post-1980 period (see Ch. 4). Yet, Belediye-İş in Diyarbakır has been embedded in local 
dynamics, as the historical background above mentioned. It has had a pro-Kurdish stance and 
been ruled by a single leader in the post-1980 period – someone who had been a victim of the 
notorious Diyarbakır prison. In this regard, the relations of local unionists with their 
respective peak association have been less cooperative for Belediye-İş, in contrast to Genel-İş 
and Tüm-Bel-Sen.250 
In each municipality, there has been one union organized for workers and one for civil 
servants; hence, a de facto monopoly of representation. This is because of the legal rule that a 
union should have as its members at least the absolute majority of the work force in the 
enterprise where collective agreement is pursued. Furthermore, unions should represent at 
least 10 per cent of the total work force in the work branch they are organized in. Note that 
unionization has been much stronger in the municipal branch.251 In some cases, membership 
can be even de facto compulsory. Municipal employers may play a role in this: I was told by a 
few employees from the municipal sector in Diyarbakır that the management encouraged 
them to become a member of the union in question after they were hired. The pro-Kurdish 
party BDP’s booklet concerning local administrations also underline the goal of encouraging 
the unionization of employees (BDP N/A: 84).252 Against this background, members may 
move collectively from one union to another union, following a change in the municipal rule 
or the emergence of conflicts between union leaders and mayors (as happens elsewhere in the 
country, see Akkaya 2001). This was seen in the 2000s with the transfer of some 
municipalities, such as the Metropolitan Municipality, from Belediye-İş to Genel-İş. Such 
possibilities might undermine the bargaining power of union leaders. 
However, as detailed in the third section below, contemporary activities by these unions are 
quite similar in political nature and they collaborate with each other despite differences in the 
associational traditions of peak associations they are affiliated with. On the other hand, the 
special circumstances of a particular municipality can be more important for the variation in 
activities. Hence, my analysis of labor unions in the municipality sector does not highlight 
                                                          
250 Based on my interviews with unions representatives in Diyarbakır (2011). 
251 The work branch concerning workers is called general works (genel işler). Majority of the branch is 
composed of workers of municipalities, while the branch also concerns workers such as doorkeepers. For more 
information on worker’s unionism in this branch, see Akkaya (2001). 
252 Labor unions, who are on good terms with the AKP, also act in a similar way in sites where they can get 
organized. In Diyarbakır, I was told about such activities in healthcare and education sectors: for instance, 
managers in public hospitals or schools tend to be pro-AKP and encourage employees to be members of aligned 
labor union. 
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leadership, unlike my analysis of other interest associations in previous chapters. The union 
leaders have not appeared as significant actors in the mainstream media either. This might be 
related to the fact that labor unions in general have experienced a significant decline in their 
political influence and social legitimacy in the aftermath of the 1980 coup and following 
liberalization processes (Adaman/Buğra/İnsel 2009; also see Ch. 4). 
Nevertheless, note that there are some associational differences between labor unions for 
workers and civil servants in general: union representatives tend to be more professionalized 
in the former type of labor union than the latter, receiving salaries and serving for longer 
periods. According to the regulations of the labor unions under scrutiny, there are no limits for 
re-election to the leadership position in workers’ union, while it is only two terms for civil 
servants’ union; hence, leaders can be more significant in the former (e.g. Belediye-İş has the 
same leader for the last two decades).253 Also, the material sources tend to be higher in the 
former.254 
In addition, the representatives of public sector unions can occupy more precarious positions, 
considering the (threat of) difficulties in promotion, exile to other provinces, investigations, 
and so on. For the routine type of political pressures confronting union representatives, we 
can remember the example of what happened to the organization committee for a peace 
demonstration that took place in Diyarbakır in 2009: the committee was composed of leaders 
of diverse political positions from business and professional associations, including also the 
then leader of Tüm-Bel-Sen; however, because of some slogans made by demonstrators, the 
committee members were put on trial according to the Anti-Terror Law and convicted of 
making propaganda for the PKK (also see Ch. 5 and 6). There have been also the KCK 
operations, as mentioned in previous chapters and below, leading to the detention and trial of 
union representatives and members from, inter alia, the municipal sector of Diyarbakır. In 
addition to such judicial constraints, dynamics in the membership environment also 
negatively influences the power of unions in Diyarbakır. 
                                                          
253 Leaders serve 3 years for each term in the labor union for civil servants (and not more than two consecutive 
terms) and 4 years in the labor union for workers. My interview with a representative of Tüm-Bel-Sen, 
Diyarbakır, 31/03/2011. 
254 Based on my interview with a representative of Tüm-Bel-Sen (Diyarbakır, 31/03/2011). 
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7.2 Dynamics in the membership environment 
Dynamics in the membership environment of labor unions are important for understanding the 
political interaction of union leaderships with the municipal government run by pro-Kurdish 
parties, as well as with the AKP government. Here in this section, I point at major dynamics 
concerning the labor force in Diyarbakır in general and in the municipal sector in particular. 
These relate to the socio-economic consequences of the armed conflict for the city, as well as 
the liberalization processes influencing the whole country. Hence, certain social problems, 
which do not reveal themselves much in the associational environments of business and 
professionals but are important for politics at both local and national levels, are better 
observed in relation with the municipal environment. Finally, I also draw attention to recent 
political pressures on the labor force. 
Between the armed conflict and liberalization 
As detailed in Chapters 2 and 5, Diyarbakır, as well the Kurdish region at large, has been 
suffering from uneven development compared to the rest of the country. The armed conflict of 
the 1990s has exacerbated this situation. Insecurity led to capital outflow, which negatively 
affected the local economy. More than one million people in the region were forced to 
migrate, having their property destroyed by security forces. This process was accompanied by 
the dissolution of agrarian structure and migrants experienced a loss of skills when they came 
to the urban areas. The migration occurred not only from the rural to the urban areas, but also 
from the east to other directions: many Kurds migrated to large cities in western and coastal 
parts of the country. As I argued in Chapter 4, Kurds came to form the most vulnerable group 
in the labor market across the country.255 
The city of Diyarbakır also received many of these migrants from its rural parts, as well as 
neighbor provinces.256 The process has led to mass poverty (see Table 2.7 and YG 
21/Sarmaşık 2007) and unemployment, while the urban population almost doubled in the 
course of the last two decades (see Table 2.1). Official statistics claim that the unemployment 
                                                          
255 The vulnerability results from various factors such as stigmatization, social exclusion, and other socio-
economic effects of the war and forced migration (see Adaman/Keyder 2006; Kurban et al. 2008). A good 
indicator of this vulnerability is seen in the informal sector: according to a research, the share of informal 
workers in the urban areas is almost twice higher for Kurds (BETAM 2009). Discrimination of and attacks on 
Kurdish workers are also seen (for resources, see Ch. 4). 
256 On the forced migration and Diyarbakır, see the reports by TMMOB (1998) and Kalkınma-Merkezi (2010) 
,as well as Yükseker (2008a; 2008b). 
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rate in Diyarbakır is 13.5 per cent for the year of 2010,257 whereas representatives from local 
associations suggest that the real rate is between 45 and 60 per cent. Hence, the difficult 
conditions for majority of Kurds both within and outside Diyarbakır have contributed to 
pressures felt by the labor force as well as unions in the municipal sector; I will come back to 
this in the next section in relation with collective bargaining. 
There is also the process of liberalization that influences the labor force across the country, in 
a fashion similar to worldwide trends. The increasing flexibilization of employment appears 
to be vital here: temporary forms of employment have been becoming more common in the 
public sector, in addition to practices of subcontracting and outsourcing. These trends, 
affecting both employees and unions, have been significant also in the municipal sector (see 
Buğra/Adaman/İnsel 2005; Buğra/Savaşkan 2010; Kadirbeyoğlu/Sümer 2012). While 
experiencing difficulties posed by the national center, as mentioned in the previous section, 
municipalities in Diyarbakır have not been excluded from this process.  
In my interview with him, Mayor Baydemir stated that they have engaged in service 
procurement for some 8 years now, instead of hiring new permanent staff. He justified this 
preference in two respects: 1) it is more efficient as the municipality can hire four 
subcontracted workers with the price a permanent employee would cost (when social security 
contributions and the like considered) and 2) it is helpful against the problem of severe 
unemployment in the city.258 There is also a political reason: decisions on permanent 
employment mean dependence on the central government; however, pro-Kurdish mayors 
complained about difficulties caused by the center in this regard.259 Municipalities, on the 
other hand, have more control on the forms of temporary employment (limited contracts and 
subcontracting). According to Nicole Watts, the municipal control over employment 
expanded opportunities for the Kurdish movement to engage in ‘patronage’ politics; hence, 
sympathizers of the movement can be hired (Watts 2010: 80). While such particularistic 
practices of staffing can be seen in any municipality across the country, they gain a special 
significance in relation with the dynamics of the Kurdish movement. 
In this respect, hiring practices can be, to some extent, embedded in the moral economy (see 
Ch. 2). Consider the criteria for hiring (as well as for eligibility to social aids): some locals 
                                                          
257 TÜİK data. Available at www.tuik.gov.tr. Access date is 14/01/2013. 
258 My interview with Osman Baydemir, Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, Diyarbakır, 16/06/2011. 
259 See, for instance, the interview with the Mayor of Sur Municipality, Abdullah Demirbaş, ‘Demirbaş: BDP'li 
belediyeler yeni bir soluk getirdi,’ Firat News, 27/01/2013. I also heard similar comments during my fieldwork. 
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argue that there can be some positive discrimination for the so-called families of worth, i.e. 
war veterans and survivors on the pro-Kurdish side.260 Hence, political commitment may 
provide a basis for legitimacy and reciprocity, also influencing expectations from the hired 
staff. My impression was that such a policy appeared fair to some locals, as opposed to the 
municipal approaches seen in the 1990s, which were described to me as corrupt, involving 
even bribing to get a permanent position. New hiring practices, as well as the labor market 
structure, also may influence union activities, as elaborated in the next section. 
Finally, let’s note that the AKP government’s policy initiatives since 2010 concerning the 
‘extra’ employees of municipalities have caused discontent among employees who are on a 
permanent contract. These initiatives officially aim to transfer the unrequired employees of 
municipalities nationwide to other public organizations such as the provincial branches of the 
Ministry of Education and the police. However, concerns have been raised by labor unions 
and professional associations across the country: the policy was seen as a form of exile for 
employees and there has been so much uncertainty about who exactly will leave and what 
status they will get in their new positions, as there has been a risk of losing the job security 
and social rights of permanent contracts.261 I heard similar concerns in Diyarbakır during my 
fieldwork too. Also, it turned out that the municipalities in Diyarbakır city had difficulties to 
get all of their extra employees to transfer to public organizations, as only a smaller number 
was accepted by the authorities. This situation was interpreted by local actors as one of 
discrimination, while municipal and union representatives were united in their reaction to the 
governmental approach (Firat News, 02/11/2011). 
Political pressures on the labor force 
As mentioned before, the labor movement in Turkey has been faced with a hostile political 
environment in the post-1980 period (see also Adaman/Buğra/İnsel 2009). As the left-leaning 
and pro-Kurdish labor unions have been the major targets of this hostility, their 
representatives and members in Diyarbakır and in the Kurdish region at large also have been 
affected from it. These pressures have increased with the KCK operations, which started in 
2009 (see Ch. 2 and 3). As detailed before, KCK operations have been based on allegations of 
links to the PKK and led to detentions and prosecution of thousands of people from different 
sites such as, inter alia, municipal governments, non-governmental organizations, lawyers, 
                                                          
260 This may include also relatives of prisoners as well as prison releases. 
261 See, for instance, a bulletin of Genel-İş: Emek, 117, December 2010-January/February 2011. 
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and labor unions. Among labor unions, those which have appeared as more supportive of the 
Kurdish movement and mostly organized in the public sector (i.e. SES in healthcare, Egitim-
Sen in education, and Tüm-Bel-Sen and Genel-İş in municipal services) were more affected. 
Police raids to labor unions and municipalities have resulted in the detention of many union 
representatives and members. According to the pro-Kurdish party BDP, the number of 
unionists that have been held in detention for trial was 28 by mid-2012 (Radikal, 01/07/2012). 
However, many more people262 were taken into custody to be released conditionally and put 
on trial during the last few years. Unions in this process, like other organized actors, have 
been under surveillance via wiretapping and covert listening of office spaces from outside, 
while collected material was used as evidence in indictments. Furthermore, attendance in 
activities such as demonstrations (hence, visual surveillance) was also used for allegations 
such as making propaganda for the PKK and such. Hence, the KCK process aimed to suppress 
the Kurdish opposition via detention and intimidation. However, the labor organizations and 
their members in Diyarbakır’s municipal sector have kept their political engagement, 
including protests against the pressures on themselves. 
7.3 Contemporary political activism 
As mentioned before, labor unions were already engaging in human rights activism in the 
1990s, in cooperation with the Kurdish movement. However, they have attained a special 
significance by the repeated election of the pro-Kurdish candidates to the local office since 
1999, an event which has led to the emergence of an interesting situation: the labor movement 
and the Kurdish movement – taken as two analytically separate actors here, but with blurred 
boundaries in actual life – found themselves in a direct relationship of employee-employer in 
the municipal sector. In this section, first, I elaborate on the resolution of this challenging 
situation, with a focus on collective bargaining. Second, labor unions also kept engaged in the 
contemporary Kurdish associational activism investigated by this dissertation. I will review 
examples of this activism, which are usually in cooperation with the Kurdish movement and 
in conflict with the AKP government. 
Unionism in hard times: collective bargaining in Kurdish municipalities 
                                                          
262 Based on my impression from the media coverage, the total number of targets shoud be at least hundreds of 
people across the country. 
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When I asked representatives from the unions and the municipalities about their relations with 
each other, they usually first referred to their political commonalities. Reminding his past 
leadership for the human rights association, Mayor Baydemir said that he and the affiliate 
unions of DİSK and KESK (the ones that also have been organized in the Metropolitan 
Municipality for the last years) worked together and gave a joint struggle for years. As a result 
of common political outlook, he argued, there has never been an employer-employee 
relationship among them. Some of the union representatives that I talked to also said similar 
things. One representative from Genel-İş referred to the pro-Kurdish party BDP as ‘our party.’ 
He, however, mentioned how his support to the party is interpreted differently by union 
members and municipal administrators: workers tell him that it would be the mayor who gives 
the final decision because the mayor and union representatives are ‘from the same party.’ On 
the other hand, mayors tell him that ‘we are from the same party, so why do you cause us 
trouble?’263 
Yet, unions and municipal governments appear to have come up with a resolution to this 
tension-prone situation. The processes of collective bargaining are illustrative in this regard. 
Especially collective agreements264 signed in the last years show that a compromise is reached 
between the actors, as well as between diverse concerns: representatives from both sides told 
me that they tend to have consensus on political-cultural topics (or, in the words of a union 
representative, ‘democratic-social demands’) and have conflicts on the issues of wage setting 
and working time.265 
In relation with the former group of issues that were included in collective agreements, for 
instance, symbolic dates such as Newroz, Women’s Day and Labor Day were often 
recognized as day-off and/or brought along bonus payments to employees. Here, especially 
Newroz has a political significance: it is the traditional Kurdish New Year taking place in late 
March and originally for welcoming spring. In the post-1980 period, it has been an important 
day for the mobilization of Kurds, as well as the expression of pro-Kurdish demands and 
symbols. However, the political authorities criminalized its public celebration until recent 
                                                          
263 My interview with a representative from Genel-İş, Diyarbakır, 30/03/2011. 
264 Collective agreements are usually signed once in two years. Unions for the public sector employees were not 
officially entitled to conduct collective bargaining until the 2010 Constitutional Referendum (see Ch. 3 and 4); 
nevertheless, they have been signing agreements since the 1990s, with references to the constitution and 
international agreements Turkey is bound by. However, collective agreements have been subjected to 
investigations by the central government and the judiciary. My interview with a representative from Tüm-Bel-
Sen, Diyarbakır, 31/03/2011. 
265 There are of course variations based on municipality. Here I present the general view of the municipal sector 
in Diyarbakır and later speficify some collective agreements according to municipality, year and union. 
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years. In a similar vein, some agreements include articles on the provision of municipal 
services for employees to learn local languages (namely, Kurdish), positive discrimination for 
employees with daughters (concerning child allowances in relation with schooling), and 
sanctions on male workers who engage in domestic violence against their wives. Hence, the 
articles concern the goals of the Kurdish movement with regard to the recognition of Kurdish 
identity, as well as gender and labor ideals.266 As such, the sides of collective bargaining 
could reach consensus easily, while articles were usually suggested by mayors themselves.267 
Also note that these identity-related articles of collective agreements sometimes become 
subjected to judicial investigations. 
The issues which can cause some conflict between the unions and mayors concern wage 
setting and working time. Mayors resist accepting the rate of wage increase as demanded by 
union representatives. Such conflicts are interpreted by some as the reason for the shift from 
Belediye-İş to Genel-İş in some municipalities in the 2000s, while others see the shift 
ideological, relating it to the pro-Kurdish approach of DİSK and its affiliate unions of which 
Genel-İş is one. The issue of wage increase is also covered in the pro-Kurdish party’s above-
mentioned manual for municipal governments: while the manual emphasizes the need to 
improve pro-labor approaches in general, it also warns against unions’ support for ‘most pay 
for least work’ and recommends that unions are asked for making ‘sacrifices’ (fedakarlık) to 
decrease the wage gap among civil servants, permanent workers, and subcontracted workers 
(BDP N/A: 82-84). Mayor Baydemir, on the other hand, justified his resistance to higher 
wage increases with a reference to severe poverty in the city.268 The problems of limited 
economic sources of municipalities and high unemployment can also be used as counter-
arguments in the processes of collective bargaining. In this vein, a worker told me that some 
municipal administrators mentioned them the option of subcontracted workers, pointing at the 
fact that they are less costly and easy to find given the high rate of unemployment.269 In a 
                                                          
266 See the collective agreements signed by Tüm-Bel-Sen with the Metropolitan Municipality (TÜM-BEL-
SEN/Diyarbakır-Büyükşehir-Belediyesi 2010) and by Belediye-İş with the Yenişehir Municipality (Sendikası 
2009). Also see the coverage of more recent agreements between the Metropolitan Municipality and Genel-İş, 
(‘Diyarbakır’dan örnek toplu iş sözleşmesi,’ Firat News, 30/04/2012) and between the Kayapınar Municipality 
and Genel-İş (Kayapınar-Belediyesi 2011: 85). 
267 My interviews with Osman Baydemir, Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality (Diyarbakır, 16/06/2011) and 
with a union representative (Diyarbakır, 31/06/2011). Also see BDP (N/A) for gender-related articles. 
268 My interview with Osman Baydemir, Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality (Diyarbakır, 16/06/2011). 
269 My interview with a municipal worker, Diyarbakır, 08/06/2011. See also the previous section on 
subcontracting. Such arguments can be made in other municipalities as well (see Adaman/Buğra/İnsel 2009). On 
the other, there have been recently some initiatives for conducting collective agreements for subconstrated 
workers as well, see ‘Yenişehir belediyesinde bir ilk,’ Diyarbakır Yeni Gun, 05/03/2013. 
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similar vein, conflicts sometimes emerge on the amount of holidays (the total number of days 
for a year or Saturdays as a day off). Concerning conflicts about this issue, Mayor Baydemir 
said that there was too much work to be done. 
Finally, there is also the issue of contributions270 to poverty-alleviation associations initiated 
by the municipalities, the most notable being the Sarmaşık Association (see Ch. 2). Articles 
are added to the collective agreements signed since 2010 so that workers make a monthly 
donation of small amount of money to Sarmaşık.271 As mentioned in previous chapters, 
Sarmaşık is financed by mostly voluntary donations from associations and individuals, 
including contributions from the compulsory interest associations analyzed in the previous 
two chapters. Union members, in this regard, used to donate voluntarily. However, an article 
on donations was included in agreements as a result of the judicial constraints facing 
Sarmaşık and as a demand by mayors.272 This does not seem to have caused serious conflict 
among the actors though, as aiming solidarity. 
Overall, the unions and the municipalities achieved a compromise by which they set wages 
and working time to a less degree than demanded by the former, yet introduce new political-
cultural entitlements for employees. One municipal employee told me that the unions pursue 
activities more in lines of ‘patriotism’ (read as collective-identity politics) rather than ‘labor 
ideals.’ He also hesitantly made a similar criticism of the municipality, pointing at the 
discrepancy between the pro-labor ideology of the Kurdish movement and the erosion of 
(acquired) social rights, such as the increasing use of subcontracting and the decrease in the 
number of vacation days. However, he was content with his own salary and would like to see 
the introduction of further services for language teaching and such, in coherence with the 
collective agreements. He also added that he did not bother with some things, although he 
would if he was working at another place, because he felt close to the municipality, in the 
sense of having things in common. This is also why he does not approve the case when the 
municipality and the union would not settle on wage increase leading to the involvement of 
                                                          
270 Note that it was also claimed in the process of KCK operations that municipal employees made regular 
contributions to the PKK via municipalities. I did not inquire about the alleged underground of municipalities 
during my fieldwork, given the highly speculative and risky (for research subjects) nature of the topic. 
271 10 to 15 Turkish liras (between 4 to 7 euros). Collective agreements signed by Genel-İş and Tüm-Bel-Sen 
include this article, whereas those by Belediye-İş do not. In municipalities other than the Metropolitan 
Municipality donations may be targeted at the respective philanthropic association linked to the municipality.  
272 My interviews with Osman Baydemir (Diyarbakır, 16/06/2011) and two representatives from Genel-İş and 
Tüm-Bel-Sen (Diyarbakır, 30/03/2011 and 31/03/2011). See also the collective agreements with the 
Metropolitan Municipality signed by Tüm-Bel-Sen (TÜM-BEL-SEN/Diyarbakır-Büyükşehir-Belediyesi 2010) 
and by Genel-İş (‘Büyükşehir Belediyesi Toplu Sözleşmeyi İmzaladı,’ Bianet, 26/05/2010). 
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the state’s arbiter bodies, as happened once during his employment. However, they could 
have solved it among themselves, he said.273 
Facing the Turkish authorities: rights claims and protests 
The labor unions have been involved in numerous joint initiatives taken in cooperation with 
the other interest associations for pro-Kurdish common demands and concerns. These 
initiatives, as illustrated in the previous chapters, attempted to moderate conflicts between the 
AKP government and the Kurdish movement. They also advocated a set of pro-Kurdish 
demands such as the right to education in mother language and constitutional safeguards for 
the recognition of Kurds (see Ch. 2). However, union leaders never appeared in the 
mainstream media as significant actors of this joint activism, unlike business and professional 
leaders. Union leaders appeared only in the background in press releases and added their 
signatures to the lists of associations, but did not read any press statements prepared by the 
encompassing coalition of associations or get interviewed by mainstream journalists. 
Moreover, they were not included among the privileged core associations, which top political 
figures tended to favor in their meetings in Diyarbakır: hence, for instance, union leaders from 
the municipal sector were not invited to the meeting with the Chief of General Staff in 2008, 
like the leaders of Bar and Medical Associations and unlike business leaders (see Ch. 5 and 
6).274 This might have to do with not only the political hostility towards labor unions in the 
post-1980 Turkey, but also the political stance of the unions in Diyarbakır’s municipal sector. 
Hence, in addition to this type of joint initiatives, which are central to the rise of Kurdish 
associational activism, we see two other axes of activism by the labor unions, in a fashion 
quite similar to (and partly in cooperation with) the Medical Association. First, the labor 
unions took steps concerning major political events such as elections and the referendum in a 
way supportive of the Kurdish movement and in opposition to the AKP government. These 
steps were made in cooperation with other left-wing associations, forming an intragroup 
coalition alternative to that of business associations and the Bar Association as the latter 
group appeared united in a pro-government fashion in significant political moments. 
However, they have not received as much media attention as the latter did (see Ch. 5 and 
                                                          
273 My interview with an employee of a municipality who is also a member of Genel-İş, Diyarbakır, 27/06/2011.  
274 The relationships with the political authorities also vary among the unions – a union representative told me 
that DİSK-affliated unions were left out in meetings organized in the city by the governorship, whereas other 
unions were invited. My interview with representatives from two unions, Diyarbakır, 30/03/2011 and 
31/03/2011. 
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6).275 Second, they raised concerns about issues facing their membership environment, 
particularly municipal mayors and executives, as a result of KCK operations; these appear in 
line with the collaborative relations in the sector discussed in the previous sub-section. 
Before the 2009 local elections, which unfolded as a significant case of fierce contestation 
between the AKP and the Kurdish movement, the Diyarbakır Democracy Platform made a 
press statement on behalf of 32 associations, including the labor unions from the municipal 
sector, to express support for the left-wing electoral bloc, which included the candidates of the 
pro-Kurdish party in the region. While doing this, the statement criticized the AKP 
government for a number of things such as the following: the abuse of religion, the support 
for Turkish nationalist values, and the use of poverty as a control mechanism (açlıkla terbiye). 
It also pointed at the contradiction of the AKP in accusing the pro-Kurdish party of doing 
‘identity politics’ because of the latter’s advocacy for constitutional safeguards for the 
recognition of the Kurdish identity, while the AKP defined the Kurdish-language 
broadcasting by a public TV channel as a revolution. Furthermore, it was argued that the 
municipalities on Kurdish territory should not be seen any more as ‘fortresses’ to conquer, 
with a ‘denial’ approach (note the reference to the debate between Erdoğan and Baydemir 
mentioned above in the first section).276 
In the same vein, the leader of Genel-İş made a statement to a local news portal about the 
2011 general elections, supporting the left-wing electoral bloc, which included the candidates 
of the pro-Kurdish party. He stated that their hopes for peace were destroyed by ongoing 
political and military operations (he means KCK operations by the former), adding that 
civilians also were being killed and some workers were recently seriously wounded by gas 
bombs (used by the police against demonstrators). Therefore, he underlined the significance 
of having representatives from the bloc in the parliament. The union leader also criticized the 
AKP government for investing in war and argued that the development level of the region was 
worsening since it came to the power.277 
Another moment of support for the pro-Kurdish party came in between these elections, in 
relation with the 2010 Constitutional Referendum. The leaders of Tüm-Bel-Sen and Genel-İş 
                                                          
275 The alternative bloc included organized local actors such as the Medical Association, the compulsory 
associations for engineers and architects (TMMOB-affiliates), the Human Rights Association, as well as labor 
union affiliates of the KESK and the DİSK, including those organized in the municipal sector. 
276 See ‘Diyarbakır’da 32 kurumdan DTP’ye açık destek,’ Firatnews, 11/03/2009. 
277 ‘Amed’de sendikalar Emek Bloğu’nu destekliyor,’ Diyarbakır Haber, 28/05/2011. Also see Chapters 2 and 3 
on the elections. 
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(but not of Belediye-İş) took part in a joint statement of public figures from across the country 
to call for the boycotting of the referendum. Note that the boycott call had been initiated by 
the Kurdish movement, whereas the leaders of major business associations and the Bar 
Association in Diyarbakır supported voting in favor of the referendum (see Ch. 2, 5 and 6). 
The joint statement, on the other hand, advocated a completely new democratic constitution, 
instead of limited amendments that were put on referendum and polarized the society.278 
As to the union activities about issues facing the membership environment and employers, 
these attained increasing significance as a result of KCK operations. As mentioned before, 
numerous union representatives and members as well as municipal administrators were taken 
into custody, kept in detention and put on trial as a result of these operations. Kayapınar 
Municipality is a major example for Diyarbakır’s municipal sector. Mayor Zülküf Karatekin 
has been in years-long detention, after he was taken into custody in the 2009 operation, which 
targeted en masse specifically pro-Kurdish mayors, the members of municipal assemblies, as 
well as the provincial executives of the pro-Kurdish party. Against the detention of Kurdish 
representatives, employees and the leaders of the unions organized in this municipality (that 
is, Genel-İş and Tüm-Bel-Sen) have been involved in weekly protests, known as Black 
Thursday and carried out in front of the municipality. Sometimes important figures from the 
Kurdish movement (e.g. MPs on the tickets of the pro-Kurdish party and Mayor Osman 
Baydemir) also attended these protests, giving speeches which criticize the operations as well 
as the AKP government’s approach to the Kurdish movement, mostly in relation with 
conjectural events.279 Hence, the union activities outside of contractual relations – that is, 
collective bargaining – also unfolded in ways supportive of the Kurdish movement and the 
municipal governments run by it and oppositional to the AKP government. 
Conclusions  
The labor unions had a special importance in associational politics. They regularly took part 
in encompassing coalitions, including all the other associations, formed in the post-2005 
period. These initiatives usually aimed to moderate the conflict and to push for peace and also 
gradually expressed pro-Kurdish common demands in an environment defined by the dual 
power contestation. However, the labor unions appeared usually as secondary actors in these 
coalitions: they signed the joint press statements, but did not, say, attract the attention of the 
                                                          
278 ‘Referandumu Boykot Çağrısının Tam Metni ve İmzacılar,’ Bianet, 30/07/2010. 
279 See the website of Kayapınar Municipality for regular reports on protests: www.diyarbakirkayapinar.bel.tr 
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mainstream media, nor get invited by top state figures to meetings as representatives from 
Kurdish civil society, unlike the business leaders. 
On the other hand, the unions played a leading role in giving shape to a narrow coalition with 
some other unions and the Medical Association. This appeared as an alternative narrow 
coalition against the business-led one. The support for the Kurdish movement provided the 
common ground. In other words, the rights-claims and concerns as articulated by the 
movement were helpful in delineating this division among the associations: the unionists 
openly supported the pro-Kurdish party’s candidates in elections as well as its call for 
boycotting the 2010 referendum. They also criticized the AKP government’s policies, some of 
which directly affected them – including union members and elected executives of the 
municipalities – as in KCK operations. This alternative bloc did not receive much attention 
from the government or the mainstream media though. 
The unionists and the municipal executives from the pro-Kurdish parties share a past of joint 
struggle dating back to the 1990s. Acquiring an employee-employer relationship in the new 
period could have damaged this alliance; however, the political pressures on the Kurdish 
movement in general and on the pro-Kurdish municipal governments in particular helped 
sustain it. Thereby, they could reach a compromise in collective bargaining. They had 
conflicting views about wage setting and work time; these usually were decided to the 
advantage of the municipal governments. The unionists also agreed to have their members 
regularly donate to the municipality’s philanthropic association Sarmaşık in a fashion of 
national redistribution. Yet, these concessions were traded by the introduction of new 
political-cultural entitlements with regard to services in the Kurdish language, symbolical 
days important for the Kurdish movement, gender ideals, and such. Indeed, these entitlements 
are in line with the Kurdish movement’s political and social projects; hence, they are not 
exactly a concession for the latter. In summary, as a municipal worker told me, the unionists 
engaged in activities more with the goal of ‘patriotism’ than the pursuit of material interests. 
This compromise reduces the salience of economic interests as a basis of social division and 
underlines instead collective identity and political-moral commitments. 
A number of conditions made this compromise possible: first, the dual power contestation. 
The AKP government put various political and economic pressures on the pro-Kurdish 
municipal governments. In particular, it targeted Diyarbakır municipalities as if it were a 
‘fortress’ to conquer. The Prime Minister promised socio-economic measures upon its 
potential electoral victory, against ‘identity politics’ of the movement. Against this, the pro-
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Kurdish mayors asked locals to show solidarity to keep the ‘fortress.’ This was accompanied 
with appeals to the common cause, in bargaining with the unionists, downplaying the 
differences in interests. If the unionists were to resist in collective bargaining, it could bring 
the state’s arbiter bodies into the game, something which both sides would not prefer for 
political reasons, if not economic reasons. 
Second, structural factors also were influential. The armed conflict of the 1990s led to the 
increase in poverty and unemployment rates in Diyarbakır. These appeared not only a social 
problem, but a political problem leading the poverty-alleviation activities by the AKP circles, 
with a goal to use in electoral politics. Against this background, the municipalities did not 
only initiate alternative charity activities but also asked for active participation and sacrifices 
from the labor force in processes of collective bargaining. These practices can be thought as a 
part of the moral economy. In addition, the process of liberalization negatively influenced the 
labor force across the country. Practices of subcontracting and outsourcing, as well as 
temporary forms of employment, have become widespread in the municipal sector as well. 
The municipalities in Diyarbakır also followed this trend for both political and economic 
reasons. The potential choice of service procurement for lowering the labor costs was used as 
an argument against the demands for wage increase by the unions. While such conditions in 
political and economic environments decreased the bargaining power of the unions, they 
could still reach a compromise within the framework of the moral economy. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion  
The Durkheimian approach to the study of interest associations argued that associations can 
play important roles in the political integration of society by articulating individuals along 
certain conceptions of identities and interests and linking them to the state. But what if the 
state is being contested? This dissertation examined the rise of Kurdish interest associations as 
political actors in Turkey vis-à-vis the struggles between the AKP government and the 
Kurdish movement for hegemony in the last decade. With an investigation of relations of the 
associations among themselves and with the rival political actors, it explored the grounds on 
which the associational actors cooperate and conflict with each other forging diverse forms of 
coalition. This exploration sheds lights on how political actors attempt to re-define and 
‘naturalize’ main lines of social division in society, parallel to their political projects, by 
‘integrating disparate identities and interests into coherent sociopolitical blocs’ (De 
Leon/Desai/Tuğal 2009: 195). 
Specifically, the dissertation examined how the cross-pressures of economic interests and 
collective identity politics, stemming from the two political interlocutors and the membership 
environments, played out themselves differently within and among associations. Despite the 
inherent ambiguity of collective action and complexity of the transitional context, the main 
findings can be summarized as the following: collective identity politics provide an 
integrative force enabling encompassing coalitions within the group in pursuit of common 
concerns. Interest politics, on the other hand, can have divisive effects within the group, 
supporting narrow coalitions, and some integrative effects across the groups for a national 
coalition. These two trajectories roughly correspond to the hegemonic projects of the Kurdish 
movement and the AKP government, respectively, but they may have unexpected 
consequences. 
While no single model of integration or a line of social division could reign in the recent 
period, the associations negotiated diverse compromises with the political actors as regards 
their interests, ideals, and status. These compromises show that some of the organized groups, 
such as business associations, could turn the situation into an advantage and appear as a 
leading civil society actor in the process, while some others, such as the labor unions, ended 
up relatively disadvantaged and became less visible in their efforts for pursuing alternative 
political projects. The empowerment and disempowerment of different social groups in the 
transitional period, however, might affect the way certain conceptions of interests and 
collective identities are stabilized as the main lines of social division and sources of political 
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integration in the process of peace building, by changing the dynamics of negotiation between 
actors (cf. Wimmer 2008: 1006). This may influence the nature of the state that would be re-
settled. 
In this conclusion, first, I give a systematic overview of the wide historical and political 
context within which the Kurdish associational activism took place. I focus on the 
contestation of the Turkish nation-state, elaborating on the struggles between the AKP 
government and the Kurdish movement for hegemony. I analyze the strategies of each actor to 
articulate Kurdish groups under its leadership. Then, I explain how particular processes 
opened up the space for Kurdish interest associations to play a politically salient role in this 
contestation. Second, I synthesize the findings of the in-depth analysis of associational 
behavior against the background of articulation activities by the two political actors. I show 
on what basis the Kurdish interest associations could come together to form encompassing 
coalitions. Afterwards, I elaborate on the conflicts and divisions that emerged between 
associations and in their interaction with the political actors. I point at the formation of 
competing narrow coalitions, as well as their varying bases and effectiveness. In this respect, I 
also elaborate on the relations between local and peak associations. These sections discuss the 
diverse effects of collective identity politics and interest politics for political integration. I 
conclude with a brief discussion on some compromises reached in the transitional period and 
the ongoing process of peace talks in relation with the Kurdish associational activism.  
8.1 Contestation of the state and the rise of Kurdish associations  
In transition from the empire, modern Turkey was established as a secular nation-state. 
Turkish nationalism and laïcité provided the major ideologies for the Kemalist ruling elites in 
their efforts to regulate state-society relations. However, the secularist-nationalist project was 
not successful in ensuring the political integration of society in the course of modernization. 
Political Islam and the Kurdish movement developed as challengers to this nature of the state 
and provided the sources for the major lines of cleavage in the post-1980s Turkey. Against the 
background of constraints presented by Kemalist bureaucratic elites, one the one hand, 
Islamist political parties pushed hard to attain the power and, on the other hand, the Kurdish 
guerilla organization PKK got involved in a devastating armed conflict with the Turkish 
army. Yet, a period of transition was to take place in the 2000s, which led to fundamental 
changes in the configuration of power. In 1999, the armed conflict came to a halt, albeit to 
restart in 2004 at a lower density, and the pro-Kurdish parties were elected to municipal 
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governments in the Kurdish region, increasing the movement’s power. In the same year, 
Turkey was recognized as a candidate for EU membership. These events triggered a reform 
process, albeit inconsistent, for conflict resolution and democratization. The AKP was to 
undertake this process, which also would help opening up the space for Kurdish interest 
associations. Let’s examine the political articulation efforts by the AKP government and the 
Kurdish movement and the introduction of Kurdish associations as a new actor vis-à-vis the 
contestation of the state. 
The AKP’s strategies for political articulation  
The last decade under the AKP rule has been characterized with significant institutional 
reforms, economic growth, social polarization, and political instability. Despite having roots 
in political Islam, the party claimed not to be a follower of the tradition, initially pursuing a 
conservative-liberal approach and gradually attaining an authoritarian-nationalist approach 
with Islamic tones. The AKP struggled against two major challengers to consolidate its 
power: the secularist-nationalist bureaucratic elites and the Kurdish movement. In other 
words, the state was being contested at two levels. The AKP’s confrontation with the 
bureaucratic elites gradually turned out to its advantage, while its confrontation with the 
Kurdish movement has been more complicated only recently leading to talks for a peace deal. 
The party employed a rhetoric of democratization and economic development to legitimize its 
struggle against its challengers. Such a general way of framing issues, inter alia, helped the 
AKP forge an encompassing coalition of social groups with disparate identities and interests. 
However, its rhetoric gradually oscillated between pro-Kurdish reformist and Turkish 
nationalist tones to appease these diverse groups and to compete with its political rivals. In 
this respect, the party leaders made some use of ambiguity in framing issues and formulating 
policy proposals on contested topics. Furthermore, it attempted to re-define the lines of 
cleavage in the country in a most vague fashion, i.e. as supporters and opponents of 
democratization: opponents allegedly supported either coup plots (referring to secularist 
nationalists) or ‘terrorism’ (referring to Kurdish activists). 
The AKP used a number of strategies to articulate Kurds to its political project. Numerous 
initiatives were taken through discursive means; political reforms and repression; and socio-
economic policies. On the discursive level, the party leaders engaged in efforts to re-define 
the categorical divisions in society. First, appeals were made to the shared identity of Islam. 
This was to be a common ground to integrate different social groups, with an effort to 
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overcome ethnic identity as a principle of categorization and oppositional politics (cf. 
Wimmer 2008). However, it was later used to depict a division within the Kurdish group in 
the form of the ‘pious’ versus the ‘perverse.’ The members of the Kurdish movement were 
depicted to be the latter. This strategy was to be counteracted by the Kurdish movement who 
also made appeals to religion (a ‘patriotic’ version of it). Still, there was a general attempt for 
a categorization of Kurds, which could be observed in discourses of the AKP, the mainstream 
media and even some associational leaders, into ‘good Kurds’ versus ‘bad Kurds.’ The former 
allegedly supports democratic means and the latter allegedly supports violent means. Note 
that this distinction is not only an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Kurdish 
movement, but also a source of intimidation. These efforts concerning social cleavages were 
complemented by the AKP’s self-definition as doing ‘service’ politics in the sense of working 
for economic development and satisfaction of social needs. It accused the pro-Kurdish party 
of doing ‘identity politics’ in the sense of pursuing illegitimate dangerous ‘passions’ and the 
PKK of opposing the development of the Kurdish region. In other words, the AKP made 
appeals to ‘interests’ to counteract ‘passions.’ In doing so, it tried to ‘disarticulate’ Kurds 
from the social base of the Kurdish movement and ‘rearticulate’ them to its own political 
project (cf. De Leon/Desai/Tuğal 2009). 
In this respect, the AKP employed various economic and social policy measures at national 
and local levels. Social provision tremendously increased thanks to initiatives some of which 
based on public-private-voluntary partnership. Access to healthcare, economic credits, 
agricultural subsidies, funds for social projects and other resources highly improved. The 
Kurdish region benefited from these new opportunities to an important degree, as the AKP 
engaged in ‘positive discrimination’ policies because of the region’s underdevelopment. In 
this respect, special programs also were developed for Diyarbakır and it was prioritized in the 
distribution of some resources nationwide because the AKP aimed to win over the province in 
elections for its symbolical importance. The Chamber played a role in mediating the access to 
some of these resources, in addition to benefiting from other resources for itself. Coupled with 
other dynamics, the local economy in Diyarbakır improved greatly in the AKP period. All of 
these complemented the rhetoric on ‘service versus identity politics’ by presenting concrete 
economic incentives and pressures. The AKP’s economic and social policies helped re-shape 
the state-society relations in the province. They contributed to state penetration and political 
integration, by dragging Kurdish citizens into the sphere of the state channels-cum-resources. 
It is plausible to see these policies as one of the reasons for the Kurdish electoral support to 
the AKP. 
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The reform process triggered by EU candidacy also increased the support for the AKP, for not 
only its introduction of linguistic-cultural rights for Kurds, but also its implications for the 
general democratization of the country. Even if the latter goal became dubious at times, the 
AKP’s confrontation with Kemalist elites contributed to the support, helping the AKP accept 
no responsibility for the oppressive state tradition. The AKP has increased its activities and 
made somewhat vague promises for a solution to the Kurdish issue since 2005, reaching a 
height in 2009 with the so-called ‘democratic opening.’ However, the government also 
deployed and supported discriminative and oppressive measures against the Kurdish 
movement, including the pro-Kurdish parties and the municipalities they run. In its 
competition against the Kurdish movement, the AKP turned its face to the Kurdish interest 
associations as a ‘third actor.’ Before elaborating on the rise of these associations, let’s 
consider the political articulation efforts by the Kurdish movement. 
The Kurdish movement’s strategies for political articulation 
Over the last decade, the Kurdish movement was faced with important opportunities and 
constraints, which influenced the nature and effectiveness of its strategies for pursuing pro-
Kurdish demands and articulating Kurds under its leadership. Guerilla leader Öcalan 
developed new projects in his prison, as the PKK quitted its initial goal of independence and 
engaged in armed struggle in a less dense and intermittent fashion. Two political channels 
could be used in this period: first, the pro-Kurdish parties increased their power in municipal 
governments in the Kurdish region, including Diyarbakır. This provided the movement with 
new opportunities to integrate and mobilize Kurds. Second, the pro-Kurdish parties entered 
the national parliament standing as independent candidates. This strengthened the legal 
component of the Kurdish movement, despite the serious tensions in the parliamentary realm 
coupled with efforts to exclude and repress the pro-Kurdish parties. 
In this period, the Kurdish movement found itself in a contestation with the AKP government. 
This contestation was not merely about the military operations, the government’s policies and 
resistance to Kurdish demands but also about the leadership of Kurds and control over the 
Kurdish region, Diyarbakır turning into the most contested site. This was an outcome of the 
situation of dual power developing since the previous decade, but took a new form as the 
configuration of power changed under the AKP rule. Since the AKP had a confrontation with 
the state elites and used this to attract the support of Kurds, inter alia, under the banner of 
‘democratization,’ the Kurdish movement had to develop new strategies, while claiming that 
the AKP was becoming the state itself. 
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The Kurdish movement used a number of strategies to articulate Kurds under its leadership. 
The PKK’s references to guerilla leader Öcalan as a leader cult and martrys, as well as an 
ideology of patriotism, targeted the main social base of the movement and they are analyzed 
in other works. What is more important in terms of our topic is the movement’s increasing 
efforts to integrate Kurdish groups with disparate ideas and interests into an encompassing 
coalition. Organized and individual Kurdish actors make diverse rights claims and proposals, 
some of which appear at odds with the PKK and compatible with the AKP, who also is the 
major rival for Kurdish votes. Against this background, the pro-Kurdish parties played a 
leading role in articulating a set of common demands by highlighting the shared ethnic 
identity. These common demands include the right to education in mother language, 
introduction of constitutional safeguards for the recognition of the Kurdish identity, and 
strengthening of local governments. The rising activism by Kurdish interest associations had a 
special role in raising the need to formulate common demands. Interactions and negotiations 
with these associations and other organized actors via, inter alia, local platforms led by the 
Kurdish movement helped the articulation efforts. Kurdish actors have different ideas and 
interests with regard to some of these demands, as seen in the two opposing approaches to the 
economic dimension of decentralization proposals (pro-market and critical approaches). 
However, the pro-Kurdish parties kept a degree of ambiguity in framing such contested topics 
to obscure the differences among Kurdish groups and, hence, to forge an encompassing 
coalition. Yet, the ambiguity kept in the party programs was not enough to avoid conflicts 
with local business actors; hence, the instability of coalitions.  
The Kurdish movement employed other strategies to counter the AKP’s efforts to disarticulate 
Kurds from its social base. First, against the government’s appeals to religion and depiction of 
the movement supporters as ‘perverse,’ the movement actors also used religious themes, 
showing pious politicians as candidates in elections, mobilizing ‘patriotic imams’ against the 
state-controlled mosques, and so on. Second, against the poverty-alleviation activities by the 
government circles, the movement engaged in alternative forms of charity at the local level, 
bringing together organized and individual Kurdish actors on the basis of ethnic solidarity. 
These counter-initiatives help stabilize the group boundaries by undermining the strategic 
options of the rival actor (cf. Wimmer 2008). On the other hand, those Kurds who appeared in 
cooperation with the AKP government were at times labeled as ‘collaborators’ in a fashion of 
intimidation.  
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The dual power situation in the Kurdish region also helps the goal of integrating Kurds under 
the leadership of the Kurdish movement. The movement’s claim to power in the region led to 
the creation of alternative institutions and sources of legitimacy, concerning state-like 
functions such as justice, fiscal policy, social provision, inter alia. In recent years, the 
movement actors and civil society organizations were to be subjected to disabling 
investigations for related allegations, leading to the detention of thousands of people. In 
addition to these claims to power, there is also a moral economy which provides an 
integrative framework. The moral economy is based on ‘patriotism’ and political ‘sacrifice’ as 
sources of legitimacy. It promotes certain conceptions of mutual rights and obligations, which 
may influence and outweigh calculations of interests. This normative order provides bonds for 
intragroup solidarity, as well as norms of conduct between the movement leaders and the 
locals; i.e. an alternative model of political integration. However, it has become more 
contested as a result of economic and political changes in the last decade, as also can be 
observed in associational politics.  
Opening up of the space for interest associations 
Kurdish interest associations in Diyarbakır have arisen as a third actor in this contestation of 
dual power. A number of factors opened up the space for them to play such a politically 
salient role. First of all, the European Union played a significant role as an external actor. By 
the early 2000s, EU delegates, as well as others, made visits to Diyarbakır and held meetings 
with representatives from interest associations, inter alia, to have information about the 
situation of the Kurdish region. The meetings in turn influenced the EU progress reports and 
pressures on the Turkish governments to democratize its political institutions as well as to 
solve the Kurdish issue. The Prime Minister Erdoğan initially criticized this connection 
between the EU and Kurdish civil society; however, he too began to take these associations 
into account following his first visit to Diyarbakır in 2005. 
The EU’s attention to Kurdish associations probably stems from a liberal normative 
understanding of civil society as a pillar of plural democracy. In fact, civil society 
organizations across the country benefited a lot from the EU accession process. However, the 
recent process shows that the AKP government began to pay attention to these associations 
for a different reason: to introduce a new actor to the game to undermine the power of the 
political rival. Kurdish interest associations would be an alternative to the Kurdish movement, 
as a civil society with its liberal connotations of being ‘democratic’ and ‘moderate.’ Indeed, 
such properties also were claimed by interest associations throughout their activism. Thereby, 
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the associations would help the AKP re-define the lines of cleavage, delegitimize the Kurdish 
movement, and mobilize ‘good Kurds’ to be articulated to its constituency. Such a need to 
manage the Kurdish issue was on the rise because of the re-start of clashes with the PKK 
since 2004 and the new regional dynamics in the Middle East in the aftermath of the 2003 
US-led war on Iraq, as well as domestic politics. 
Why interest associations, especially the corporatist ones? I think one factor is that the 
significance of corporatist associations in general has increased in the AKP period. 
Corporatist associations represent important political traditions and may serve as a good basis 
of political mobilization. They are some of the few organizations with the oldest and 
uninterrupted institutional histories and large memberships, linking the local and the national 
levels. Using different strategies, the AKP tried to penetrate to these associations in its quest 
for hegemony; yet, as it did not always succeed, it also started planning (or threatening) to 
reform the corporatist environment into a pluralist one. Against this background, Kurdish 
interest associations had an advantage over other types of associations thanks to their 
corporatist structure. This structure provides them with a larger and heterogeneous 
membership, greater capacity and more credibility because of organizational properties such 
as compulsory membership, representational monopoly, internal elections, membership to 
hierarchical national bodies, and public status; hence, ideal mechanisms for the political 
integration of society. In addition, the associations’ relevance to the definition of the Kurdish 
issue also puts them in a strategic position; for instance, the Bar relates to the legal dimension 
and the Chamber relates to the economic dimension of the Kurdish issue. 
The AKP government, its leaders and bureaucrats interacted with the associations in diverse 
ways: they held meetings with representatives of the associations; provided the associations 
with access to new resources for themselves and for their members; used the party networks at 
local to influence the internal elections of the associations and indirectly supported particular 
candidates for leadership; and provided opportunities for political career. These, of course, 
showed a variety among the associations, contributing to different patterns of political 
interaction between the actors. The Kurdish movement too gradually began to take the 
associations into account and try to articulate them to its political project despite having a 
discontent with some of their activities. In a similar fashion, the movement actors held 
meetings with representatives of the associations especially via local platforms for civil 
society organizations; used the movement’s network to influence the internal elections of the 
associations and indirectly supported particular candidates for leadership. Both political actors 
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at times harshly criticized associational leaders for some of the positions they took. 
Considering the wider political environment, these may be thought as intimidation, forming 
an important component of the constraints associational leaders were faced with. In between 
the dual power contestation and political instability, associational activities showed a great 
diversity. 
8.2 Associational role in formation of social divisions and coalitions 
In the 1990s, some of the Kurdish interest associations were already engaging in activities to 
draw public attention to human rights violations under the Emergency Rule. However, in the 
next decade, especially after 2005, political activities increased in amount, enlarged in scope 
and achieved great public visibility, while some associations who were not politically very 
active before, such as the Chamber and the voluntary business associations, joined the front 
too. Associations had cooperation and conflicts in their interaction with each other and with 
the political actors in this transitional period up to 2012. Let’s examine the patterns of 
political interaction, focusing on the processes of coalition formation with regard to its scope 
and basis. 
United by collective identity politics  
The associations could come together in their joint activities and through their individual 
undertakings, forming encompassing coalitions on a variety of bases. Most of these activities 
consisted of press statements and negotiations with the political actors, while concerns about 
the conflict situation provided the common ground: associational actors called for an end to 
the armed clashes; tried to moderate the dual power contestation and political tensions; and 
pressed for a solution to the Kurdish issue through democratization. These were in harmony 
with the initial rise of the associations as supported by the AKP government to include them 
as a third actor. Despite forming an encompassing coalition within the group, these activities 
helped the AKP and the mainstream media in their efforts for a categorization of Kurds into 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ ones. It is because the associations were depicted as a Kurdish ‘civil 
society,’ as an alternative to the Kurdish movement, supporting democratic means of political 
struggle as opposed to violent means. Associational leaders, especially business leaders, made 
claims about such a distinction as well. This contributed to their legitimacy at the national 
level, as well as to their strategic capacity. 
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However, the associations also increasingly acted in coordination to make pro-Kurdish rights 
claims in their proposals for a solution to the Kurdish issue. The minimum common demands 
– such as the right to education in mother language, constitutional safeguards for the 
recognition of the Kurdish identity, and strengthening of local governments – provided the 
basis for this coalition. As mentioned above, the Kurdish movement played an important role 
in articulating these common demands, by highlighting the ethnic collective identity and 
keeping some ambiguity about the content of some demands to obscure the differences in 
ideas and interests among Kurdish actors. 
The associations also articulated pro-Kurdish rights claims, especially concerning the 
language, with their activities for interest representation and associational responsibility. For 
instance, the Medical Association advocated the provision of healthcare services in Kurdish 
language and undertook supportive initiatives toward physicians. The Bar Association 
advocated the demand for defense in Kurdish language, as articulated by the detained 
members of the Kurdish movement, and resisted the requests by courts for its appointment of 
lawyers when the demand was repeatedly rejected and the right to fair trial was violated. The 
labor unions included clauses in their collective agreements with the municipal governments 
on the provision of services for employees in Kurdish language. It appears like it was only the 
Chamber, as well as the voluntary business associations, who did not articulate linguistic 
demands in their associational site; however, business actors saw it as a strategy for pursuing 
economic opportunities: they emphasized how Kurdish businesspeople could play an 
intermediary role between the Turkish economic actors and the market in the Kurdistan region 
of northern Iraq thanks to their ethnic and linguistic commonalities with Iraqi Kurds. 
The Kurdish movement brought the associations together for charity activities in a form of 
intragroup solidarity. The major example for this is the Sarmaşık Association. Sarmaşık was 
founded by the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality as an alternative to the AKP’s 
activities; however, it was closed down because of pressures from the center. It was later re-
founded on the basis of a founding platform of associations, municipal actors and local public 
figures, including the then leaders of the associations under scrutiny. Such an encompassing 
platform increases its legitimacy against the political threats at the Kurdish movement. Its 
financing method and target group (mostly the survivors of the armed conflict) give it an 
appearance of national redistribution and can be thought as a part of the moral economy 
which provides an integrative normative framework. In addition to individual donors, the 
associations gave donations to Sarmaşık. Also, recent collective agreements signed between 
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the labor unions and the municipal governments include clauses on monthly donation from 
employees. 
As the associations acted in cooperation for common concerns and demands, their activities 
contributed to the political salience of ethnic collective identity as a basis of social division 
and political coalition. This was not exactly the goal of the AKP government in supporting 
these associations at the first place. The associational activism added to the pressures to enact 
reforms with regard to pro-Kurdish demands. The recent legislative arrangements to allow 
defense in Kurdish language in courts is one example. In this respect, the Kurdish movement 
played an important role in the re-definition of demands and grievances and in the articulation 
of Kurdish interest groups along these lines. Yet, the movement was not all successful either. 
Divided and/or united by interest politics 
The associational leaders also held conflicting views on a number of significant political 
events, leading to the formation of narrow coalitions on an ad hoc basis and shifts in political 
alignment. These pointed at a polarization among associations vis-à-vis the dual power 
contestation. One bloc was led by the business leaders (sometimes including also the Bar) in a 
fashion supportive of the AKP government and opposition to the Kurdish movement. This 
one attracted most of the attention by the mainstream media and political actors. There was 
also an alternative bloc led by the labor unions and the Medical Association. It was supportive 
of the Kurdish movement and oppositional to the AKP government; however, it did not 
achieve visibility in the mainstream media, nor could draw the attention of rival political 
actors. 
The increasing visibility of the business leaders was accompanied by a depiction of another 
line of division for Kurds: an ‘emerging bourgeoisie,’ who favored ‘democratic channels’ 
over ‘violence.’ Both press statements by the business leaders and the coverage by the 
mainstream media contributed to such a categorization effort. This depiction was seen 
especially during the 2010 referendum. The referendum on the constitutional amendments 
carried out by the AKP was a highly polarizing issue for the country; some claiming it as a 
step further toward democratization and others as a step backward, helping the government 
consolidate its power. The Kurdish movement, on the other hand, called for boycotting the 
referendum because it did not take into account Kurdish demands for a new constitution 
which would enable a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue. Against this background, the 
Chamber’s leader and other business leaders publicly expressed their support in favor of the 
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referendum. Later, the Bar’s leader also declared his support. The leaders explained their 
decision with a reference to the referendum’s potential for the democratization of the country. 
However, one should consider this decision in relation with the political environment at the 
time, as the AKP put intense pressures on organized interest groups around the country to 
publicly support the referendum. Hence, the decision seems to be more of a strategic one, 
increasing the power of the leaders, despite the reaction by the Kurdish movement. 
The relations between the business groups and the government also have an economic 
background, as outlined in the previous section. In addition to the supportive state policies, 
the local economy has quite improved in the recent decade, further integrating with the 
national and, to a degree, international markets. Against this background, the conflict of views 
between the business leaders and the Kurdish movement became more pronounced as seen in 
their debates on the economic dimension of the decentralization proposal by the movement 
under the name of ‘democratic autonomy.’ The proposal supports a model critical of the 
markets, advocating a mixed economy with the introduction of cooperatives. The business 
leaders firmly opposed this proposal and support instead a pro-market model of economic 
decentralization similar to the relevant state restructuring initiatives by the AKP government. 
As mentioned before, the pro-Kurdish parties kept ambiguity in the party programs with 
regard to the proposal’s economic dimension; nevertheless, these clashes appeared around the 
same period with the referendum. The differences in ideas and interests seem to be an 
important reason for the tensions between the two sides, as also seen in business actors’ 
resistance to be bound by the moral economy with its aspects overriding calculations of 
interest. 
The alternative bloc led by the unions and the Medical Association, on the other hand, 
publicly expressed support for the Kurdish movement’s boycott call for the 2010 referendum. 
They also supported the candidates of the pro-Kurdish parties in local and national elections. 
In addition, they advocated the proposal of democratic autonomy in general. As the empirical 
analysis shows, there are many factors contributing to this alignment, ranging from dynamics 
in the membership environment to associations’ political traditions and leadership structures. 
Yet, the roles played by the dual power contestation have significant effects: the rights claims, 
concerns, and proposals as articulated by the Kurdish movement helped delineate this division 
among the associations. Furthermore, the AKP government pursued some policies and 
supported judicial investigations which led to disadvantage and political repression for these 
associations and their membership. This was not the case with the business associations, 
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which were favored in various ways. It became an issue with the Bar mainly when judicial 
investigations targeted lawyers as well. In this regard, the AKP played a significant role in the 
division of associations. 
The relations between the local associations and their respective peak associations also 
deserve attention in relation with the question of political integration. While the historical 
traditions of associations may help the two levels converge on political positions, the 
peculiarity of the conditions of the Kurdish region and specifically of Diyarbakır as a 
contested zone leads to different lines of cleavages gain political salience. The national 
environment of interest associations is very fragmented including both compulsory and 
voluntary associations. Political polarization in the country had its manifestations in this 
environment as well. Associations roughly divide between pro-government and anti-
government positions. However, there are divisions among themselves as well. For instance, 
the Union of Bar Associations was ruled by secularist nationalists until recent times. The 
Union had tensions with not only the government, but also the Diyarbakır Bar because of its 
secularist and nationalist approaches, respectively. Yet, the Union’s leadership was recently 
undertaken by a liberal person. And the pressures increased on the Diyarbakır Bar and 
Kurdish lawyers in an unlawful manner, parallel to the judicial investigations targeting the 
opponents of the government. These led to cooperation between the Diyarbakır Bar and the 
Union of Bar Associations – and even the Istanbul Bar, which has been ruled by secularist 
nationalists – on the basis of professional solidarity and concerns about the rule of law. In this 
respect, the rising activism by the Kurdish interest associations had an integrative effect 
across the groups. 
Cooperative relations have been more common among other associations. The Chamber had 
very good relations with the peak association TOBB, as its leaders occupied important 
positions at central bodies and played a special role when TOBB held meetings with Iraqi 
Kurdish actors. Both actors pursued a balanced strategy when it came to the AKP 
government. Yet, as the Chamber had to take into account the local dynamics and the dual 
power contestation, it was more active concerning the Kurdish issue and more enthusiastic in 
supporting the AKP government on the 2010 referendum, whereas the TOBB was somewhat 
forced to support the referendum. The Medical Association also had very cooperative 
relations with the peak association TTB. The latter has been ruled by pro-Kurdish left-leaning 
groups and incorporated delegates from Diyarbakır into its central executive bodies, engaging 
in collaborative activities. Both actors opposed the AKP government’s policies regarding 
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healthcare and working conditions of physicians, while advocating demands such as the 
provision of healthcare services in Kurdish language. It has been quite the same with the labor 
unions: the Diyarbakır affiliates of the KESK and the DİSK, which are both left-leaning and 
pro-Kurdish while at odds with the government, had cooperative relations with the peak 
associations. It is only the local affiliate of the TÜRK-İŞ, which has not been at harmony with 
the peak association as it is center-right leaning. However, even then it seems like the peak 
association allows local diversion in case it wants to get organized in that locality. And this 
has been the case in Diyarbakır. 
Cooperative relations between local and peak associations are conducive to the political 
integration of different ethnic groups. However, this does not necessarily take a form the AKP 
government would be looking forward to, as these two levels might unite in their opposition 
to the government. And this has been the case with some of them. This is why the AKP 
government has developed some reform proposals in recent years to enable influencing the 
internal elections of corporatist associations and, alternatively, to turn the corporatist 
organizational structures into pluralist ones so that it can undermine their power which comes 
by being united. It seems like the quest for hegemony requires integrative and disintegrative 
forces simultaneously. 
Diverse compromises and future prospects 
The relations of the professional associations with the political actors have been relatively 
indirect and fewer exchanges were involved. Yet, it has been different for the business 
associations and the labor unions. These associations negotiated diverse compromises with 
the political actors as regards their (including the memberships) interests, ideals, and status. 
On the one hand, business leaders usually pursued a balanced approach, strategically 
manipulating the dual power situation despite the constraints it presented: they took part in 
shifting flexible coalitions and cooperated with each political power in projects ranging from 
political to socio-economic and cultural issues. They changed their approach to the Kurdish 
movement, increasing their collaboration and publicly voicing pro-Kurdish common 
demands. The Kurdish movement, on the other hand, started taking into account these 
associations more seriously and loosening the moral-economy obligations for economic actors 
(at least at the municipal level). Hence, they reached a kind of compromise. Also considering 
their usually positive interaction with the AKP government, business leaders could turn the 
situation into an advantage and increased their bargaining power, becoming a leading Kurdish 
civil society actor.  
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The labor unions, on the other hand, found themselves in a different situation though. They 
had to consider a number of constraints: the state-induced pressures on the municipal 
governments and employees; structural processes concerning the local economy, poverty, and 
the labor force; and the existence of a moral economy which emphasizes group solidarity over 
economic interests. As a result, the unions and the municipal governments reached a 
compromise in collective bargaining: they had conflicting views about wage increase and 
work time, but these were usually decided to the advantage of the municipal governments. On 
the other hand, new political and cultural-linguistic entitlements were introduced for union 
members. As these entitlements are in line with the Kurdish movement’s political project, 
they are less of a concession, though. In the end, the compromise help reduce the salience of 
economic interests as a basis of social division and underlines, instead, collective identity 
politics. Considering also the AKP government’s approach to these unions and the 
environment of unionism in general, the labor unions ended up relatively disadvantaged in the 
process, faced with a decline in their bargaining power and less visibility in the rising Kurdish 
civil society at a national level. 
As this dissertation was being written, the AKP government and the PKK have been 
negotiating a peace deal, ending the three-decades of armed conflict. Hence, none of the 
actors could succeed in struggles for hegemony against each other. The ongoing process lacks 
transparency and is characterized with uncertainty; however, we can say that a solution to the 
Kurdish issue will not simply bring an end to the contestation of the state, but it also can 
change the nature of the state profoundly – the hopes are for a democratic change. In his work 
on organized interests in transitional contexts, Schmitter argues that interest associations, as 
one partial regime for the political representation of social groups, do not play a major role in 
determining whether democracy will succeed an authoritarian rule. Rather, ‘their (delayed) 
impact will be significant in determining what type of democracy will eventually be 
consolidated’ (Schmitter 1992: 433). In this respect, the rise of Kurdish associational activism 
and the introduction of such an important center to the associational map of political 
representation in Turkey have a great significance. Yet, it seems important also how the 
empowerment and disempowerment of different social groups in the transitional period may 
influence the ways certain conceptions of interests and collective identities are stabilized as 
the main lines of social division and sources of political integration in the upcoming process. 
This would be influential on the type of democracy a peace deal consolidates.   
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2003  ‘YÖK ve Öğrenciler’ [YÖK –Higher Education Council– and Students], Radikal 2, 
October 5.   
Interviews 
2009  Interviewed. ‘Kadınların Sosyal Hakları’ [Women’s Social Rights], BÜ’de Kadın 
Gündemi, 16, Spring, 23-29.   
Book Reviews 
2004  Review of Porto Alegre: Farklı Bir Demokrasi Umudu [Porto Alegre: Hope for a 
Different Democracy] by Marion Gret and Yves Sintomer. In Varlık, July, 24.   
Selected Translations 
2009  Ayşe Buğra/Kaan Ağartan (eds). 21. Yüzyılda Karl Polanyi'yi Okumak: Bir Siyasi 
Proje Olarak Piyasa Ekonomisi [Reading Karl Polanyi for the Twenty-First Century: 
Market Economy as Political Project. New York: Palgrave, 2007]. Istanbul: İletişim.  
2004  Marion Gret/Yves Sintomer. Porto Alegre: Farklı Bir Demokrasi Umudu [Porto 
Alegre: Hope for a Different Democracy. Paris: La Découverte, 2002]. Istanbul: 
Ithaki.   
 
Presentations 
 
2012 Presentation. ‘Ethnicity, Class, and Politics: Kurdish Interest Associations in Dual-
Power Contestation’. 7th Max Planck Summer Conference on Economy and Society: 
Politics, Power, and Institutions. Northwestern University, July 1-3, Chicago.  
2008 Invited presentation. ‘Women and Citizenship in the Context of Social Security 
Reform’. Conference on Gender Studies in Turkey: Inequalities, Struggles, and 
Advances, Koç University, November 29-30, Istanbul.  
2008 Invited lecture. ‘Gender and Social Policy in Turkey’. 13th Fall School for Public 
  
IV 
 
Health: Social Policy, Turkish Union of Medical Associations, October 11-14, Izmir.  
2008 Invited presentation. ‘Gender, Family and Children at the Crossroads of Social 
Policy Reform in Turkey: Alternating between Familialism and Individualization’. 
International Workshop: Children, Gender and Families in Mediterranean Welfare 
States, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, June 1-3, Jerusalem.  
2007 Presentation. ‘Gender and Social Policy in Turkey: Towards Equal Citizenship?’ 
Second International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, University of 
Granada, July 10-13, Granada.   
 
Additional Training 
 
2010 Barcelona Summer School in International Politics (‘Explaining Ethno-Nationalist 
Civil Wars’), Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, July 5-9, Spain. 
 
2010 ECPR Summer School in Methods and Techniques, University of Ljubljana, July 
30–August 14, Slovenia. 
  
 
IT Skills 
 
MS Office, Endnote, Atlas.ti (basic), Macromedia Dreamweaver & Fireworks (basic).   
 
Languages 
 
Turkish (native), English (advanced), German (basic), Azeri (family exposure-passive).    
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